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ABSTRACT  
   
It is now fashionable to seek innovation in the public sector. As routine 
government practices have failed to solve complex policy problems, innovation is 
increasingly seen as the key to establishing public faith in government agencies' ability to 
perform. However, not surprisingly, governments have often failed to support and 
maintain innovation over time.  
The purpose of this study is to examine what accounts for sustained innovation in 
government transparency. This is an in-depth analysis of the diffusion of the Electronic 
Freedom of Information Act (EFOIA) across the US states from 1996 to 2013. With the 
theoretical basis of policy diffusion, this study measures the degree of innovation among 
states by the timing of adoption, and by the extent of implementation. The factors that 
influence states' adoption and implementation of EFOIA will be compared, thereby 
explaining why some early adopters failed to maintain the leader position in innovation in 
government transparency through the implementation phase. The study findings show 
that the failure of early adopters in sustained innovation is the result of the conditional 
nature of diffusion mechanisms (i.e. socialization and learning) which operate differently 
at the adoption and implementation stages of EFOIA. This study contributes to a better 
understanding of the role of the legal environment created by the federal government, and 
the relationships between state governments in sustaining innovation in government 
transparency. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
There is nothing more difficult to plan, more doubtful of success,  
nor more dangerous to manage than the creation of a new order of things 
Niccolo Marchiavelli, The Prince (1513) 
 
Background 
  Over the past few decades, it has become fashionable to seek innovation in the 
public sector. As routine government practices have failed to solve complex policy 
problems, innovation is increasingly seen as the key to establishing public faith in the 
ability of government agencies to perform. However, not surprisingly, the governments 
have often failed to support and maintain innovation over time. 
 The purpose of this study is to examine who maintains the leader position in 
innovation in government transparency. To identify the factors influencing sustained 
innovation, this study employs theory of policy diffusion. The diffusion literature has paid 
great attention to the way in which a new policy spreads from one government to another, 
providing numerous insights into "interdependence" among governments in policy 
adoption. This diffusion approach tends to measure the degree of innovation between 
states by the timing of adoption (Walker, 1969; Gray, 1973; Berry & Berry, 1990).  
 In recent years, however, diffusion scholars have emphasized the importance of 
studying diffusion at the implementation stage of a policy. This new approach to 
diffusion examines whether adopters continue to keep pace with state-of-the art 
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developments in the field over time, focusing on the scope of implementation (Tolbert, 
Mossberger, & McNeal, 2008). Indeed, policies are reinvented or evolve through their 
implementation. Thus, investigating the implementation stage of a policy can provide a 
more accurate portrayal of how policies spread from one government to another (Graham, 
Shipan, & Volden, 2012). 
 Employing both of perspectives on diffusion, this study investigates the 
differences in diffusion between adoption and implementation to explain why not every 
early leader in adoption maintains the leader position in innovation over time. This is an 
in-depth analysis of the diffusion of the Electronic Freedom of Information Act (EFOIA) 
across the US states from 1996 to 2013. This policy area is an appropriate case for this 
study because there are distinct differences in diffusion between states' adoption and 
implementation of EFOIA; some early adopters have failed to achieve satisfactory 
performance or extensive use of EFOIA in implementation, thereby limiting it to a 
symbolic policy. Comparing the differences in diffusion between two stages of EFOIA 
may deepen the understanding of innovation in an area of transparency policy.  
 In addition, this study will demonstrate that such differences in diffusion between 
states' adoption and implementation of EFOIA result from the conditional nature of 
diffusion mechanisms operating differently at two stages; one diffusion mechanism may 
influence states' adoption of EFOIA, but its influence may fade in the states' 
implementation of EFOIA. To identify the appropriate mechanisms associated with the 
diffusion of EFOIA, this study will use the constructivist and the rationalist perspectives 
on policy diffusion. Those theoretical points of view suggest two potential mechanisms 
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through which the diffusion of EFOIA takes place: socialization and policy learning. 
Therefore, this study will examine the nature of socialization and policy learning that is 
conditional on the stages of the adoption and implementation of EFOIA.  
Research Questions  
 With state-years as the unit of analysis, this study will identify the factors 
influencing sustained innovation in government transparency. This study will begin with 
a review of the diffusion of EFOIA in the adoption and implementation stages, and 
describe differences in the diffusion patterns of EFOIA in the two stages. This study will 
then test possible theories of why some states adopted EFOIA before or with greater 
success than others. Those sub-questions are based on the assumption that states do not 
respond uniformly to the diffusion of EFOIA. Finally, this study will compare the 
determinants between states' adoption and implementation of EFOIA, thereby finding the 
clues to how differently diffusion mechanisms operate at two stages of EFOIA.  
 To sum up, the research questions explored by this study are as follows: 
  "What accounts for sustained innovation in government transparency?" 
    Sub-question 1: Why did some states adopt EFOIA earlier than others? 
          Sub-question 2: Why have some states implemented EFOIA more  
      successfully than others? 
    Sub-question 3: Why have some early adopters failed to implement EFOIA 
      successfully? 
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Significance of the Study 
 This study makes several contributions to the scholarly research to practice.  
 First, the study findings will contribute to a better understanding of the role of 
the legal environment created by the federal government, and the relationships between 
state governments in sustained innovation in government transparency. 
 Second, this study will shed light on the conditional nature of diffusion 
mechanisms in different stages of the policy process. Some scholars have investigated the 
conditional nature of diffusion mechanisms by relying either on the endogenous aspects 
of jurisdictions (Shipan & Volden, 2008), or on the sub-phases of policy adoption 
consisting of pre-adoption (i.e. the agenda-setting and proposal formulation), and 
adoption (Cohen-Vogel & Ingle, 2007; Damanpour & Schneider
1
, 2006). Yet, little is 
known about the conditional nature of diffusion mechanisms depending on the policy 
process that consists of adoption and implementation. Therefore, this study will be the 
first to examine the different responses of diffusion mechanisms to the adoption and 
implementation phases of the policy process. 
 Third, this study will extend the policy diffusion literature beyond policy 
adoptions by including the analysis for states' implementation, providing a rich case study 
of EFOIA. Almost all policy diffusion studies to date have been limited to the adoption 
                                           
1
 It is difficult to see that Damanpour and Schneider (2006) appropriately analyzed the 
implementation phase of a policy because they defined implementation simply as the degree of 
the employment of a program by using dummy variables ( not implemented, 0; sometimes 
implemented, 1; always implemented). According to the communications model of 
intergovernmental policy implementation, implementation is conceptualized as a process, 
meaning that implementation involves a number of activities related to carrying out the intent of 
the law (Goggin et al., 1990). In this point of view, if implementation is described dichotomously, 
as Damanpour and Schneider did , one could not say that implementation has occurred. 
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stage in which decision-making units determine the adoption or rejection of a policy 
(Karch, 2007; Moynihan, Shipan, & Volden, 2012). However, policy processes do not 
end at adoption, but rather evolve in the course of their implementation (Moynihan, 
Shipan, & Volden, 2012). Moreover, simply discussing dichotomous choices of states 
concerning policy initiation prevents diffusion theory from serving to evaluate outputs or 
outcomes the states have produced (Goggin et al., 1990). Thus, this study can help 
scholars and practitioners understand why some states have limited themselves to a 
symbolic policy when there has not been extensive use of the policy by their members, 
thereby offering a larger picture of policy diffusion (Damanpour, 1987; Graham, Shipan, 
& Volden, 2012).  
 Fourth, this study will empirically investigate norm diffusion across the United 
States. Despite early suggestions by Walker (1969) that socialization processes could be 
of great importance in policy diffusion, most diffusion researchers have set aside key 
points about the diffusion of norms across governments (Graham et al., 2012). Although 
the literature in international relations and comparative politics has examined the role of 
norms in the reinvention or evolution of international politics, it was based mostly on 
case study research (Goodman & Jinks, 2005). Therefore, this study can empirically 
clarify how policy diffusion takes place through socialization processes.  
 Finally, this study returns transparency debates to the policy diffusion literature. 
Many studies have examined the influences of government transparency on trust, 
corruption, or economic consequences. Applying the diffusion approach to an area of 
transparency policy can be useful in conducting a comparative study that can be a lens for 
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understanding jurisdictional differences in adopting and implementing a policy. Thus, 
this study will be the first step towards an empirical understanding of the diffusion of a 
transparency policy in the states of the US. 
Outline of the Study 
 This dissertation consists of six chapters. The first chapter introduces the 
background, goals and significance of the study, and research strategy.  
 The second chapter will provide an overview of EFOIA, and then describe how 
EFOIA spread across the US states in the adoption and implementation stages. This 
chapter also describes characteristics of diffusion in the adoption and implementation 
stages of EFOIA, and identifies the differences in diffusion patterns in the two stages.  
 The third chapter explores the previous literature that has conceptualized policy 
diffusion, and suggested various diffusion mechanisms. In addition, this chapter reviews 
the theoretical logic that can explain why some states are leaders in adopting or 
implementing EFOIA, and why some early adopters failed to maintain the leader position 
in innovation through the implementation phase. Moreover, this chapter presents the 
conceptual framework and develops hypotheses for answering the research questions. 
 The fourth chapter presents the research design and methodology used to answer 
the research questions. Specifically, this chapter includes detailed descriptions of the 
sources of data, instruments for measuring dependent, independent and control variables, 
grouping strategy, and statistical techniques for data analysis. 
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 The fifth chapter presents the results of data analysis for answering the research 
questions as well as the statistical findings. These results and findings will generate 
insight into the factors that enable state governments to maintain the leader position in 
innovation.  
 The final chapter summarizes the empirical findings, and then discusses the  
implications of the findings, contributions, and limitations. This discussion will be 
associated with the states' legal environment, their relationship with other states, and what 
role the federal and state governments should play in sustaining the innovation. This 
chapter concludes with suggestions for future research.   
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CHAPTER 2 
DIFFUSION OF EFOIA IN THE US STATES 
 This chapter introduces the Electronic Freedom of Information Act (EFOIA) of 
1996. Next, it describes the diffusion of EFOIA in the adoption and implementation 
stages. This chapter concludes with a discussion of the characteristics of diffusion in the 
adoption and implementation stages of EFOIA, and the differences between them. 
The Electronic Freedom of Information Act  
 The past several decades have brought greater attention than ever to the 
importance of government transparency. The emphasis on enhancing public access to 
government information has to do with the rhetoric of citizen sovereignty, and the need 
for citizens’ informed oversight of governmental activities (Doty, 2000). According to 
the principle of democracy, the actions of government bodies must be traced back to be 
held accountable to the public because these bodies are legitimated only indirectly; they 
are not directly elected (Liem, 2007). Furthermore, increased skepticism about the 
government’s working has put substantial pressure on the government to open its 
activities to public scrutiny, highlighting citizens’ responsibility to challenge the 
government’s operations (Relyea, 1987; Doty, 2000).  
 Passage of the Electronic Freedom of Information Act (EFOIA) in 1996 was an 
important first step by Congress to increase government transparency, in response to the 
information and electronic age. Indeed, as early as 1976, public agencies began refusing 
requests for electronic information by arguing that FOIA did not mandate the agencies to 
disclose government information in digital formats. Agencies insisted that government 
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costs would soar as a result of requesters' demands for information in electronic versions, 
and that the agencies should not bear the burden of the costs (Halstuk, 2008). Although 
some courts held that electronic data may be subject to FOIA, they also ruled that 
government bodies were not obligated to provide members of the public with public 
records electronically (Halstuk, 2008). Thus, policies regarding public access to 
electronic data were decided on a case-by-case basis. 
 In 1996, President Clinton signed the EFOIA into law, after five years of 
congressional hearings
2
, floor debates, and compromises (Halstuk & Chamberlin, 2001). 
In the 1996 EFOIA statement, President Clinton emphasized that open access to 
government information is crucial in preserving and fostering democracy. The EFOIA 
amendment of 1996 established a legal basis for the public’s online access to government 
information, by updating FOIA that did not ensure the provision of computerized 
materials. Much of the discourse surrounding the EFOIA assumed that the incorporation 
of digital technologies would enhance government accountability by enabling a greater 
and immediate public access to government information (Oltmann, Rosenbaum, & Hara, 
2006).  
 The EFOIA required government agencies to provide public access to 
information in an electronic format, and post on the Internet (i.e. electronic reading room) 
commonly requested information about government operation, such as statements of 
                                           
2
 In 1985, Congress held its first hearings on collecting public records in an electronic form and 
its dissemination by the federal agencies. The resulting House Report warned that agency control 
over electronic information was tantamount to a government information monopoly (Halstuk, 
2008).  
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agency rules and policy, agency annual reports, and FOIA handbooks
3
. Furthermore, the 
EFOIA supplemented the definitions of “governmental record” and "public body" 
(U.S.C.§552(f)(2)) to include all information produced and maintained by a public body, 
regardless of physical form or characteristics by which the information is stored, recorded, 
or reproduced. In addition, the EFOIA encouraged government agencies to exert all 
reasonable efforts to make public records available to requesters in the medium requested 
(U.S.C.§552(a)(3)). 
 Since the EFOIA amendment by the federal government in 1996, almost all state 
governments
4
 have followed the federal model along with the expressed purpose of 
providing parity with the federal movement toward government transparency (Open 
Government Guide
5
, 2011). At present, each of the 50 states has a governmental 
transparency website to create the environment in which citizens can access government 
data and government can deliver services 24 hours a day via the Internet. 
 The diffusion of this type of innovation is unique in that it is irrelevant to 
diffusion mechanisms frequently employed in the previous literature to explain policy 
diffusion; the diffusion of EFOIA is not associated with economic competition between 
states over tax revenue, or federal mandates (or incentives such as federal grants) to 
coerce states to take actions in compliance with federal policy preferences. Furthermore, 
                                           
3
 Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments § 5.   
4
 Before the federal EFOIA of 1996, West Virginia (1992), Indiana (1993), Kentucky (1994), and 
Texas (1995) already had their own law on electronic records to guarantee that the public would 
have access to public records of government bodies at all levels. A fundamental philosophy of the 
state law on electronic records is that the ultimate goals of agency responsibility and popular 
control of government are best-served by maximum public access to governmental records 
regardless of the type of data (Open Government Guide, 2011). 
5
 Retrieved from http://www.rcfp.org/open-government-guide 
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the movement toward increasing public access to government information has shown 
different patterns across the states, depending on two stages of EFOIA; adoption and 
implementation.  
US States' Adoption of EFOIA 
 Since the 1996 EFOIA amendment by the federal government, states have 
responded in different ways to the federal move toward increasing transparency. In terms 
of timing, some states adopted EFOIA earlier than others. In addition, the state statutes 
were designed differently in response to their political climate, although the basic format 
was similar to the federal model.  
 Subsequent to the enactment of the federal EFOIA of 1996, in the same year, 
several states supplemented their FOIA by adding legal statements on public access to 
government information through a digital form. The Colorado General Assembly enacted 
legislation requiring public agencies to keep public records only in miniaturized or digital 
form. Furthermore, Colorado's Open Records Act declared that it is necessary for state 
agencies to assist the public in locating any record sought by providing portable disk 
copies of computer files or direct electronic access via online bulletin boards. Similarly, 
Maryland’s Public Information Act contained the legislative statements that state 
agencies need to prepare electronic images of public records to enable all persons to have 
access to information about the affairs of government. As a practical matter, the 
electronic imaging of government documents by state agencies has made it significantly 
easier for public records to be accessed through agency websites.  
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 Mississippi has updated its public records law for the electronic age. The 
Mississippi Public Records Act offers members of the public the right to request public 
records in digital formats: records must be electronically maintained and available for 
inspection by the public. According to this mandate, state agencies were forbidden to 
contracts for information services in the absence of public access to the information 
provided by those services.  
 In a similar vein, Vermont recognized as a matter of common law that the public 
has a fundamental right to inspect the public records of any government body. Vermont's 
1996 amendment to the statute, for the first time, granted state agencies the authority to 
recover costs and fees for offering information; state agencies might charge the actual 
cost associated with providing the copy, including the costs of mailing or transmitting the 
record electronically. In North Carolina, no official legislative organ was associated with 
public access to government information. However, the state court confirmed that public 
records cover all materials that government agencies made or collected at their discretion 
in conducting government business, and had to be made available for public inspection. 
 Meanwhile, in Nebraska, online access by the public to government information 
was a matter of hot debate for several years. In 1995, the State Library Commission 
contracted with a private entity to access to electronic records without legislative 
approval, angering many senators during the 1996 legislative session. Yet, as a result of 
this move, a bill was passed that established a committee charged with studying the topic 
of public access to government information in a digital format.  
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 In 1997, Alabama, Florida, and Delaware continued to follow the federal model  
of EFOIA. The Alabama trial court recognized that computers added a great amount of 
value to the creation of public records, and ensured public access to the records. By 
quoting with approval an Ohio Supreme Court opinion, the trial court confirmed that the 
public should not be required to expend massive amounts of time and resources to access 
information which public officials had already created. In Florida, public records should 
be also provided where they are easily with available to the agency and could have been 
released with a minimum of expense or time. In addition, the agencies in Florida had the 
discretion
6
 to furnish electronic records in a format other than the format routinely 
employed by the agency. 
 At the same time, the Delaware Freedom of Information Act did not specify 
online access to public records, only defining public records that would include all 
information regardless of the physical form or characteristics. In Delaware, government 
bodies are responsible for enacting their own rules and regulations pertaining to the 
public's online access to government information and fees. Such discretion
7
 allowed 
government entities to refuse to provide public records unless members of the public 
seeking information physically visited the government office, and inspected the 
information there.   
  
                                           
6
 Yet, in that case the cost of converting the information should be imposed on requesters. 
7
 This was changed in 2011 with the adoption of a standardized form for requesting public 
records across the state, thereby eliminating much of the discretion of a governmental body. 
http://spotlight.blogs.delaware.gov/2011/10/20/a-standard-foia-form/ 
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 Similar to Delaware's Statute, the Access to Public Records Act (APRA) of 
Rhode Island in 1998 indirectly dealt with online access to government information by 
broadly defining public records as those maintained by any public body regardless of 
their physical form or characteristics. Although the Rhode Island's APRA provided online 
access to public records, the Act denied access to non-residents or non-citizens: In 2006, 
however, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Lee v. Minner 
rejected the denial of FOIA requests based on state citizenship, requiring the states
8
 
limiting access to state citizens to provide public records to all US citizens. 
 In 1999, Georgia's statute contained the declaration regarding online access by 
the public to government information. Georgia had a long tradition of encouraging 
openness in governmental records. The philosophy behind Georgia's Open Records Law 
was that a democratic government enables those who elect public officials to have free 
access to what those public officials are doing, thereby allowing them to participate in 
democratic processes and to hold government officials accountable. The Georgia Open 
Records Law required state agencies to maintain public records available by electronic 
means. However, in accordance with the Georgia Administrative Procedures Act, 
governmental bodies cannot use the Open Records Law to access public records 
pertaining to the proceeding without the prior approval of the presiding administrative 
law judge.   
  
                                           
8
 Delaware, New Jersey, Virginia, Arkansas, and Pennsylvania, retrieved from 
http://ballotpedia.org/Delaware_Freedom_of_Information_Act#Transparency_report_card 
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 In 2000, Illinois, Nevada, South Carolina, and Wisconsin joined the transparency 
movement in providing online access to government information. While the state acts of 
public records enacted in previous years gave the authority for enforcing the act to the 
Attorney General, these states allowed civil enforcement by any person. Furthermore, 
these states tended to specify legal statements regarding fee provisions for access to 
public records or limitations on refusal to disclose.  
 When it comes to fee provisions, the Illinois Attorney General issued an opinion  
saying that county recorders could not charge a fee for access to online records posted on 
a governmental website. The South Carolina Freedom of Information Act declared that 
fees for access to public records had to be uniform, and that the records had to be 
provided at the lowest possible cost which could not exceed the actual cost of searching 
for the records.  
 With respect to exemption in disclosing information for public interest, the 
Nevada Supreme Court declared that the public bodies must establish the existence of a 
privilege as to public records when the refusal to disclose is based on confidentiality. 
Similarly, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that public employees whose reputational 
interest would be influenced by disclosure of public records had to be notified of the 
decision on the release of the records with a reasonable amount of time so as to seek 
circuit court review of the decision. 
 In 2001, Arkansas, California, and Michigan updated their FOIA for the 
electronic age by requiring state agencies to make public records available in digital form. 
These states have two prominent features of their state laws on electronic records. The 
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public records acts formerly amended in other states did not allow requesters to choose a 
format for receiving public records: rather, that right lay with public agencies. However, 
the act of these states granted requesters the right to determine the format in which public 
records were made or provided. For instance, the California Public Records Act required 
public agencies to make information available in an electronic format when requested by 
any person in that format. This statute, effective January 1, 2001, superseded portions of 
an earlier statute that granted public agencies to determine the form holding the 
information if requested. Similarly, the Arkansas FOIA
9
 declared legal intention that any 
person is allowed to request public records in any medium if those records are readily 
available.  
 As another distinct feature of theses states' laws on electronic records, the 
imposition of prohibitive fees to discourage requesters was constrained. Many public 
bodies were routinely assessing search fees for every request, in an attempt to deter 
requesters. For example, a Georgia county government attempted to bill a citizen almost 
$2,300 for copying fees and $90 an hour for legal review of public records. On one 
occasion, South Carolina agencies sought to prohibit information requests by requiring 
exorbitant advance deposits.  
                                           
9
 The Arkansas FOIA did not formerly mention electronic records until its amendment in 2001. 
The Electronic Records Study Commission created in 1999 examined the Arkansas FOIA, and 
provided the General Assembly with recommendations for addressing various issues surrounding 
electronic access in the 2001 session. 
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 However, Arkansas', California's, and Michigan's laws on electronic records 
recognized such routine labor charges as illegal. To combat these fees, the Michigan 
FOIA stipulated that 
 
 “[a] fee shall not be charged for the cost of search, examination, review, and the 
 deletion and separation of exempt from nonexempt information . . . unless failure 
 to charge a fee would result in unreasonably high costs to the public body 
 because of the nature of the request in the particular instance, and the public 
 body specifically identifies the nature of  these unreasonably high costs.” 
 (Michigan Attorney General. Op. No. 7083, 2001).  
 
In a similar vein, the Arkansas FOIA and the California Public Records Act
10
 contained 
declarations that public agencies are not allowed to impose prohibitively high copying 
charges to discourage information requests.  
 After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the George W. Bush 
administration altered its position on FOIA requests. The centerpiece of the George W. 
Bush administration’s change in the direction of FOIA releases was the Justice 
                                           
10
 Although the CPRA prohibits fees in excess of the “direct costs of duplication,” many public 
bodies, especially at the local level, routinely overcharge. More problematic are the charges 
associated with releasing public records in a digital format. "While costs for compiling or 
extracting and related programming necessary to produce electronic records not otherwise 
routinely generated by the agency are allowable under Section 6253.9 of the CPRA, such costs 
have often placed access beyond the reach of most requesters, with agencies often demanding 
many thousands of dollars for anticipated programming costs. It also has become a new way for 
agencies bent on nondisclosure to discourage requesters from pursuing their access rights." (Open 
Government Guide, 2011, p. 8). 
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Department's FOIA policy memorandum issued by Attorney General John Ashcroft on 
October 12, 2001. Ashcroft's memo addressed concerns about national security associated 
with access to government information. Ashcroft identified fundamental values that 
included safeguarding national security, enhancing the effectiveness of the law 
enforcement by agencies, and protecting personal privacy and sensitive business 
information (Feinberg, 2004).  
 Ashcroft also pointed out that, prior to making any decisions to release public 
records, government agencies should fully take account of the institutional, commercial, 
and personal privacy interests that could be influenced by the records. Ashcroft's memo 
allowed public agencies to defend their decisions to withhold government information 
from the public, "unless they lack a sound legal basis or present an unwarranted risk of 
adverse impact on other agencies' abilities to protect their records." (Anderson, 2003, p. 
1622). This was almost the opposite of the FOIA guidelines issued by the Clinton 
administration, stating that public agencies could not defend their decision to withhold 
records merely based on a substantial legal basis (Feinberg, 2004).  
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Figure 1 Adopters of EFOIA from 1996 to 2001 
 This new chapter to the FOIA story created in the aftermath of the 2001 terrorist 
attacks influenced states' decisions to update their public records acts, sending out 
"contradictory" guidelines; requiring public agencies to make more information available 
electronically, while urging the agencies to remove broad categories of information from 
their transparency websites (Feinberg, 2004). 
 In 2002, the governors of Connecticut, New Jersey, and Minnesota signed into 
law a new open public records act to provide a uniform system for responding to requests 
for electronic records. The new statutes preserved the common law right of access, and 
provided for access to government information stored or maintained electronically. Yet, 
these state laws specified legal statements about an exemption for public records when 
there were reasonable grounds to believe disclosure might pose a safety risk. Since there 
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was no integrated or coherent government policy to balance access, privacy, and secrecy, 
each state had discretional standards regarding an exemption from disclosing public 
records. However, in general, the amended section of these states addressed security 
concerns regarding disclosure of sensitive information associated with engineering 
drawings, operational specifications, security training manuals, and emergency plans of 
government-owned or government-leased facilities, or risk management plans of water 
companies.   
 Virginia (2003), Missouri (2004), Montana, Ohio and Utah (2005), and 
Oklahoma (2006) subsequently amended the section of their state FOIA to deal with 
creation or maintenance of an electronic database. These states encouraged but did not 
require public bodies to maintain an electronic data processing system of nonexempt 
records, and produce the records at reasonable cost as well as in any tangible medium 
requested by the requester, including posting the records on a website or delivering them 
through e-mail. However, these states simultaneously sought to remove some materials 
from public records based on the discretion about exemption. For example, under the 
Utah Government Records Access and Management Act, the following information is 
exempt: records created or maintained for civil, criminal, or administrative enforcement 
purposes or audit purposes, and private information on certain government employees. 
Meanwhile, the Montana Public Records Act contained the privacy “exemption” 
analysis
11
 used for determining whether records may be kept confidential. 
                                           
11
 The privacy exemption analysis includes a following three-part test: 1. Did the person involved 
have an actual or “subjective” expectation of privacy; and, if so 2. Is that expectation 
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Figure 2 Adopters of EFOIA from 2002 to 2006 
 With regard to EFOIA management between 2001 and 2004, the GAO reports
12
 
noted that public agencies modified or removed government information, even frequently 
requested records, from their websites in response to concerns about national security 
(GAO, 2001, 2002, 2004). Indeed, the number of exemptions cited to support denials rose 
by approximately 73% from 2001 to 2002, including exemptions of law enforcement 
records, and personnel and medical files. Moreover, a change in policy climate 
characterized as moving from "a right to know" to "a need to know" was reported along 
with a drop in requests (Feinberg, 2004).  
                                                                                                                             
“reasonable”? 3. If the answers to paragraphs 1 and 2 are affirmative, then the documents 
containing private information may be withheld if the demands of individual privacy clearly 
outweigh the merits of public disclosure. If the answer to either 1 or 2 is negative, then the 
documents are available for public inspection.  
12
 Although the GAO reports focused mainly on the federal agencies, state governments cannot 
be isolated from such policy climate regarding exemption of public records.  
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 In 2007, political attention turned to the promotion of accountability for agency 
decisions to withhold information under FOIA. Senators Patrick Leahy and John Cornyn 
introduced the OPEN Government Act in the 110th Congress on March 13, 2007. This 
bill was expected not only to help members of the public obtain timely responses to their 
information requests, but also provide an alternative to costly litigation for information 
requesters and the government. The need for this bill resulted from the major 
delays
13
encountered by information requesters. In April, 2007, the bill was placed on the 
Senate Legislative Calendar (No. 127) under General Orders, and political debates 
continued. 
 In this political atmosphere, Idaho's and Ohio's legislatures determined to include 
electronic information as governmental records. As other states had done in previous 
years, these states recognized that some types of public records associated with privacy 
and safety should not be available for public inspection and copying. However, the 
statutes of theses states — rather than simply following the federal EFOIA model14 — 
identified the actual types of records exempt from public disclosure with a greater degree 
of specificity. In addition, these states sought to interpret their public records statute and 
enforce the law comprehensively, rather than taking a case-by-case approach. 
                                           
13
 The government Accountability Office found that federal agencies and 43 percent more FOIA 
requests pending and outstanding in 2006 than they had in 2002 (the 110th Congress report, 
2007). 
14
 In the federal EFOIA, a small number of exemptions are loosely defined, along with the 
parameters of the exemptions left to agency regulations and judicial interpretation (Open 
Government Guide, 2011, Retrieved from http://www.rcfp.org/open-government-guide).  
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 The Idaho Public Records Act refused to give government agencies the 
discretion to withhold public records from the public on the basis of judicial 
interpretations. This approach was especially appropriate in Idaho, a state with a small 
population, and therefore expecting infrequent judicial interpretations of the open records 
statutes (Open Government Guide, 2011). In Oregon, the State Department of Justice 
played a central role in interpreting its public records statute and in aiding in the 
enforcement of the law. The public records manual published and updated by the 
Attorney General every two years could serve as a useful desk reference for many records 
questions: the manual contained a summary of all public records statutes, the Attorney 
General's opinions, and valuable commentaries about frequently asked questions. 
 On December 31, 2007, President George W. Bush signed the OPEN 
Government Act into law. The OPEN Government Act enhanced public and press access 
to information about inner workings of the government in several important procedural 
ways: to strengthen and speed agency compliance with FOIA requests; to establish 
tracking numbers for each FOIA request so that users can follow the progress of their 
requests online; to identify agencies that rejected requests for capricious and arbitrary 
reasons; to prohibit an agency from assessing search and copying fees if the agency failed 
to release requested information within statutory time limits (Open Government Act, 
2007).  
 After the enactment of the OPEN Government Act of 2007, states responding to 
the electronic age sought to amend their by focusing exclusively on "procedural issues" 
of information requests. In 2008, New Hampshire, New York, North Dakota, 
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Pennsylvania, and Tennessee amended their statutes to make explicit the application to 
governmental records in electronic form. These states addressed the issues of time frames 
for responses to requests, the provision of the new programming to provide the 
information, and the standard of a reasonable price for copies of records.  
 For instance, the New Hampshire Right to Know Law stipulated that an agency 
had to respond to a request for records within five business days. The New York 
legislation contained a new provision requiring an agency to use a new program — rather 
than manually manipulate or redact the data — either to retrieve a record maintained 
electronically, or to convert that record to the medium requested. North Dakota's statute 
contained provisions setting a reasonable price for copies of records: if locating records 
requires more than one hour, the entity may impose a fee not exceeding $25 per hour per 
request, excluding the initial hour, for locating records, including electronic ones. 
 Meanwhile, the statutes of Pennsylvania and Tennessee created institutions to 
assist public officials and the public, thereby expanding upon the procedures increasing 
the civil judgments that would be awarded against an agency acting in bad faith. Under 
the Pennsylvania Right to Know Act, the Office of Open Records was created to 
disseminate information, handle appeals, issue advisory opinions, create a mediation 
program, and ensure compliance with the Act’s requirements.  
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In a similar vein, Tennessee formed the Office of Open Records Counsel as a department 
of the State Controller, thereby assisting and advising public officials and the public. The 
Open Records Counsel
15
 was also an ombudsman that would mediate disputes and 
opinions regarding open records issues.  
 In 2009 and 2011, remaining states
16
 that had not designated legal statements on 
electronic records finally amended their FOIA: Arizona, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, New 
Mexico, Massachusetts,
17
 South Dakota, Washington, Wyoming, and Maine. Some of 
these states created an office of an "ombudsman." In Arizona, any citizen may complain 
to the Office of the Ombudsman-Citizens Aide about the actions of public agencies. 
When responding to a complaint, the Ombudsman-Citizens Aide had the power to 
investigate the administrative acts of agencies and make recommendations to the 
governor, the legislature, and/or the appropriate prosecutor. The Iowa legislature also 
created the office of the Ombudsman-Citizens Aide that would investigate, on complaint 
or on the citizens’ aide’s own motion, any administrative action of any agency.  
  However, these late adopters, ironically, retreated from advances in the creation 
or maintenance of an electronic database. The statutes of these states did not have  
statutory language concerning procedural issues of FOIA requests, such as response time  
                                           
15
 The office of Open Records Counsel, and its Advisory Committee, may also review and make 
comments to the General Assembly on any legislation affecting open records. The Act has no 
provision for allowing the requester to choose a format to receive records. The Supreme Court 
held that if there is information that is stored on computer but not in the format desired by the 
requester, the agency is required to provide the information in the format requested (Open 
Government Guide, 2011). 
16
 Maine included legal statement regarding electronic records in 2011. 
17
 The public records law of Massachusetts is among the weakest in any of the 50 states (Open 
Government Guide, 2011, http://www.rcfp.org/open-government-guide). 
 26 
 
frames and the provision of electronic data processing system. For example, although the 
Arizona Public Records Law required public records to be promptly furnished, it did not 
designate a specific number of days within which a public body had to furnish the records. 
Thus, the state courts had to rely on a dictionary definition of “promptly” to require that 
public records be produced at once or without delay. Under the Kansas Public Records 
Act, a delay was not recognized as denial for appeal purposes.  
 Therefore, in Kansas, a public agency was simply required to give a detailed 
explanation of the cause for delay, and the place, time and date that the record would be 
available for inspection, unless a request is granted immediately. Furthermore, these 
states did not provide even statutory language stating that online access to public records 
in electronic form may be made available at the discretion of the public agency: instead, 
they implicitly designated online dissemination by broadly defining
18
 "public record." 
 Finally, none of the statutes of these states mentioned the format for receiving the 
records requesters can choose, and customized searches of computer databases. The state 
statutes merely noted that reporters, as a matter of practice, have been able to determine a 
format for receiving records, if the format is available. In the statutes, statutory  
exemption did not specify the records or information that the legislature considered  
private. 
 
                                           
18
 Public record is defined as all existing documents, papers, letters, maps, books, tapes, 
photographs, films, sound recording or other materials, regardless of physical form or 
characteristics (Open Government Guide, 2011, Retrieved from http://www.rcfp.org/open-
government-guide). 
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Figure 3 Adopters of EFOIA from 2007 to 2011 
 
US States' Implementation of EFOIA 
 State governments across the US have established a legislative environment for 
public access to government information, but there is a great deal of variation in terms of 
the extent of implementation of EFOIA (U.S. PIRG, 2010, 2011, 2012); some states 
managed their transparency websites by excelling in living up to the spirit or the letter of 
EFOIA, while others failed to achieve progress in their transparency portals. 
 In 2010, 32 states allowed residents to access online databases of government 
expenditures such as tax subsidies and economic development grants. Seven of these 
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states were "leading states" or "advancing states
19
 " in the transparency movement, 
hosting websites that provided comprehensive information on government spending: 
Kentucky, Ohio, Texas, Illinois, Minnesota, Missouri and Pennsylvania. These states set 
user-friendly portals enabling visitors to quickly and easily search government spending 
data by vendor's names and types of services purchased.  
  In addition, transparency websites of leading and advancing states contained 
detailed information on government contracts, such as the purpose of contracts, the 
amount of each contract, and contract information for vendors. Kentucky's website 
offered visitors both a detailed summary of state spending and PDF versions of the 
contracts. Furthermore, a few of the leading transparency sites had unique features 
designed to increase citizen involvement. For example, Illinois' website listed the number 
of jobs created by tax subsidies or development grants, thereby allowing visitors to 
determine the efficacy of the allocation. Similarly, Kentucky's website enabled users to 
submit suggestions about improving spending efficacy.  
 Yet, the transparency websites of these leading and advancing states still had 
room for improvement. They did not contain information that citizens needed to assess 
the efficacy of government spending. Some of these websites gave only a short 
description (two or three words) of the purpose of government contracts. In addition, 
most of the transparency portals had no information prior to fiscal year 2009.  
                                           
19
 The US PIRG evaluated state transparency websites in terms of data availability, usability, and 
accessibility, and then drove through the review of state agencies administering the transparency 
websites for accuracy. Leading and advancing states refer to those who achieved a grade of A 
(>=90) and B (>=80), respectively in online transparency.  
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 Unlike the seven leading and advancing states, 25 states
20
 either offered less  
comprehensive information (i.e. emerging states), or failed to provide spending data in a 
searchable format (i.e. lagging states) For instance, the transparency websites of Georgia, 
Nevada, and Oklahoma did not specify the purpose or output information of government 
spending, providing only the vendor's name, the contracting agency, and the obligation 
amount. Alaska, Oregon, and Tennessee offered information on grants, local expenditures, 
and tax expenditure reports, but visitors already had to know what they were searching 
for to find the information.    
 The remaining states — failing states — were left behind by the transparency 
movement for increasing public access to government information. Fourteen of the 
failing states
21
 did not have transparency websites. Arizona, New Jersey, South Dakota, 
and Washington had transparency portals, but they offered either limited or superficial 
information about government expenditures. The transparency websites of Arizona and 
New Jersey specified only aggregate spending amount for departments and agencies, 
offering no description of the types of services purchased or the amount of each 
individual transaction. In South Dakota and Washington, visitors could view information 
on the contracts for professional services, but search for much less summary information 
on general contracts.  
 
                                           
20
 Alabama, Hawaii, Nevada, Colorado, New York, Virginia, Kansas, Mississippi, North Carolina, 
Utah, Rhode Island, Delaware, Oklahoma, Louisiana, Florida, Maryland, New Mexico, Oregon, 
Wyoming, South Carolina, Nebraska, California, Georgia, Tennessee, and Alaska 
21
 Arkansas, Connecticut, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, New 
Hampshire, North Dakota, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin 
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Figure 4 States' extent of Implementation of EFOIA in 2010 
   
 In 2011, Indiana, Louisiana, Arizona, Massachusetts, North Carolina, and 
Oregon were highly ranked in terms of providing online access to government spending 
data, newly involving the group of leading states or advancing states. These leading and 
advancing states made distinctive improvements in the detail of the information available. 
The states' websites posted details about past contracts, a link to its tax expenditure report, 
and information about economic development incentives, thereby allowing visitors to 
evaluate specific expenditures.  
 Another remarkable feature of transparency portals of leading and advancing 
states was the ease of use. Each of the portals offered tools enabled citizens to make 
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targeted searches and sort the data. For example, on Indiana's transparency website, 
visitors could search for information by the types of payments spent with vendors (e.g. 
Grant, Lease, Professional/Personal services, Contracts) along with the typical keyword 
search box. Louisiana's website provided separate search sections for grants, contracts, 
and economic incentives. On North Carolina's website, users could also search for 
spending data by the vendor's location, and thus see how government expenditures were 
geographically distributed. 
 As in the previous year, Kentucky, Ohio, and Texas were at the leading edge of 
enhancing public access to government information by making up for the weak points of 
their transparency portals. In Kentucky, Ohio, and Texas, visitors could access 
information about the purpose of economic development incentives and grants, outcome 
data about the number of jobs created from a specific incentive, and historical financial 
reports. However, as a result of the rise of new leading states, Illinois, Minnesota, 
Missouri, and Pennsylvania went through a small drop in online transparency scores and 
rankings although they maintained levels of comprehensiveness and searchability similar 
to the previous year. 
 Meanwhile, New Jersey, Michigan, South Dakota, and Wisconsin broke away 
from the group of failing states. These states made dramatic improvements to their 
transparency portals, raising their annual transparency total score by at least 50 points. In 
2010, New Jersey and South Dakota posted only aggregated spending numbers for 
departments and agencies on their transparency websites. However, these states upgraded 
their portals by allowing visitors to track specific payments made to individual vendors 
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(e.g. general contractors, subcontractors, consultants, business entities). Michigan and 
Wisconsin — which did not host transparency portals in 2010 — launched their websites 
that would offer users information about sales, income, and property tax expenditures 
through easy-to-use search tools.  
 The rest of the states, such as Arkansas, Iowa, Idaho, and Maine, did not show 
clear improvement or change in the provision of online access to government information 
in comparison to the previous year; the other states tended to remain roughly at the 
previous transparency scores or rankings.  
 
Figure 5 States' extent of Implementation of EFOIA in 2011 
Leading (Grade A)
Advancing (Grade B)
Emerging (Grade C)
Lagging (Grade D)
Failing (Grade F)
WA MT ND
SD
OR
CA
NV
ID
WY
UT
AZ
CO
NM
TX
OK
KS
NE
MN
IA
MO
AR
LA
MS AL GA
SC
FL
NCTN
IL IN OH
PA
WV
KY
NY
VT
ME
NH
MA
CT RI
NJ
VA
DE
MD
WI
MI
 33 
 
 In 2012, Texas, Kentucky, Indiana, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Arizona, North 
Carolina, and Oregon continuously made progress in increasing public access to 
government spending data. These leading and advancing states expanded the online 
spending data they contained on transparency websites by including government 
contracts with private entities, subsidies, tax expenditure data, and transactions by quasi-
public agencies. In addition, these states' transparency websites enabled visitors to search 
easily and quickly for information by inscrutable layers of subcategories, recipients' 
names, purchasing departments or agencies, types of good or service purchased, or 
directed keywords.   
 The most distinctive feature of transparency portals of these states was the ability 
to allow users to download datasets of vendor-specific information and compare state 
spending over time. Such functions of transparency websites made it easy for visitors to 
uncover "whether some companies are historically favored over others and whether the 
state is paying an appropriate amount for the goods and services purchased in a certain 
year as compared to others." (U.S. PIRG, 2012, p. 32). However, all leading states 
provided either the projections of the number of jobs created, or other intended benefits 
of economic development awards, failing to specify the number of jobs or other benefits 
which were "actually" created. 
 In addition to these states, Connecticut, New York, Utah, Washington, and West 
Virginia excelled in providing online access to government spending data, entering the 
group of leading or advancing states. These states updated their transparency portals to 
make government spending data far more accessible, not just (technically) available to 
 34 
 
the public. For example, on Connecticut's website, the layout was intuitive and 
understandable to an ordinary Connecticut citizen, along with clear links for the types of 
state payments (e.g. "Contracts", "Grants", or "Compensation") and simple search criteria 
(e.g."2010" or "2011"). Thus, visitors did not need to be tech-savvy budget experts to 
search for information. New York's and Utah's websites were directly linked to tax 
expenditure reports of the states, thereby allowing users to see tax exemptions, credits, 
deferrals, and preferences that would affect state budgets.  
 Meanwhile, compared to the previous years, some states made significant 
improvements to their transparency websites with a noticeable increase in the score of 
online budget transparency: Delaware, Michigan, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, 
Mississippi, and South Dakota. These states redesigned their transparency websites to 
incorporate more detailed information on government expenditures and searchability. For 
instance, Delaware's website gave visitors a one-stop place to find government spending 
information from the Office of Management and Budget, Government Support Services, 
and county governments. North Dakota opened the state's checkbook specifying the 
payments made to vendors. The checkbook was updated monthly and included 
expenditure information dating back to 2007. On New Mexico's website, most pages had 
a sidebar that explained the page and provided helpful links, along with a glossary for 
ambiguous terms.  
 However, when it came to making their spending data available and accessible 
online, several states were a little behind the transparency movement. Ohio and Rhode 
Island dropped about 20 points from the previous year. Although Ohio was the second-
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highest scoring state for online budget transparency in 2010, it failed to innovate at the 
pace of its peers. Ohio disconnected the link from the state's Recovery Act spending 
portal, thereby losing the access to important expenditure information. Furthermore, Ohio 
lacked tools for targeted searches by companies, the purchasing department, or agency, 
making it difficult for citizens to scrutinize the benefits for specific companies, and 
evaluate the efficacy of the expenditures. Similarly, Rhode Island failed to make its 
checkbook searchable, and thus dropped in the rankings. Although Wisconsin launched 
its transparency portal, the website did not allow visitors to view the individual payments 
made to vendors, and thus earned a low score of spending transparency. 
 California took the biggest step backwards from online budget transparency. In 
November 2011, Governor Jerry Brown shut down California's transparency portal, 
making California's spending picture vague. Brown's administration rationalized this 
action by contending that citizens ought to use the primary sources of information such as 
agency websites. However, with the state's spending data scattered across multiple 
agency websites, it would be difficult to access the data because of its different formats 
and locations. Therefore, although the state's spending data were technically available, 
this shutdown of California's website rendered the data inaccessible by removing a 
central searchable location for government information.  
 Meanwhile, Alaska, Florida, Tennessee, Vermont, and Wisconsin were still 
lagging in the transparency movement. On transparency websites of theses states, visitors 
were not allowed to access spending data with easy-to-use search tools. No state was 
easily searchable by the kind of good or service; Florida's and Tennessee's portals were 
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searchable only by the purchasing department or agency. Beyond the difficulty of 
searching spending data, the transparency websites of these states did not make important 
government spending data — such as information on the state revenue forgone through 
tax code spending — available online.  
 
Figure 6 States' extent of Implementation of EFOIA in 2012 
 
 The rest of the states, Arkansas, Idaho, Iowa, Montana, and Wyoming, were 
failing in online transparency, although they took a small step toward increasing public 
access to government spending data over previous years. For example, on Wyoming's 
portal, the state's checkbook was searchable only by vendor. Thus, users could not view 
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the individual payments made to vendors unless they already knew the name of the 
vendor they were looking for. Moreover, Wyoming's website lacked information on 
historical expenditures, grants, economic development subsidies, and local spending. In a 
similar vein, Idaho's, Iowa's and Montana's transparency portals provided little 
information on government expenditures, and made it difficult for visitors to sort the data.  
Characteristics of EFOIA Diffusion at the Adoption Stage  
 Most of all, the early adopters, the states adopting EFOIA in the late 1990s and 
the early 2000s
22
, tended to follow the federal model of EFOIA; their statutes stipulate 
that they use the same basic format as the federal model of EFOIA, including the scope 
of public records, fee provisions, and characteristics of exemptions. 
  Another distinctive feature of the early adopters is that precise improvement 
continued along with the state laws on electronic records. In 1997, the definition of 
"public record" (or governmental record) was more clearly specified than before in order 
to encompass information that was electronically maintained or produced. In 1998, with 
respect to the decisions on the rules pertaining to online access, the state laws were able 
to constrain the discretion of public agencies and their refusal to fill information requests, 
thereby increasing online access to public records. Moreover, in 1999 the state statutes 
extended the right to online access to non-citizens. In 2000, the state statutes allowed for 
civil enforcement by any person, simply beyond giving the authority of enforcing the act 
to the Attorney General. Finally, the state statutes of 2001 granted requesters the right to 
determine the format in which information was made or provided. 
                                           
22
 before the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001 
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Figure 7 Numbers of Adopters 
  
 At the same time, there has been considerable variation in the timing of adoption  
among the states. After the September 11 terrorist attacks, there was a sharp drop in the 
number of the adopters of EFOIA; while 18 states adopted EFOIA before the 9/11 attacks, 
nine adopted the law from 2002 to 2006. Such a retreat from offering online access to 
government information might be associated with the political climate under the George 
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W. Bush administration in which public agencies withheld government information from  
the public out of concern for national security
23
. Since the OPEN Government Act in 
2007, however, the number of EFOIA adopters nearly doubled from 9 to 17, reflecting a 
statutory language of the Act.  
  In addition to political climate of a state, policy actions of other states may have 
an impact on the adoption of EFOIA by a state. When grouping the states by the period in 
which an event
24
 influencing a state's legal environment occurred, diffusion in states' 
adoption of EFOIA appeared to be associated with geographical proximity. For example, 
according to Figure 8, Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina, and 
South Carolina, which adopted EFOIA between 1996 and 2001 are located in the same 
geographic region (i.e. BEA
25
 5 region). 
 Furthermore, the influence of other states on the adoption of EFOIA by an 
individual state is also "national" beyond geographical proximity. For instance, the 
Maryland Public Information Act was patterned after Colorado's state statutes (Open 
Government Guide, 2011). 
 
                                           
23
 Despite the policy mood against government transparency, legislators of some states 
determined to amend their existing FOIA, taking notice of the overwhelming voter support for 
enhancing online access information about governmental operations. 
24
 the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001 and the enactment of the OPEN Government Act of 2007 
25
 Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) region are a set of geographic areas that are 
homogeneous in terms of industrial, economic, demographic and social characteristics. The total 
number of the BEA regions in the US is eight. 
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Figure 8 Geographical Location of Adopters 
 In conclusion, early adopters of EFOIA appear to be supportive of improving 
online access to public records. In addition, states' decisions in adopting EFOIA seem to 
have been associated with the legal practice created by the federal government, which 
may have affected the state's legal environment concerning transparency.  
 According to the legal environment theory suggested by Edelman (1990, 1992), 
the legal circumstance imposes normative pressure on organizations to change their 
behavior in accordance with legal practice or law. According to this perspective, legal 
practices of the federal government with regard to transparency, such as the policies of 
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the George W. Bush administration for withholding information and the OPEN 
Government Act of 2007, can create normative circumstances that influence a state's 
decision on its transparency policy. In this respect, the political environment or policy 
culture of a state might make it more receptive to EFOIA.  
 Furthermore, a state's adoption of EFOIA seems also to be affected by other 
states' decisions on the adoption of the law. The influence of other states that had already 
adopted EFOIA on an individual state can be either regional or national; an individual 
state's interactions with neighboring states as well as those within its geographic region 
through national networks may affect its decision to adopt EFOIA. Considering these 
characteristics of EFOIA diffusion at the adoption stage, states whose policy culture 
supports government transparency and/or that have involved in more interactive  
circumstances may adopt EFOIA earlier than others. 
Characteristics of EFOIA Diffusion at the Implementation Stage.  
 In 2010, leading and advancing states that had shown impressive performance in 
providing online access to government spending data were dispersed across the United 
States. At a glance, in 2010, there was no distinct pattern link between states' 
implementation of EFOIA and their geographical proximity. However, several noticeable 
features of states' implementation of EFOIA were found, especially among states that saw 
the steepest increase in their online budget transparency score.  
 First, states adjacent to those that maintained a high rank in online transparency 
tended to show great improvement in operating their transparency portals in the following 
year. For example, Indiana and Michigan bordering Ohio (which was highly ranked in 
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online budget transparency of 2010 and 2011) were failing states in terms of online 
transparency of 2010. Both states, however, became new leading states in 2011, with at 
least a 50-point jump in their annual transparency total score.  
 
Figure 9 States with Steep Increase in Online Transparency Score (2010-2011) 
 A similar situation was observed in 2012 and 2013. For instance, Washington 
which borders Oregon, a leading state of 2011 and 2012, was highly ranked in online 
transparency in 2012, because of its dramatic progress in providing online access to 
government spending data. Oklahoma and New Hampshire — both of which were 
situated near leading states, Texas and Massachusetts, respectively — joined the group of 
leading states or advancing states in 2013.  
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Figure 10 States with a Steep Increase in Online Transparency Score (2011-2012) 
 
Figure 11 States with a Steep Increase in Online Transparency Score (2012-2013) 
 From these observations, an individual state seems to learn from the success of 
its neighbors or from other states in its region when implementing EFOIA. Considering 
that information sharing through interactions is a substantial factor in the learning 
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process (Lee et al., 2011), interactions with successful neighbors may help an individual 
state learn to provide online access to governmental spending data, thereby leading to 
progress in online transparency.  
 Yet, not every state adjacent to "successful" states made distinct progress in 
providing online access to government spending data. As described in Figure 13, 
Tennessee and New Mexico fell behind in increasing online access to government 
information in 2011, despite their geographical proximity to Kentucky and Texas, 
respectively, which were highly ranked in online transparency in 2010 and 2011. 
Likewise, among the states located near Oregon, a leading state in 2011 and 2012, only 
Washington saw a great improvement in online budget transparency in 2012; California 
and Idaho were falling behind or failing in the transparency movement. In 2013, only 
Iowa achieved noticeable progress in operating its transparency portal, along with 
Nebraska which ranked high in online transparency in 2012 and 2013. 
 According to the US PIRG Education Fund (2013), many of these states were 
operating transparency portals within their existing budget or very limited funds
26
. The 
operation of EFOIA generally requires start-up and maintenance costs associated with 
transparency websites. Thus, when states cannot afford these costs, they are unable to 
institutionalize EFOIA. Indeed, the Reporters of Committee (2011) said that the most 
frequently mentioned impediment to states operating transparency websites was the lack 
of resources and funding. 
                                           
26
 The start-up costs of California, Idaho, and Nevada were approximately $21,000, $28,000 and 
$78,000 respectively, while Kentucky and Louisiana spent $150,000, and $325,000, respectively 
(U.S. PIRG, 2013). Retrieved from www.uspirg.org/reports/usp/following-money-2013  
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 Moreover, some states lost ground in online budget transparency. As seen with 
the shutdown of California's transparency website, obtaining supports from state 
legislators is essential for agencies wishing to maintain innovation in government 
transparency. In fact, in many cases political decisions of state legislators are directly 
connected to budgetary issues to implement and sustain a policy, practice, or program. In 
this regard, the learning effect may rely on slack resources which are affordable to a state 
for implementing EFOIA  
Figure 12 Variation in Improvement to Online Transparency 
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 Meanwhile, a state's learning was not reduced to geography or geographical 
proximity to more successful states. Indeed, Arizona, Florida, Massachusetts, and Oregon 
are not adjacent to leading states such as Indiana, Kentucky, and Texas. Yet, these states 
have been able to carry out the intent of EFOIA through their transparency websites. 
Therefore, one could argue that the extent of a state's implementation of EFOIA may be 
associated with its engagement in more "nationally interactive" environment such as 
professional networks.  
 To summarize, states' success in implementing EFOIA has to do with regional 
and national interactions with successful leading and advancing states. However, states' 
involvement in interactive circumstances is necessary but insufficient. A state's 
implementation of EFOIA may also rely on its financial capacity to create and manage 
transparency practices. Considering these characteristics of EFOIA diffusion at the 
implementation stage, states that have frequently interacted with successful states along 
with adequate financial resources may implement EFOIA more successfully than others. 
Comparison of Diffusion between Two Stages of EFOIA 
 Comparing diffusion between two stages of EFOIA can reveal whether or not 
early adopters maintain the leader position in innovation through the implementation 
phase. Figure 13 shows geographical location of early adopters of EFOIA as well as 
states that have made great performance of implementing their transparency websites 
from 2010 to 2013.  
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 Many of early adopters have failed to sustain the leadership position in online 
transparency through the implementation stage of EFOIA; among 18 states that adopted 
EFOIA between 1996 and 2001, only six states belong to the group of successful states.  
 
Figure 13 Comparison of the Location between Early Adopters and Success Group 
 Figure 14 presents the extent of states' early adoption of EFOIA and their 
implementation of transparency portals by using the percentage score (%). One could see 
that there are great variances
27
 among states in adopting and implementing EFOIA. 
                                           
27 Vermont and Rhode Island adopted EFOIA in 1996 and 1998 respectively, but failed to show 
great performance in providing online access to government spending data: they belonged to the 
group of failing states with a grade of D. According to the US PIRG Education Fund (2013), the 
average rank of Vermont and Rhode in online budget transparency between 2011 and 2013 was 
37
th
 and 39
th
 respectively. Indeed, only two early adopters — Nebraska and Illinois — were 
among the top ten in online budget transparency. In contrast, Louisiana and Oregon made distinct 
progress in operating their transparency portals although they adopted EFOIA around 2010. 
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Furthermore, such variance exists within the same state. For example, Louisiana has only 
reached 20% points
28
 of the earliness of adoption along with 85% points in the extent of 
implementation of EFOIA. Despite 100% points of the earliness of adoption, Vermont 
has only achieved 61% points in the extent of implementation.  
 
Figure 14 Earliness of Adoption & The Extent of Implementation 
                                                                                                                             
 
28
 If a state adopted EFOIA in 1996, 100% points for the earliness of adoption will be given to 
the state. The percent score of online transparency serves for the proxy of the extent of 
implementation of EFOIA. 
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Figure 15 Innovator Zone 
 Figure 15 illustrates the innovator zone for those who are early leaders in 
adopting or implementing EFOIA. Most of early adopters involved in the adoption 
innovator zone have failed to join the implementation innovator zone. In this respect, not 
every early leader in adopting EFOIA sustains the leader position in online transparency 
through the implementation phase. Moreover, there is no connection between the timing 
of adoption and the extent of implementation. The percentage scores of early adopters 
range from 35 (Arkansas) to 82 (Illinois). The laggards also have a wide range of the 
percentage scores of the extent of implementation from 28 (Idaho) to 91 (Massachusetts). 
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Figure 16 Regional Effects in Adoption 
 
Figure 16-1 Regional Effects in Implementation 
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 As shown in Figure 16 and Figure 16-1, states that belong to the same region 
tend to have a similar position in the timing of adoption as well as the extent of 
implementation of EFOIA. This implies that a state's interactions with neighbors (i.e. 
neighboring effects) may influence both its adoption and implementation of EFOIA.  
 To conclude, early adoption of EFOIA in itself does not ensure a state's 
successful implementation of the law. Indeed, most of early adopters have failed to show 
satisfactory performance in carrying out the spirit or the letter of EFOIA, thereby limiting 
it to a symbolic policy. Thus, the mechanism resulting in the diffusion of EFOIA may 
differ in the two stages of the law. In the diffusion of EFOIA at the adoption stage, states 
that have long sought to increase public access to government information tend to adopt 
the law earlier than those that have not. In addition, the legal environment created by 
federal legislative practices concerning transparency seems to affect state adoption 
behavior. In this regard, political climate (or policy culture) of an individual state which 
is consistent with the norm of transparency may play an important role in the diffusion at 
the adoption stage. 
 However, the political climate in favor of transparency does not seem to have 
great impact on early adopters to maintain the leader position in online transparency at 
the implementation stage of EFOIA. In fact, few early adopters have made great strides in 
providing online access to government spending data in the past four years (from 2010 to 
2013). On the other hand, the effect of a state's interactions with others were still likely to 
be influential at the implementation stage. In this respect, the diffusion mechanisms of 
EFOIA seem to be "conditional," depending on the stages of adoption and 
 53 
 
implementation: a particular diffusion mechanism facilitating the spread of norm of 
transparency among the states may cease to work at the implementation stage. Therefore, 
states may need to understand the conditional nature of mechanisms associated the 
diffusion of EFOIA to identify what factors contribute to sustained innovation in 
government transparency.  
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CHAPTER 3 
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
 This chapter begins by describing diffusion, especially in the public policy 
context, and four mechanisms leading to policy diffusion. These findings will be 
contextualized with the adoption and implementation of EFOIA in the US states. This 
chapter then discusses the theoretical logic that can explain the potential mechanisms 
through which EFOIA spread among states, and the differences in diffusion between 
states' adoption and implementation of EFOIA. This chapter concludes with presenting 
the conceptual framework and research hypotheses pertaining to the research questions of 
this study. 
What is Diffusion?  
 Rogers (2003) defined diffusion as "the process through which an innovation 
spreads via certain communication channels over time among members of the social 
system." (p.11). By definition, Rogers (1962, 2003) suggested four main elements related 
to diffusion as follows: innovation, communication channels, time, and a social system. 
Innovation is an idea, practice, or object that is perceived as new (Amabile, 1988). The 
newness assumes that if something is new to an individual, the individual determines his 
or her reaction to it (Rogers, 2003). Communication channels are the means by which 
messages are transmitted from one individual to the next. In this sense, diffusion is also a 
particular type of communication that conveys the message content associated with a new 
idea. The time dimension is usually described either as a form of the relative 
earliness/lateness with which an innovation is adopted by a member in comparison with 
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other members of a system, or as the innovation's rate of adoption in a system usually 
measured by the number of members of the system adopting the innovation in a given 
time period (Rogers, 2003). A social system is a set of interrelated units involved in joint 
problem-solving to achieve a common goal. The units of a social system may be 
individuals, groups, organizations, and/or subsystems. 
 The concept of diffusion is widely used in fields such as physics, biology, 
economics, and sociology, but it commonly evokes "the image of the spread of 
something across space" (Elkins & Simmons, 2005, p. 36); the subject that is diffused 
over a network or throughout a community could be a disease, rumor, fad, news event, 
product, policy, or even culture but diffusion typically accounts for spread. For example, 
scholars of news diffusion have investigated the way that an extraordinarily important 
news story, such as the assassination of President Kennedy, or the September 11, 2001 
terrorist attacks, spread among the public. These investigations have revealed that radio, 
television, newspaper, and interpersonal networks play a substantial role in diffusion of 
the story (Deutschmann & Danielson, 1960; Mayer eta al., 1990). Marketing diffusion 
scholars have paid great attention to the spread of a new product such as mobile 
telephones by tracing the rate of adoption for the product over time (Rosen, 2000; 
Dekimpe et al., 2000; Shermesh & Tellis, 2002). The findings of marketing diffusion 
literature have shown the effect of the perceived attributes of a new product, in addition 
to the marketing mix of advertising and personal selling, on its rate of purchase. 
 Meanwhile, for most sociologists and political scientists, the notion of diffusion 
has suggested multiple adoptions of similar practices by a population (Elkins & Simmons, 
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2005). In the public policy context, therefore, diffusion is seen as the spread of a policy 
that is new to the jurisdiction adopting it, regardless of whether or not it has already been 
adopted elsewhere (Walker, 1969; Gray, 1973). However, policy diffusion is not defined 
exclusively by the fact that a new policy has spread in that it is a consequence of 
"interdependence." (Gilardi, 2014) Strang (1991) defined diffusion as the process by 
which the “prior adoption of a trait or practice in a population alters the probability of 
adoption for remaining non-adopters.” (p. 325)  
 Strang’s (1991) definition captured the meaning of policy diffusion by implying 
the interdependence among units such that policy choices in one jurisdiction are 
influenced by the choices of others (Elikns and Simmons, 2005; Moynihan, Shipan, & 
Volden, 2012; Fuglister, 2012). In a similar vein, Simon et al. (2006) argued that policy 
diffusion at the international level takes place when government policy choices in a 
specific country are systemically conditioned by prior policy decisions made in other 
countries.  
 Policy diffusion in adoption. Policy diffusion scholars have studied diffusion by 
concentrating on the stage of policy initiation (Damanpour & Schneider, 2006; Graham, 
Shipan, & Volden, 2012). Borrowing the notion of the innovation initiation stage
29
 
suggested by Zaltman et al. (1973), the stage of policy initiation can be subdivided as 
follows: knowledge-awareness, formation of attitudes toward the innovation, and 
decision. 
                                           
29
 Similarly, Rogers (2003) subdivided the initiation stage as knowledge, persuasion, and 
decision. 
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 Knowledge-awareness substage is the stage of the innovation process in which a 
decision-making unit is exposed to a new policy and the opportunity to utilize that policy 
in a jurisdiction. With regard to which comes first, the knowledge (or awareness) or the 
needs of a new policy, it is debatable because research does not clearly answer this 
question (Rogers & Shoemaker, 1971; Zaltman, Duncan, & Holbek, 1973; Rogers, 2003). 
Yet, the awareness of a new policy can lead a jurisdiction to the perception of a 
performance gap,
30
 thereby improving the jurisdiction's functioning, either internally or 
in its relationship with the outside environment. 
 Formation of attitudes toward the innovation substage implies attitudinal 
dimensions that a decision-making unit can exhibit about a new policy. The main 
attitudinal dimensions are openness to the innovation and the perception of potential for 
innovation (Duncan, 1972). The components of openness to the innovation include 
whether decision-making units are willing to consider a new policy, and whether they 
expect a new policy to improve the jurisdiction's functioning. The perception of potential 
for innovation is associated with the confidence of decision-making units concerning the 
jurisdiction's capacity to operate a new policy and the members' commitment to work for 
implementing the policy.  
 Decision substage takes place when decision-making units determine the 
adoption of a new policy. In this substage, these units assess the information about the 
potential policy. According to Rogers (1995), adoption is “a decision to make full use of 
                                           
30
 It indicates a discrepancy between criteria of satisfactory performance (what decision makers 
ought to do) and the actual performance (Zaltman et al., 1973). 
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an innovation as the best course of action available.” (p. 21) By this definition, the policy 
that is new to a jurisdiction is considered to have been adopted when it is enacted by 
legislature, or when the law supports a political decision on the policy creation (Zaltman, 
Duncan, & Holbek, 1973; Damanpour, 1987). 
 In accordance with Zaltman et al.'s approach to innovation initiation, scholars 
have conceptualized policy initiation as a multiphase process (Jasperson, Carter, & Zmud, 
2005; Damanpour & Schneider, 2006; Cohen-Vogel & Ingle, 2007). For example, 
Cohen-Vogel and Ingle (2007) divided the process of policy initiation into agenda-setting, 
proposal formulation, and adoption. Similarly, Damanpour and Schneider (2006) looked 
at pre-adoption activities and the managerial decision to adopt the policy.  
 However, most of empirical research on policy diffusion has equated policy 
initiation with "dichotomous" adoption decision by treating it as a dummy variable — 
either to adopt or reject (Germain, 1996; Nystrom, Ramamurthy & Wilson, 2002). The 
primary concern of diffusion studies, therefore, has lay in the variation in jurisdictions' 
adoption of a policy as well as the timing of adoption in relation to the institutional or 
political characteristics of a jurisdiction or interdependence with other jurisdictions 
(Walker, 1969; Gray, 1973; Berry & Berry, 1990; Lieberman & Shaw, 2000; Boehmke & 
Witmer, 2004; Lee, 2009; Shipan & Volden, 2012; McGrath, 2013).   
 Policy diffusion in implementation. The diffusion approach, focusing on the 
temporal adoption of a policy across jurisdictions, has long been central to diffusion 
research. Yet, this diffusion perspective has faced severe criticism for providing only a 
dichotomous measure of adoption that ignores policy scope, especially, the extent of 
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implementation or the extensive use of a policy (Downs & Mohr, 1976; Clark, 1985; 
McNeal et al., 2003; Tolbert, Mossberger, & McNeal, 2008). Studies of innovation 
diffusion — especially on the diffusion of information technology (IT) applications — 
have pointed out that a political decision to adopt an innovation could not guarantee its 
actual use within a jurisdiction (Boyne, Gould-Williams, & Walker, 2005; Walker, 2006); 
innovation would be truly able to take place when it was actually implemented by 
members (Damanpour, 1987; Damanpour & Schneider, 2006).  
 For example, Jasperson et al. (2005) argued that the functional potential of an 
adopted IT application was underutilized due to the managerial decisions on its 
implementation. Such evidence demonstrated that the innovation failed in its 
implementation would not influence the legitimacy of a public organization, although the 
organization adopted an innovation to seek its legitimacy (Boyne, Gould-Williams, & 
Walker, 2005).  
 Against the single-minded attention to policy adoption, scholars have 
emphasized that policy diffusion should be associated with knowledge utilization in two 
stages: adoption and implementation (Downs & Mohr, 1976; Beyer & Trice, 1982; De 
Lancer Julnes & Holzer, 2001). According to this point of view, understanding the extent 
of implementation can help scholars and policy makers avoid limiting their jurisdictions 
to symbolic policies (Clark, 1985; De Lancer Julnes & Holzer, 2001).  
 According to the communications model of intergovernmental policy 
implementation developed by Goggin et al. (1990), policy implementation is considered 
both a process itself and the result of the process. Understanding implementation as a 
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process is to put already-made policy decisions into effect. In this view, state 
implementation behavior, at its simplest, can be described dichotomously; 
implementation occurred (scored 1), or it did not occur (scored 0). However, policy 
implementation should be assumed to involve several related activities to achieve a goal 
(Goggin et al., 1990). Thus, the essential aspect of implementation is "the satisfactory 
performance of certain necessary tasks related to carrying out the intent of the law." 
(Goggin et al., 1990, p. 34)   
 Meanwhile, implementation as the result of a process is defined in two other 
ways: outputs and outcomes. Outputs are the extent to which programmatic goals have 
been accomplished; outcomes are the change in the complex problem that the policy is 
intended to solve. In the conceptualization of implementation as a process, if certain 
activities are carried out as specified by law, implementation has taken place. However, 
in the notion of the implementation results, mere occurrence of certain activities is not the 
same as the true implementation due to a lack of outputs or outcomes (Goggin et al., 
1990).    
 The research on policy diffusion tends to measure the extent of implementation 
of a policy across jurisdictions by conceptualizing implementation as a process. For 
instance, McNeal et al. (2007) used Campaign Finance Disclosure Grade, a 13-point 
scale ranging from F to A+, to explore the extent of e-disclosure implementation across 
the states. The grades were based on 120 points allocated for state activities, such as the 
content of the disclosure law, the enforcement of the law, and the filing schedule 
(Campaign Disclosure Project, 2003). Tolbert et al. (2008) used an index of state e-
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government use to examine overall performance of state digital government. This 
measure was a zero to 100 point e-government index (i.e. percentage score) for each state 
e-government website, and was created to see how the 50 states rank. McNeal et al. (2003) 
used the percentage score of state government websites offering online services to 
citizens, including, for a comparison and validity test of the index of state e-government 
use, the overall state ranking of government websites as a secondary measure. 
Meanwhile, Lee et al. (2011), at the global level, used the Web Measure Index to measure 
e-government performance of nations. This indicator was "based on a questionnaire, 
which allocated a binary value to the indicator base on the presence/absence of specific 
electronic facilities/services available." (UN, 2008, p. 15) 
Diffusion Mechanisms in the Previous Research  
 Policy diffusion is considered a product of interdependence (Strang, 1991; 
Maggetti & Gilardi, 2013). Diffusion scholars usually associate interdependence with 
mechanisms that identify how diffusion is occurring (Maggetti & Gilardi, 2013) From the 
various studies either of state-to-state diffusion or of the diffusion between the 
governments at the different levels, diffusion scholars have suggested the main 
mechanisms that fall into four categories of interdependence: Competition, coercion, 
policy learning, and socialization (Berry & Berry, 1990; Case, Hines, & Rosen, 1993; 
Mooney & Lee, 1995; Shipan & Volden, 2006; Graham, Shipan, & Volden, 2012). Since 
the diffusion of EFOIA is irrelevant to economic motivation and coercion, this section 
elaborates on policy learning and socialization, rather than competition and coercion. 
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 Competition. Policy diffusion through competition can occur when governments 
react to one another either to gain an economic advantage or to avoid an economic 
disadvantage, thereby improving their economic conditions and the quality of the lives of 
state residents (Walker, Avellaneda, & Berry, 2007). This type of policy diffusion is 
generally associated with races between state governments for tax bases or tourist 
revenues (Boehmke & Witmer, 2004; Berry & Baybeck, 2005; Baybeck, Berry, & Siegel, 
2011). For example, Baybeck et al. (2011) found that the diffusion of lottery business 
was derived by intergovernmental competition over residents' location choices either to 
avoid a loss of revenue or to attract residents of other states across the border to play. 
Similarly, Boehmke and Witmer (2004) argued that the spread of Indian gaming 
compacts resulted from economic competition among cities sensitive to economic 
spillovers across the jurisdictions. 
 Economic competition among states is considered either to facilitate or to hinder 
the spread of public policies, depending on economic spillovers across states (Shipan & 
Volden, 2008). If there are positive economic spillovers, states will be more likely to 
adopt others' policy. However, if there are negative economic spillovers, states will be 
less likely to adopt a policy that others lack. Thus, considering the economic effect of 
adoption by other states, states either defensively prevent as a loss of revenue (Alm, 
McKee, & Skidmore, 1993; Erekson et al., 1999; Berry & Baybeck, 2005), or proactively 
avoid increased costs for service provision resulting from policy choices of others (Berry, 
Fording, & Hanson, 2003; Bailey & Rom, 2004; Baybeck, Berry, & Siegel, 2011).  
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 Coercion. Policy diffusion through coercion can arise horizontally or vertically 
when one government imposes its policy preferences on others. In a horizontal setting, 
powerful institutions may apply pressure on targeted governments until they change their 
policies through collaborative efforts, such as economic sanctions or issue linkage 
(Schelling, 1960; Hufbauer, Schott, & Elliott, 1990). International institutions like the 
United Nations and the International Monetary Fund can attempt to coerce individual 
countries to take actions that meet common expectations. In a vertical setting, the federal 
government may fulfill this role (Karch, 2006; Lee, 2009). According to the scholars 
examining the effects of federal “top-down pressure” on policy adoptions of states, the 
passage of federal laws in a policy area can force specific state activities (Karch, 2006; 
Berry & Berry, 2007). Furthermore, Shipan and Volden (2008) contended that state-level 
policies can be coercive when the state law preempts either future local laws on the same 
policy. 
 As Berry and Berry (1999, 2007) noted, however, this type of policy diffusion 
through coercion seems highly uninteresting in that the federal law constrains states’ 
discretion. A more interesting form of policy diffusion through coercion can take place 
when federal actions affect policy choices of states, but states retain their discretion. 
Subsequent studies investigated the influence of federal actions intertwined with carrot-
and-stick incentives (Welch & Thompson, 1980; Allen, Pettus, & Haider-Markel, 2004; 
Volden, 2006; Nicholson-Crotty, 2009; Martin, Strach, & Schackman, 2013). The 
findings suggested that the use of fiscal incentives — often in the form of federal grants 
— led states to federal policy preferences. For instance, states can be encouraged to adopt 
 64 
 
lower speed limits and higher drinking ages to avoid the lost of highway funds from the 
federal government (Shipan & Volden, 2008).  
 Policy learning. Policy diffusion through policy learning can take place when 
governments learn from others’ experience to solve policy problems they in common face 
(Lee, Chang, & Berry, 2011; Graham, Shipan, & Volden, 2012). Policy learning 
generally refers to “a process whereby policy makers change their beliefs about the effect 
of policies.” (Dobbin, Simmons, & Garrett, 2007, p. 460) When others’ experiences 
influence these belief changes, policy learning can be considered a mechanism of policy 
diffusion (Gilardi, 2010). Levy (1994) describes this experiential learning as “the 
development of new beliefs, skills, or procedures as a result of the observation and 
interpretation of experience.” (p. 283)  
 Policy learning is characterized as analytic construction (Levy, 1994). Individual 
states may interpret the experience of others in terms of their own analytic assumptions 
and worldviews. According to the rationalists’ theory of policy learning, the analytic 
capabilities of states can be either strong or bounded. If states have full analytical 
capabilities and thus take into account all available information, their policy learning will 
be rational (i.e. Bayesian learning).  
 However, if states use cognitive shortcuts by looking at relevant information 
rather than at all information, their policy learning will be more bounded (i.e. bounded 
learning). Most analysis of policy diffusion bases policy learning on the model of 
bounded learning, such that states facing a common policy problem may simplify the 
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search for a solution through the cognitive shortcut of learning from each other (Simon, 
1947; Walker, 1969; Berry & Baybeck, 2005; Walker, Avellaneda, & Berry, 2007). 
 When it comes to what policy makers learn from others’ experience, diffusion 
studies have noted that they learn about success (or effectiveness) of a given policy 
(Volden, 2006; Gilardi, 2010; Fuglister, 2012). Yet, policy learning may be more 
complicated than simply perceiving success, as policy makers may have different goals 
(Gilardi, 2010). For example, policy makers may want to learn about a policy’s political 
viability and public supports that are associated with their re-election and reappointment 
(Graham, Shipan, & Volden, 2012). Moreover, policy makers often learn about failed 
policies (Soule, 1999; Sharman, 2010). Therefore, policy learning can be defined as a 
process whereby others’ experience provides relevant information on the likely 
consequences of a given policy (Gilardi, 2010). 
 Two notable scholars supported the diffusion through policy learning: US 
Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis and Schattschneider. Justice Brandeis praised 
states as laboratories of democracy, including the potential for federal learning from 
states beyond state-to-state learning (see New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 
262[1932], 311); governments act as laboratories where a law is enacted from the lower 
level of the democratic system, up to the higher level. Meanwhile, Schattschneider (1960) 
assumed that groups unable to prevail in one venue may widen the scope of conflict by 
seeking action in another to accomplish their goals.   
 According to diffusion scholars, policy diffusion through learning is associated 
with various channels for information flows. For example, Grossback et al (2004) and 
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Volden (2006) found states' geographical learning for solutions in the areas of education 
and criminal sentencing policies via regional interactions among the states. On the other 
hand, Mossberger (1999) examined the upward diffusion from the states to the federal 
government, concentrating on the federal Empowerment Zone and Enterprise 
Communities (EZ/EC) program. The findings suggested that federal policy makers 
learned how to coordinate the EZ/EC program from the state enterprise-zone programs31, 
via professional networks — such as the Council of State Community Development 
Agencies and the Democratic National Committee — conveying information about 
general trends in the state enterprise zones. 
  Socialization (Normative pressure). The greatest degree of interdependence 
among governments accompanies socialization. Socialization — that is, normative 
pressure labeled by DiMaggio and Powell (1983) — is generally defined as “a process of 
inducting actors into the norms and rules of a community.” (Siegel, 1965; Alderson, 2001; 
Checkel, 2005; Graham, Shipan, & Volden, 2012, p. 692) Central governments (e.g. 
federal government or international organizations) can engage in socialization by 
inducing sub-governments to change policy preferences in conformity with central norms, 
rules or practices that appear legitimate to citizens and policy entrepreneurs (Finnemore, 
1993; Walker, Avellaneda, & Berry, 2007). 
                                           
31
 Similarly, Weissert and Scheller (2008) identified the role of policy learning from states in 
decision-making of federal health laws. They noted that federal policy learning from the states 
occurred when extensive state expertise and a definite lack of federal knowledge existed. 
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 Constructivists
32
 consider socialization an important mechanism of diffusion 
that causes even more stable long-term policy changes (Graham, Shipan, & Volden, 
2012). According to Aberg (2008), socialization is the provision of access to norms or 
ideals that should be incorporated so as to be recognized as members of a given society. 
Moreover, socialization is often called hegemonic power that “shapes the norms and 
value orientations within which policy is conducted.” (Ikenberry & Kupchan, 1990, p. 
288)  
 Socialization has two characteristics that make it distinguished from policy 
learning. The first distinction is that policy learning has to do with a state’s learning of 
the likely (or anticipated) consequences of a policy, whereas socialization connotes a 
state’s learning of norms and rules of a political community to which it belongs. The 
second distinction is that policy learning is consistent with the logic of consequence, 
while socialization is based on the logic of appropriateness (March & Olsen, 2006).  
 The logic of consequence implies that a state’s assessment of the likely 
consequences of a policy may drive a change in its policy actions; states are expected to 
choose among alternatives by assessing the likely consequences of each for policy goals 
(Croidieu & Monin, 2010). However, considering states’ policy actions only in the logic 
of consequence overlooks the substantial roles of norms, rules, and identities of a 
political community that may influence states.  
                                           
32
 Alderson (2001) did not see socialization as a diffusion mechanism, arguing that socialization 
imagines states reacting in a similar way to different initial conditions, not related to the process 
triggering the diffusion of norms from one country to another. However, this study follows the 
general viewpoint of socialization suggested by diffusion scholars (Graham et al., 2012). 
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 Within the logic of appropriateness, states’ policy actions are based more on 
identifying the “normatively appropriate behavior” than on calculating the return 
expected from alternative choices (March & Olsen, 2006). It is because states do care 
about their national reputation and image as “normal” members of a political community 
(Gurowitz, 2006). According to the logic of appropriateness, states are expected to fulfill 
the obligations encapsulated in rules and membership in a political community since the 
rules are seen as legitimate and rightful (March & Olsen, 2006). Such normative pressure 
may compel states to change their policy preferences to conform to norms and rules of 
the community in which they are involved (Risse et al., 1999; Johnston, 2001; Aberg, 
2008).  
 The primary processes
33
 of socialization in which norms change behavior are 
persuasion and acculturation (Checkel, 1999; Goodman & Jinks, 2004; Pegram, 2010). 
These mechanisms are essentially based on theories of how preferences form as well as 
the conditions under which preferences change (Goodman & Jinks, 2004). Persuasion is 
the active inculcation of norms (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998): persuaded states 
internalize new norms and rules of appropriate behavior, thereby redefining their 
preferences accordingly (Checkel, 1999). Persuasion theorists contend that persuasion 
“requires argument and deliberation in an effort to change the minds of others.” 
(Goodman & Jinks, 2004, p. 635) In other words, persuasion can take place when states 
assess the content of a particular norm actively, and then change their minds along with 
                                           
33
 This study does not include strategic calculation as a process of socialization that is typically 
associated with incentives (or sanctions) regarding membership (Checkel, 1999; Goodman & 
Jinks, 2004), as states cannot be excluded from the membership of the U.S. federal system. 
 69 
 
confidence in the appropriateness of the norm. Thus, persuasive efforts need careful 
arguments and reasoned logic that prove the appropriateness of a norm, belief, or practice 
(Patterson, 2006).  
 Meanwhile, acculturation is the process by which states adopt the beliefs and 
behavioral patterns of their reference group (Goodman & Jinks, 2004, 2005). Social 
psychologists argue that acculturation results from cognitive pressures that are self-
imposed or externally imposed. States may assimilate to a reference group to minimize 
cognitive dissonance (Goodman & Jinks, 2004). Cognitive dissonance is the self-imposed 
discomfort — such as anxiety, regret, or guilt — that is caused by holding inconsistent 
cognitions (Frank, 1985).  
 This internal pressure can motivate states either to change their behavior, or to 
find ways to justify their past behavior (Gibbons et al., 1997). In addition, states can be 
compelled to change their behavior to conform with their reference group, as they seek 
social legitimacy and minimize social disapproval (Petty et al., 1997). This external 
pressure can impose social-psychological sanctions on states through shaming or 
shunning (Patterson, 2006).  
 It has been little known about policy diffusion through socialization at the state 
level. Most studies of norm diffusion have employed the international or global level by 
assuming that the international system is an "institutional environment structured by 
inter-subjective cognitions and norms." (Schimmelfennig, 2000, p. 114) The diffusion of 
e-government and e-democracy across nations (Lee, Chang, & Berry, 2011), the diffusion 
of transparency across European countries (Grigorescu, 2002) and the diffusion of the 
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value of science policy organizations across the UNESCO members (Finnemore, 1993) 
offer scholars and practitioners good examples of policy diffusion through socialization. 
Theoretical Logic for Understanding the Diffusion of EFOIA   
 The diffusion of EFOIA in the US states cannot be attributed to competition in 
that the individual state does not compete with others over the economic well-being of 
EFOIA. Coercion is also inappropriate as an explanation for the diffusion of EFOIA, as 
the federal government or a powerful state does not coerce targeted states to influence 
their adoption and implementation of EFOIA. In regard to an indirect effect of the federal 
law, some scholars have argued that political forces, such as national debates and 
Congressional hearings, may influence state policymaking by increasing national 
attention to a given policy (i.e. visibility or salience) (Karch, 2012; McCann, Shipan, & 
Volden, 2012).  
 However, this argument says little about a cognitive process through which the 
observation and interpretation of a certain event produce a change in beliefs, and thereby 
induce behavioral change (Heclo, 1974; Hall, 1993). The study finding that highly salient 
policies do not necessarily spread across sub-national government shows the weak 
explanatory power of such argument (Nicholson-Crotty, 2009; Koski, 2010).  
 If so, why have many of early adopters failed to sustain the leadership position in 
online transparency through the implementation stage of EFOIA? To identify the 
appropriate mechanisms associated with the diffusion of EFOIA, this study employs the 
constructivist and the rationalist perspectives on policy diffusion. Those theoretical points 
of view suggest two potential mechanisms through which the diffusion of EFOIA takes 
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place: socialization and policy learning. In addition, this study suggests that such 
differences in diffusion between states' adoption and implementation of EFOIA result 
from the conditional nature of diffusion mechanisms operating differently at two stages; 
socialization may influence states' adoption of EFOIA, but its influence does not continue 
through the implementation phase because of its "period effects." 
 Socialization as a diffusion mechanism only at the adoption stage of EFOIA. 
Theoretical arguments on socialization can provide the logic for explaining the diffusion 
of EFOIA. As the public access to government information became institutionalized by 
the federal government, its value as a symbol of good governance can rise. Given the 
reasoned logic that the adoption of EFOIA is “the right things to do” for realizing civil 
sovereignty, states might be persuaded to engage in increasing public access to 
government records. Yet, change in a state's legal circumstance poses a dilemma: an 
individual state should comply with the norm of e-transparency to maintain its legitimacy, 
but the state — in terms of the interest of efficiency — should minimize the extent to 
which complying with EFOIA disrupts its activities. Thus, EFOIA is more likely to be 
transmitted the state in which considerable societal supports for the law exist. 
   Borrowing the concept of norm resonance, constructivist theorists explain why, 
even holding a diffusion mechanism constant, some states are more vulnerable than 
others to activism invoking a new norm. Constructivist theorists define norms as a 
community’s shared understandings and its intentions reflecting legitimate social 
purposes (Ruggie, 1998; Payne, 2001). By this definition, a norm is an enabling 
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framework for action that offers collective expectations about proper behavior for a given 
identity (Jepperson, Wendt, & Katzenstein, 1996).  
 The notion of norm resonance is associated with the role of an existing normative 
framework in accepting emergent norms (Payne, 2001). According to Guido (2001), 
preexisting norms provide actors who pursue the introduction of a new norm with reasons 
to justify their argument. Thus, unless a new norm “resonates” with preexisting collective 
norms embedded in a political community, persuasive messages justifying a new norm 
cannot be transmitted (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; Marcussen et al., 1999). In this view, 
effective resonance occurs when a new norm fits into a given context, and thus enjoys 
considerable societal acceptance of its legitimacy (Goodman & Jinks, 2004). 
 The following empirical studies underline the importance of norm resonance for  
successful norm diffusion. Lee et al. (2011) found evidence that e-government and e-
democracy are more likely to be developed in an area that is already highly ranked in 
transparency. Grigorescu (2002) attributes the unsuccessful transmission of the norm of 
transparency to the lack of “resonance” with the foundational norms on European 
institutions. The concept of norm resonance offers the expectation that EFOIA will be 
more likely to be transmitted to the state in which the existing normative framework (e.g. 
policy culture) is consistent with a norm of transparency. From the research on e-
disclosure, ethics laws, and anti-corruption reforms, this study suggests several factors 
indicating the "internal normative climate" that is consistent with a norm of transparency: 
liberal ideological climate, public pressure, and innovative policy culture. 
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 Liberal ideological climate. Government transparency is often considered an 
issue that lacks a strong ideological basis, as both Republicans and Democrats are 
supportive of it (Cornyn, 2005). Yet, this viewpoint is half right in that conservatives and 
liberals are both interested in transparency, but different types of transparency 
(Piotrowski & Van Ryzin, 2007); conservatives are more concerned than liberals about 
accessing security-related information, whereas liberals are more concerned with 
accessing government information on principle and for good governance concerns. 
Scholars of e-disclosure, ethics laws, and anti-corruption reforms have offered empirical 
findings that a liberal ideological climate in a state is positively associated with 
disclosure of government information since it is supportive of regulating the actions of 
government officials (Loftus, 1994; Rosenson, 2003; McNeal & Hale, 2010; Ríos et al., 
2013). The statutes of the early adopters precisely designated that a democratic 
government provides the public with information they need to participate in the 
democratic process and request government officials to be held accountable for their 
actions. Also, the early adopters appeared to support openness to government information 
in that they made precise improvement to their laws on online access to public records. 
Thus, I predict that a state with a liberal ideological climate will be more likely to adopt 
EFOIA.  
 
H1: There is a positive relationship between a liberal ideological climate 
and a state’s adoption of EFOIA. 
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 Public pressure (Public demand). Collective pressure from citizens may affect 
state policymaking in that elected officials are very sensitive to their reelections (Berry & 
Berry, 1999, 2007). Skocpol et al. (1993) argued that the active engagement of citizens in 
enhancing their civil rights would force the government to become more supportive of 
civil rights reforms. From this point of view, greater engagement of citizens in 
democratic processes, such as referendum, may put greater pressure on states to adopt 
EFOIA (Gamble, 1997; McNeal & Hale, 2010). Furthermore, various scholars argued 
that the high levels of citizens' education and their Internet use increased public demand 
for e-disclosure policies of states, such as electronic campaign finance laws (Cheng, 1992; 
Debreceny et al., 2002; McNeal et al, 2007; Serrano et al, 2009; McNeal & Hale, 2010). 
Piotrowski and Van Ryzin (2007) argued that possessing the high levels of education and 
the Internet use may provide individuals with necessary skills for navigating a 
bureaucracy as well as the confidence to request information from the government. In a 
similar vein, Lee et al. (2011) contended that citizens became more informed and more 
knowledgeable about e-government and e-democracy as their level of education and 
Internet use increased. Therefore, I predict that a state with a greater level of public 
pressure to disclose information will be more likely to adopt EFOIA.  
 
H2: There is a positive relationship between public pressure and a state’s 
adoption of EFOIA. 
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 Innovative policy culture. Innovative policy culture of a state refers to general 
climate of supporting policy change (i.e. adoption of a new policy) in the state (Soule, 
1999). Many diffusion scholars argued that states with more innovative policy culture 
may pass new policies earlier than do those with less innovative policy cultures (Walker, 
1969; Gray, 1973; Eyestone, 1977; Savage, 1978; Grattet et al., 1998). Moreover, Soule 
and Zylan (1997) found that states appeared to be fairly consistent over time with regard 
to policy decisions; early adopters of one type of policy tended to be early adopters of 
other policies. Thus, I predict that innovative policy culture will have a positive impact 
on a state's adoption and implementation of EFOIA.  
 
H3a: There is a positive relationship between innovative policy culture and a 
state’s adoption of EFOIA. 
  
 In addition, many scholars have supported the positive association of slack with 
innovative projects because slack resources not only protect organizations from the 
uncertain success of those projects, but also permit those organizations to more safely 
experiment with new strategies (Delbecq & Mills, 1985; Damanpour, 1987; Moses, 1992). 
Therefore, I predict that the effect of innovative policy culture will increase in the state 
with the high levels of slack resources. 
 
H3b: The effect of innovative policy culture will increase in the state with the 
high levels of slack resources. 
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 Period effects (Temporalization). According to the legal environment theory, the 
passage of EFOIA by the federal government created a normative environment in which 
legitimacy was conditioned on government transparency. In response to this normative 
environment, states may adopt EFOIA to enhance their legitimacy. However, this 
normative pressure on states to adopt EFOIA is a "period" or "temporal" effect that is not 
pervasive, but time specific (Walker, 1969; Gray, 1973; Edelman, 1990, 1992; Grattet & 
Jenness, 1998). In other words, the influences of normative pressure of law on 
organizations fade over time. Normative pressure from the legal environment does not 
easily erode long-held managerial interests (Edelman, 1992).  
 In addition, the meaning of compliance with law is vague. The weak enforcement 
mechanisms of law, such as inadequate and inconsistent feedback on what organizational 
practices are legal, make the meaning of compliance more obscure, thereby allowing 
organizations to mediate the meaning of compliance in a way that accommodates their 
managerial interests (Edelman, 1992). As an empirical example of the period effects of 
socialization, Edelman (1992) found that the ambiguity and weak enforcement 
mechanisms of EEO/AA
34
 law weaken its capacity to influence organizations directly. In 
addition, Mbaye (2001) demonstrated that EU members failed to implement EU 
directives because they paid more attention to bureaucratic efficiency and economic 
power than compliance with their normative obligations. Thus, I predict that the effect of 
socialization is unlikely to continue through the implementation phase because of period 
effects. 
                                           
34
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H4: There is no relationship between internal normative climate (i.e. 
liberalism, public pressure, and innovativeness) and a state's implementation 
of EFOIA. 
 
 Policy learning
35
 as a mechanism at the adoption and implementation stages. 
Theoretical argument on policy learning can provide the logic that explains the diffusion 
of EFOIA at the stage of both adoption and implementation. If a state seeks a policy 
solution to government transparency, but faces uncertainty about what to do, it may 
monitor others’ experience in increasing public access to governmental records. 
Observing others' experience may provide an individual state with cognitive shortcuts to 
deal with the issue of government transparency, and thus help the states save time and 
resources for obtaining new information. Furthermore, learning from others enables an 
individual state to assess the likely consequences of EFOIA, offering knowledge about 
EFOIA the state can experiment with in its own jurisdictions. 
 Lee et al. (2011) argued that information sharing through interactions could be 
the substantial factor leading to the learning process. A state's involvement in more 
interactive circumstances can increase the "opportunity to learn" through information 
exchange with others. Although interactions in itself do not ensure that learning takes 
place, scholars have argued that they might involve learning (Berry and Berry, 1999) 
Thus, this study also argues that states may learn from others through interactions with 
                                           
35
 This study focuses on horizontal learning whereby states learn from each other through 
regional or national interactions among them, not considering the opportunity to learn from the 
federal government or vice versa. 
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others. From scholarly research on the diffusion of policies across state governments, this 
study suggests two factors associated with interactions among states: Neighboring effects 
and professional networks.  
 Neighboring effects. Neighboring effects refer to the impact of regional 
interactions among the states sharing a border or those within a similar geographic region 
on policy behavior of states (Hageman & Robb, 2011); neighboring effects include the 
notion both of neighboring models and of fixed-region models to consider direct and 
indirect neighboring states (Hageman & Robb, 2011). According to regional diffusion 
theorists, states are more likely to learn from the experience of their adjacent neighbors or 
those within a similar geographic region to reduce the political risk of their policy choices 
(Berry & Berry, 1990, 1999; Mintrom, 1997; Balla, 2001; Hageman & Robb, 2011).  
 Many studies have demonstrated that neighboring effects can influence policy 
behavior of states. For example, the scholars of civil rights legislation and anti-corruption 
policies demonstrated that states were more likely to emulate neighboring states 
regarding civil rights reforms or e-disclosure policies (Grattet et al, 1998; Rosenson, 
2003). Berry and Berry (1999) also argued that learning from nearby states could lead a 
targeted state to similar policy outcomes, as they tended to have similar economic, 
political, or social environments. Similarly, Mooney (2001) contended that the bias of 
policy makers relying on geographical learning for policy solutions resulted from 
"familiarity, ease of communication, cross-mixing of media and population, and common 
values.” (p. 105) Thus, I predict that neighboring effects are positively associated with a 
state's adoption of EFOIA. 
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H5a: There is a positive relationship between neighboring effects and a 
state's adoption of EFOIA. 
  
 At a glance, states adjacent to those that have maintained a high rank in online 
transparency tended to show great improvement in operating their transparency portals in 
the following year. In this respect, a state's implementation may rely heavily on evidence 
of success because of its greater access to information on the likely consequences of a 
specific policy other states have shown. According to Grossback et al (2004), the policy 
choices of states depend on a "function of the gain in utility the government will receive 
by moving away from its status quo policy and toward the innovation." (p. 523) In 
addition, Volden (2006) and Fuglister (2012) found that states tended to emulate only 
successful policies after having assessed how others had performed elsewhere. Similarly, 
Costa (2013) found that a country was more likely to strengthen its FOIA law when its 
neighbors had a strong FOIA law.  
 Furthermore, the effect of learning from the success of neighbors may be 
conditional on states. In fact, not every state adjacent to "successful" states shows distinct 
progress in providing online access to government spending data. If so, who can be more 
sensitive to success? If states consider innovation with inadequate slack resources, they 
may prefer to avoid failure in the innovation because of concerns on political risk of their 
policy choices, and thus pay greater attention to success from nearby states. Thus, I 
predict that neighboring effects will be positively associated with the implementation of 
the states in a lack of slack resources.  
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H5b: Neighboring effects will be positively associated with the 
implementation of the states in a lack of slack resources. 
   
 Professional networks. Geographic location should not constrain the learning 
process. Research has long shown that national interactions through formal and informal 
professional networks (or associations) of state policymakers, such as the National 
Governors Association (NGA) and National Conference of State Legislators (NCSL), 
may increase states' opportunity to share policy ideas and experiences with each other 
(Walker, 1969; Grupp & Richards, 1975; Baumgartner & Jones, 1993; Rogers, 1995).   
 Many studies have demonstrated that professional networks can provide an 
institutional environment or channels whereby policy makers exchange and learn from 
the experiences of others. Mossberger (2000), in her six-state case study of enterprise 
zones, noted that professional networks functioned as sources of information as well as 
influence that was independent from federal policy impetus. McNeal et al. (2003) found 
that professional networks of topical subcommittees formed within the NGA and NCSL 
played a significant role especially in the administrative reform that was not politically 
salient. Furthermore, Lee et al. (2011), at the global level, found that the more 
international professional networks a nation belonged to, the more highly ranked the 
nation was in e-government. Therefore, professional networks of governors or state 
administrators can be expected to play a significant role in the promotion of EFOIA. 
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H6a: There is a positive relationship between professional networks and a 
state’s adoption of EFOIA. 
 
H6b: There is a positive relationship between professional networks and a 
state’s implementation of EFOIA. 
 
Conceptual Framework 
 
  
 Figure 17 Conceptual Framework for Analysis 
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 Figure 17 presents a conceptual framework for explaining the differences in 
diffusion between the adoption and implementation of EFOIA. This study considers 
socialization and policy learning the mechanisms that induce the diffusion of EFOIA. 
Also, this study suggests that the operations of socialization and policy learning differ, 
relying on the stage of EFOIA. The operation of socialization does not continue through 
the implementation stage, leading to the differences in diffusion between adoption and 
implementation.   
 As shown in Figure 17, states that resonate with the norm of transparency will be 
more likely to engage in socialization. Thus, a state with a liberal political climate, public 
demand for transparency, and innovative policy culture will be more likely to adopt 
EFOIA. Furthermore, the legal practice of the federal government concerning 
transparency can impose normative pressure on states to take actions in compliance with 
the legal environment.  
 At the same time, states that involve in more interactive environment will be 
more likely to engage in policy learning. Therefore, greater interactions of an individual 
state with neighbors and its participation in professional networks will have a positive 
impact on a state's adoption and implementation of EFOIA. Understanding the different 
nature of socialization and learning relying on two stages of EFOIA will answer the 
following questions: Why some states have adopted EFOIA earlier than others, why 
some states have implemented EFOIA more successfully than others, and why some 
early adopters have failed to implement EFOIA successfully.  
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 In addition, based on the findings of the previous research on diffusion, this 
study will employ several control variables that may affect states’ adoption and/or 
implementation of EFOIA: Slack resources, partisanship, state legislative professionalism, 
scandals, legal practice, FOIA strength, IT management, and e-government. 
 Slack resources. Scholarly literature on e-disclosure has concluded that slack 
resources associated with the capacity to innovate may account for states’ adoption and 
their more extensive implementation of e-disclosure initiatives (Rosenson, 2003; McNeal 
et al, 2007; McNeal & Hale, 2010). The operation of EFOIA requires start-up and 
maintenance costs associated with transparency websites. Those apparent costs will be 
significant resistance to the institutionalization of EFOIA. In addition, McFarland (1976) 
found that citizens of wealthier states tended to have a greater desire for good-
government initiatives. In this view, slack resources may affect public or social pressure 
for e-transparency as a symbol of good governance, thereby leading to a trustworthy, 
high performing, and accountable government (Hood & Heald, 2006). Thus, I predict that 
slack resources will be positively associated with a state’s adoption and implementation 
of EFOIA.  
 
H7a: There is a positive relationship between slack resources and a state’s    
adoption of EFOIA. 
 
H7b: There is a positive relationship between slack resources and a state’s  
implementation of EFOIA. 
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 State legislative professionalism. Walker (1969) argues that "the states which 
provide the most extensive staff and research facilities in their legislatures ought to 
pioneer in the adoption of new programs." (p. 885) Moreover, as legislatures become 
more professional, they are better prepared to deal with complex policy issues (Jones, 
1994). Legislative professionalism has been considered to influence program adoption 
and spending levels in various policy areas, such as public assistance (Derthick, 1970), 
juvenile corrections (Downs, 1976), and air pollution (Downs & Rocke, 1980). Thus, I 
predict that state legislative professionalism will be positively associated with a state’s 
adoption and implementation of EFOIA. 
 
H8a: There is a positive relationship between state legislative 
professionalism and a state’s adoption of EFOIA. 
 
H8b: There is a positive relationship between state legislative 
professionalism and a state’s implementation of EFOIA. 
  
 Partisanship. The Clinton administration in the 1990s promoted the idea of free 
access to information about the government and the actions of elected officials (Halstuk 
& Chamberlin, 2001). However, in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001, the 
George W. Bush administration imposed tighter restrictions on the public's access to 
government records by creating a category of "sensitive but unclassified" information 
(Pack, 2004). Meanwhile, under the Obama administration, the trend toward unmitigated 
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access to government information has been resumed (Ginsberg, 2011). Thus, I predict 
that party control of the state legislature will be positively associated with a state’s 
adoption and implementation of EFOIA. 
 
H9a: There is a positive relationship between party control of the state 
legislature and a state’s adoption of EFOIA. 
 
H9b: There is a positive relationship between party control of the state 
legislature and a state’s implementation of EFOIA. 
  
 Scandals (Applied only to the analysis for the adoption of EFOIA). Studies of 
legislative ethics reforms have demonstrated that scandals concerning corruption act as 
the catalyst for anti-corruption reform (Hofstadter, 1955; Hoogenboom, 1978; Link & 
McCormick, 1983; Rosenson, 2003). Rosenson (2003) argued that legislators did care 
about scandals due to the fear of defeat in election when they did not take aggressive 
action to regulate their own ethics. EFOIA is expected to regulate corrupt behavior of 
legislators by increasing the possibility of exposing their behavior for personal gains, 
such as bribery and embezzlement, to public scrutiny. In this respect, if a state struggles 
with scandals concerning corruption, the state may seek anti-corruption reforms. Thus, I 
predict that scandals will be positively associated with a state’s adoption of EFOIA. 
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H10: There is a positive relationship between scandals and a state’s 
adoption of EFOIA. 
 
 Legal practice (Applied only to the analysis for the adoption of EFOIA). 
According to the legal environment theory developed by Edelman (1990, 1992), the 
passage of law creates a normative environment to which organizations must adapt, but 
its effect is indirect, not directly intervening organizations. Indeed, the legal environment 
theory views law, the legal circumstance as an important normative pressure on 
organizations to change their organizational behavior.  
 Moreover, this theoretical perspective emphasizes legitimacy as a major 
motivation for organizational attention to the legal environment; organizations respond to 
law because of legitimacy, not because of efficiency. From the legal environment theory, 
the legal practice of the federal government regarding transparency can create a 
normative circumstance that may influence a state's decision on its transparency policy. 
Such legal practices can "mediate" the effect of EFOIA of 1996 on state policymaking. 
This study considers two types of legal practices the federal government made: the 
creation of a category of unclassified information of 2002, and the OPEN Government 
Act of 2007. 
 After the 9/11 terrorists attacks, 2001, as the concerns on national security 
increased, the George W. Bush administration in 2002 created a new category of 
"sensitive but unclassified" information to constrain public access to government records 
(Pack, 2004). According to this new categorization, the agencies are urged to remove 
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broad categories of information from their transparency websites because of concerns 
about national security.  
 Meanwhile, Congress in 2007 enacted the OPEN Government Act that would 
address a range of procedural issues impacting FOIA administration, thereby improving 
the agencies' disclosure of information (McDermott, 2010). The OPEN Government Act 
aimed to enhance public and press access to information about inner workings of the 
government in several important procedural ways: to strengthen and speed agency 
compliance with FOIA requests. Thus, I predict that the legal practice enacted by the 
federal government will increase or decrease the likelihood of a state's  
adoption of EFOIA.  
 
H11a: There is a negative relationship between the creation of unclassified 
information category and a state’s adoption of EFOIA. 
 
H11b: There is a positive relationship between the OPEN Government Act 
and a state’s adoption of EFOIA. 
  
 FOIA strength (Applied only to the analysis for the implementation of 
EFOIA). Tavares (2007) argued that the introduction of FOIA could reduce corruption in 
that it would enable the public to observe corrupt behavior of government officials and 
thus punish them at elections. Similarly, Cordis and Warren (2012) contend that the 
“strong” FOIA laws of states had a positive impact on corruption by increasing in 
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detection probability (p. 5). As state FOIA legislation is stronger, it is better to force a 
state to provide access to government information. Thus, I predict that the strength of 
state FOIA will be positively associated with the scope of a state's implementation of 
EFOIA.  
 
H12: There is a positive relationship between the strength of state FOIA and 
a state’s implementation of EFOIA. 
  
 IT management (Applied only to the analysis for the implementation of 
EFOIA). Scholarly research on e-government demonstrated that institutional capacity in 
the area of information and technology (IT) policy played a significant role in sustaining 
e-government development (Clark, 1985; Fountain, 2001; Tolbert, Mossberger, & 
McNeal, 2008).  According to Tolbert et al. (2008), innovation in digital government 
requires the institutional infrastructure and leadership capacity for its development, such 
as dedicated legislative committees and IT executive departments. Under the EFOIA, 
states that are sustained innovator allow for powerful searches, enough sources of data, 
and various ways to engage citizens on the transparency websites. Thus, I predict that 
state institutional capacity for IT management will be positively associated with the 
extent of a state's implementation of EFOIA.  
 
H13: There is a positive relationship between IT management and a state’s  
implementation of EFOIA. 
 89 
 
 e-Government implementation (Applied only to the analysis for the 
implementation of EFOIA). The degree of a state's e-government implementation has 
been often used as a proxy for state infrastructure capacity (McNeal et al., 2007). 
Increasing online access to government information requires great levels of infrastructure 
capacity associated with the use of information technology. Moreover, McNeal and Hale 
(2010) found the evidence that greater levels of state infrastructure capacity for e-
government were strongly related to more extensive e-disclosure implementation. Thus, I 
predict that there is a positive relationship between the level of state e-government 
implementation and a state's implementation of EFOIA. 
 
H14: There is a positive relationship between e-Government and a state’s 
implementation of EFOIA.  
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CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
 This chapter deals with the issues of the research design and methodology used 
to address the research questions of this study. First, various sources of data are briefly 
introduced. Second, instruments for measuring dependent variables, independent 
variables, and control variables are described. Finally, this chapter concludes by 
describing statistical techniques for data analysis.  
Sources of Data  
 This study identifies factors influencing the diffusion of EFOIA among the US 
states at the stages of adoption and implementation, and examines the differences in 
diffusion between adoption and implementation of EFOIA. To answer the research 
questions, this study utilizes panel data (or longitudinal data) for the US states 
between1996 and 2013; panel data
36
 for 44 states between 1996 and 2009 for the 
adoption stage of EFOIA, and panel data for 48 states between 2010 and 2013 for the 
implementation stage of EFOIA. The data were collected from a variety of existing data 
bases as follows:  
 the Bureau of Census, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Council of State 
Governments, Indiana State University - Klarner Politics, Institute for Quantitative Social 
Science, National Conference of State Legislatures, National Governors Association, 
                                           
36
 This study excludes Alaska and Hawaii because they differ on a number of important 
economic and political variables that make them less directly comparable than their counterparts 
(Doyle et al., 2010)., In addition to these states, in the analysis for the adoption phase, this study 
excludes four states that already enacted the state law on electronic records before the federal 
EFOIA of 1996. 
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National Telecommunications and Information Administration, U.S. Public Interest 
Research Group, U. S. Department of Justice, and Reporters committee for Freedom of 
the Press (Open Government Guide)  
 Panel data
37
 (or longitudinal data) typically are the data that contain time series  
observations of a number of units (e.g. individuals, states and nations). Panel data 
sampling design offers many benefits compared to either single cross-sectional or single 
time-series design (Frees, 2004; Hsiao, 2005, 2007).  
 First, panel data provide rich information in that observations in the data include 
both a cross-sectional dimension and a time series dimension. Thus, panel data have 
greater capacity for capturing complicated and dynamic behavioral hypotheses than a 
single cross-section or time series data. 
 Second, panel data offer more accurate inference of model parameters because of 
more degrees of freedom and more sample variability than cress-sectional data (with T=1) 
or time-series data (with N=1), thereby improving the efficiency of statistical estimates. 
Especially, compared to cross-sectional regression models, panel data sampling design 
has the ability to separate subject-specific effects by individual-specific error term αi
38
 
from the disturbance term (or error term, εit). By separating out, statistical estimates of 
the variability become more precise.  
                                           
37
 Panel data are also known as pooled cross-sectional time series and in the natural sciences 
(Frees, 2004) 
38
 The parameters αi vary by subject and are known as individual, or subject-specific. 
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 Third, panel data may control the impact of omitted variables correlated with the 
included independent variables. Panel data contain information on both the inter-temporal 
dynamics and the individuality of the entities, and thus may enable researchers to control 
the effects of unobserved variables.  
 Finally, panel data can reduce collinearity that refers to an exact or approximate 
linear relationship between explanatory variables in estimating unrestricted time-
adjustment patterns. For example, while time-series observations of current and lagged 
variables are likely to be higher collinear, panel data relying on the inter-individual 
differences can reduce such collinearity.  
 Yet, panel data sampling design can also have drawbacks since the sampling 
structure is complex. The most common drawback of panel data sets results from attrition, 
although the primary approach to panel data analysis generally assumes balanced data 
where each subject has the same number of observations (Frees, 2004). Attrition refers to 
a gradual erosion of responses by subjects: In US Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
(PSID), while a non-response (i.e. missing data) rate was 24% in the first year (1968), the 
non-response rate grew to about 50% by 1985 (Frees, 2004). Attrition or the existence of 
missing data can be troublesome because it may cause a selection bias that "potentially 
occurs when a rule other than simple random (or stratified) sampling is used to select 
observational units." (Frees, 2004, p. 9) 
 According to Little and Rubin (1987), there are several approaches for 
addressing partially missing data. One option is to treat the available data as if non-
responses were intentionally planned, utilizing unbalanced estimation techniques. A 
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second option is to use only subjects (i.e. the units of observation) with a complete set of 
observations by removing unobserved observations from subjects with missing responses. 
A third option is to impute values for missing responses. Each option is generally easy to 
carry out, and may be satisfactory with small amounts of missing data (Frees, 2004).  
 Due to the existence of small amounts of missing data, this study will employ the  
second and third options suggested by Little and Rubin (1987). When examining the 
effect of partisanship on the diffusion of EFOIA, the missing data for the case of 
Nebraska will be discarded because of the state's nonpartisanship. Furthermore, with 
regard to the observations of variables in a given year that are not reported, I will adjust 
them by imputing values of the observation of the variables as an average of the observed 
values of the variable in a surrounding 5-year period. This approach can avoid undue 
weight being given to observations in a particular year (Glaeser & Saks, 2006). 
Instrumentation 
 Dependent variable. This study has two dependent variables in the analysis. The 
dependent variable in the event history analysis (for the adoption stage of EFOIA) 
indicates the probability that a state will adopt the EFOIA in a specific year, given that 
the state has not already done so. It is a dummy variable; it is coded as 1 in the year a 
state adopted the EFOIA, and 0 otherwise. States’ adoption years of EFOIA were 
collected by accessing the Open Government Guide.  
 The dependent variable in the multivariate regression analysis (for the 
implementation stage of EFOIA) represents the extent to which state governments 
implement their transparency or governmental websites in compliance with EFOIA. It is 
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measured by the percentage score of a state's transparency website that offers online 
services regarding government spending data in a given year, ranging from 0 to100. The 
transparency score was determined by the US Public Interest Research Group. The US 
PIRG Education Fund researchers evaluated a state’s transparency website providing 
information on state government spending, in terms of data availability, usability, and 
accessibility. Only one website was graded for each state. If a state had a designated 
transparency website, that site was graded. If a state did not have a transparency website, 
the government website that earned the highest possible score was graded. The US PIRG 
Data went through the review of state agencies administering transparency websites for 
accuracy. In this study, the scores of 2010 and 2011 are weighted based on the score of 
2012 as a standard, since state governments have improved their transparency websites 
by increasing their online services over time. 
 Independent variables. This study has a variety of independent variables 
associated with socialization and policy learning.  
 Socialization. As a proxy for socialization, three variables representing norm 
resonance are used: liberal ideological climate, public pressure, and innovative policy 
culture. Liberal ideological climate is measured by government ideology index and 
citizen ideology developed by Berry et al (1998, 2010). Government ideology refers to 
the mean position on a liberal-conservative continuum of the elected officials in a state, 
weighted according to the power they have over public policy decisions. Citizen ideology 
refers to the mean position on a liberal-conservative continuum of the active electorate in 
a state. Higher values in those ideology index imply greater policy liberalism.  
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 Public pressure is measured by voter turnout, the public’s Internet use, and 
educational attainment by state. Voter turnout refers to a voting rate for gubernatorial 
elections in each state. It represents the ability of citizens engaging directly in democratic 
processes to protect their civil rights and challenge the government’s operations (Gamble, 
1997; McNeal and Hale, 2010). The public's Internet use indicates the percent of state 
households with Internet access. Educational attainment by state implies the percent of 
state residents over age 25 with a bachelor’s degree or more in a given year.  
 Innovative policy culture is measured by state policy innovativeness index. This 
index indicates the propensity of a state for policy innovativeness; a state’s willingness to 
adopt new policies sooner or later relative to other states. This score varies from 0 to 1, 
with larger values indicating a quicker policy adoption rate and a higher innovation score.  
 Legal practice serves for a proxy of a legal action of the federal government 
concerning transparency, which may create the legal environment influencing a state's 
policy decision on transparency. This normative pressure can mediate the effect of 
EFOIA of 1996 on states. This measure is described as a dummy variable; it is coded 1 if 
a state adopted EFOA after such legal action, 0 otherwise. 
 Policy learning. Two variables serve as a measure of policy learning: 
neighboring effects and professional networks. Neighboring effects indicate the 
proportion of neighboring states and states within the applicable BEA region (without 
double-counting) that have previously adopted (adoption phase), or that have a grade A 
(leading states) or B (advancing states) in online transparency in a given year 
(implementation phase).  
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 The numerator is the total number of neighboring states and states within the 
applicable BEA region (without double-counting) that have previously adopted (adoption 
phase), or that have a grade A (leading states) or B (advancing states) in online 
transparency in a given year (implementation phase). The denominator is the total 
number of neighboring states and states within the applicable BEA region (without 
double-counting). This variable captures the implications of both the neighbor model and 
fixed-region model of regional diffusion theory.  
 In addition, this study uses the "lagged" form of neighboring effects by replacing 
the variable with the same variables lagged by one year because the states appeared to be 
influenced by the performance of neighbors in the previous year. Furthermore, since this 
study considers neighboring effects to be influenced by slack resources, this variable is 
treated as an interaction term. 
 Professional networks imply a state’s representation in the leadership of the 
National Governor Association (NGA) or National Conference of State Legislatures 
(NCSL) in a given year (McNeal et al, 2003, 2007). It is a dummy variable; it is coded as 
1 if a state had a leadership position in a given year, 0 for otherwise. Specifically, 
leadership in professional networks is defined as state membership on the NCSL’s 
Executive Committee including ex-officio members, and the NGA Executive Committee 
including standing committees.  
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 Control variables. This study includes control variables in the analysis to isolate 
the effects of socialization and policy learning from other factors that may influence 
states' adoption and/or their implementation of EFOIA as follows: slack resource, party 
control, public opinion, state legislative professionalism, scandals, legal practice, FOIA  
strength, and IT management. 
 Slack resource. Slack resource is measured by GDP and per capita income. GDP 
indicates the state counterpart of the Nation's gross domestic product (GDP). GDP by 
state is derived as the sum of the GDP originating in all the industries in a state (Millions 
of current dollars). Per capita income refers to the income that is received by persons 
from all sources. It is measured by total personal income divided by total midyear 
population.  
 Partisanship. Partisanship or party control indicates the party alignment between 
the presidency and the governor of a state government. This variable is treated as a 
dummy variable: coded as 1 if the governor's party is the same as the president's party, 0 
otherwise.  
 State legislative professionalism. State legislative professionalism is measured 
by state legislative professionalism index that Squire (2007) developed based on 
indicators of pay, staff resources, and session length of state legislatures. This index 
indicates the percent of professionalism that a state’s legislature had compared to 
Congress in a given year, representing state institutional capacity or overall 
professionalism of state government.  
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 Scandals. Scandals imply a state conviction rate per capita, representing the 
extent of corruption at the state level (for 100,000 people in the state population). This 
corruption data were derived from the Justice Department’s “Report to Congress on the 
Activities and Operations of the Public Integrity Section.” This publication lists the 
number of federal, state and local public officials convicted of a corruption-related crime 
by state. As Glaeser and Saks (2006) did, this study collects information on the number of 
convictions by state annually from the Justice Department’s report, and then divides these 
convictions by state population to form an estimate of the state conviction rate per capita. 
 FOIA strength. FOIA strength is the score of representing the strength of state 
EFOIA, ranging from 0 to 10. Cordis and Warren (2012) determined the FOIA score of 
each state by giving one point for each of the criteria, such as the presumption for 
disclosure and exemptions, fee provisions, agencies’ response times to a request, 
administrative appeal provisions, and penalties imposed for violation of the statutes. State 
FOIA scores are considered confidential since they are positively correlated with the 
scores provided by several surveys that were conducted by the Better Government 
Association (BGA) and the Investigative Reporters and Editors Inc. (2002), and the BGA 
and the National Freedom of Information Coalition (2007). 
 IT management. IT management serves as a measure of state infrastructure and 
leadership capacity, consisting of the dummy variables of IT office and IT committee. IT 
office presents whether a state has a separate IT office as a department unto itself; it is 
coded as 1 if a state has the office, 0, otherwise. IT committee presents whether there is a 
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IT committee in the state legislature; it is coded as 1 if either the state House or Senate 
has an IT committee, and 0 if neither has the committee or office. 
 E-government implementation. E-government implementation indicates an 
index of state e-government use or overall performance from 2001 to 2008. This measure 
is an annual index based on a composite score using the following criteria: online 
publications, online databases, audio clips, video clips, foreign language or language 
translation, advertisements, premium fees, user payments or fees, disability access, 
privacy policy, security policy, online services, digital signatures, and so on (West, 2008). 
Conceptualization of Early Adopter and Successful Group 
 To define "early adopter," this study uses the adopter categorization model of 
Rogers (1962, 2003) as well as Moore's (2002) concept of chasm. The adopter 
categorization model proposes five categories of adopters of innovation according to 
typical behavior-based profiles: Innovator, early adopter, early majority, late majority, and 
laggard.  
 Innovators are enthusiasts who are willing to accept new ideas, technologies or 
policies to improve their lives, even taking a risk. Early adopters are open to innovation, 
but, unlike the innovators, they want to see the benefits of the innovation. The early 
majority group consists of pragmatists because they make their decisions on the results 
that are proved or supported by established references. The late majority members are 
pessimistic about the new values of innovation, and thus make decisions once the 
innovation becomes mainstream based on the previous experience of others. Finally, the 
laggards group consists of skeptics who feel uncomfortable with innovation (Bernstein & 
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Singh, 2008). According to Moore (2002), a "chasm"(or gap) between the early adopter 
group and the early majority group arises because of socio-economic and demographic 
differences between them; the early majority group waits until the innovation is proven 
and supported while the innovator and early adopter groups are committed to innovation. 
In this respect, the early majority members may change their behaviors according to a 
result of the innovation being introduced (Bernstein & Singh, 2008). 
 In 2002, the George W. Bush administration created the category of sensitive and  
unclassified information in response to the 9/11 terrorists attacks. Since 2002, states 
adopting EFOIA, unlike the previous adopters, stipulated legal statements that would 
constrain public access to government information when there were reasonable grounds 
to believe disclosure might pose a safety risk. In this respect, these states appeared to 
exhibit behavior of the early majority group, taking a much more pragmatic view of 
EFOIA than those adopting EFOIA in previous years. Thus, this study defines early 
adopters as states that are committed to EFOIA by combining the innovator group with 
the early adopter group — that is, states adopting EFOIA from 1996 to 2001. 
 Meanwhile, this study defines a" successful" group as the group of states that 
achieved "programmatic success" related to intended outcomes (Marsh & McConnell, 
2009). Programmatic success implies that a program or a policy did achieve the intended 
outcomes. Since the objective of state transparency websites is to provide online access to 
government spending data, this study defines a successful group as the group of leading 
and advancing states that have achieved at least 80 % points of online transparency score.   
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Statistical Analysis Techniques 
 Data analysis is based on the event history model (especially, with a discrete-
time model) for the adoption stages of EFOIA, and a multivariate regression model (with 
a mixed-effects model) for the implementation stages of EFOIA. Each analysis model has 
been generally employed in past diffusion studies. For data analysis, this study uses 
STATA (version 12).  
 Event history analysis model. This study uses the event history analysis (EHA) 
with panel data in determining the factors associated with a state's adoption of EFOIA. 
Event history models have a variety of names, such as duration models, survival models, 
failure-time models, reliability models, and so on. Events imply "changes" or represent a 
"transition" from one state (or position) to another, while the history refers to the “timing” 
of the occurrence of the event. In this study, an event is a state’s adoption of EFOIA and 
the history is the number of years leading up to the adoption of EFOIA.  
 Employing the EHA model can overcome the obvious shortcoming of the 
traditional regression model. The binary logistic regression model generally looks at the 
effect of "covariates” (independent variables) on the likelihood of an event's occurrence. 
However, this model treats units (e.g. individuals, organizations, states) experiencing a 
given event equally, losing duration information: one treats a person who held on to 
his/her job for 5 years before unemployment the same as someone who was out of work 
after only 2 months.  
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 However, an EHA model deals with an examination of both the occurrence of an 
event and the history leading up to the event’s occurrence. Thus, understanding the 
“event history” includes a consideration of not only whether something  
happens, but also when something happens.  
 The strength of the EHA model lies on its statistical inferences (Box-
Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004; Doyle, McLendon, & Hearn, 2010). Inferences from the 
EHA model can be made in describing how the covariates of interest (i.e. independent 
variables) may influence duration time or survival time before an event’s occurrence — 
that is, "the length of time that passes between entry into the process and occurrence of 
the event." (Box- Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004, p. 9) The inference is comparative in 
nature. Explicit comparative inferences can be made in terms of differences across the 
units (e.g. individuals, organizations, states, and so on) (Box- Steffensmeier & Jones, 
2004). As long as event history data are longitudinal, and are generated across many 
observations, any event history model can provide comparative inferences. 
 A critical concept in EHA is the risk set representing the set of units in the 
sample that are "at risk" of experiencing an event. When the event under analysis cannot 
repeat (e.g. death), the size of the risk set will decrease over time as units in the sample 
experience the event; if units are annual, the size of the risk set will decrease at the end of 
each year. Since most government policies or programs can only be adopted once by a 
given jurisdiction, they are generally treated as non-repeatable events in EHA. Once a 
unit experienced an event, the unit in subsequent years is removed from the risk set 
because it is no longer at risk of experiencing the event.  
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 Another key concept in EHA is hazard rate, which represents the probability that 
units that are at risk of experiencing an event will do so during a given time period (Berry 
& Berry, 1990). Thus, in this study, a hazard rate is the probability that a state will adopt 
EFOIA between 1996 and 2009, given that the state has not previously adopted the law at 
that time. Since the hazard rate is an unobservable variable, it is estimated from observed 
years of passage for a state's adoption of EFOIA. The observable dependent variable for 
estimating effects in EHA is a dummy variable (Berry & Berry, 1990); it is coded 1 when 
a state adopted EFOIA in a given year, 0 otherwise. The dichotomous nature of the 
dependent variable in EHA makes probit or logit the substantial estimation technique 
(Berry & Berry, 1990).  
 EHA models can be computed for either discrete intervals or continuous. In a 
discrete time model, the period of time of the analysis is divided into a set of distinct 
units (e.g. year(s)). However, a continuous time model does not make this division 
assuming that an event can occur anywhere in time (Berry & Berry, 1990). Berry and 
Berry (1990) first applied the discrete time model to the field of policy diffusion to 
examine lottery adoptions of states. Berry and Berry’s discrete time model has been 
considered a standard form for event history analyses in the field of policy diffusion.  
 The commonly used function for the discrete time model is the logit function, 
which has the following form: 
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log {
  
    
} = β0 + β1x1i + β2x2i + ··· + βkxki 
Where,  i : the probability of an event's occurrence 
 1-  i : the probability of a nonoccurrence 
β’x : the covariates and regression parameters 
  
 The above model specifies in terms of the log-odds ratio of the probability of an 
event's occurrence ( ) to the probability of a nonoccurrence (1- ). In addition, this model 
posits that this probability is a function of covariates, X. The logit coefficients, βk, are 
interpreted in relation to the log-odds of an event occurrence: when βk > 0, the log of the 
odds ratio is increasing as the covariate increases, and decreasing when βk < 0. To 
directly retrieve the predicted probability of an event occurrence ( ), the above model can 
be expressed as follows:  
 
 i = exp
β’x
 / 1 + exp
β’x
 
Where, exp
β’x 
: the exponentiated logit parameters for a given covariate 
The baseline hazard under the discrete time model will be equivalent to  
 
 i = h0(t) = exp
β0
 
 Hence, the hazard probability is constant with respect to time; a distributional 
shape of the hazard rate over time remains constant and thus the probability that a state 
will adopt a policy is fixed over time. Although the discrete time model is widely used 
and well understood by social scientists, there are some ostensible disadvantages of this 
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model. Assuming a flat baseline hazard for the discrete time model can be inappropriate 
due to the problem of time dependency; the hazard rate may assume a wide variety of 
shapes, rather than fixed over time (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004). Moreover, if the 
time underlying time process is continuous, then discrete time model may be problematic 
to be applied.  
 The general way to avoid the problem of time dependency in the discrete time 
model is to include k -1 temporal dummy variables. Yet, this approach has two drawbacks. 
First, if the number of time points in the data set is large, the temporal dummies can 
quickly consume many degree of freedom (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004). Second, 
the interpretation of the coefficients of many temporal dummies can become unwieldy, 
especially if the pattern of the coefficients is very noisy. Therefore, the alternative for  
addressing the time dependency in the hazard is the use of "the natural log  
transformation" or "polynomials
39
" (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004).  
 Meanwhile, in a continuous time model, an event is assumed to take place 
anywhere in time. There are a variety of continuous time model depending on the 
assumption of the baseline hazard rate, such as the exponential model, Weibull model, 
and Compertz model. However, arbitrary decisions regarding the nature of the baseline 
hazard rate have to do with false interpretations (Box- Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004).In 
this regard, the Cox proportional hazard model has been considered an attractive 
alternative for the event history analysis (Doyle, McLendon, & Hearn, 2010; Park, Park, 
                                           
39
 Francesco (2010), Carter and Singnorino (2010), and Buckley and Westerland (2004) included 
three time variables, t, t
2
/10, and t
3
/100. 
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& Lee, 2010). In the Cox model, the particular distributional form of the duration times 
remains “unspecified” (Cox, 1972, 1975; Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004); the Cox 
model does not have an assumption about the distributional form of the baseline hazard 
rate. The basic Cox model is as follows: 
 
hi(t) = exp(β1x1i + β2x2i + ··· + βkxki)h0(t) 
   Where, hi(t) : the hazard rate for the i
th
 state 
         h0(t) : the baseline hazard function 
         β’x : the covariates and regression parameters 
  
 As seen above, the Cox model does not have an intercept term (β0) because the 
baseline hazard (h0(t) ) is assumed to be unknown, and thus remains unspecified. In this 
regard, the Cox model often called a “semi-parametric” model (Box-Steffensmeier & 
Jones, 2004). In terms of the log of the hazard ratios including predictor variables, the 
above model can be re-presented as follows:  
 
log {
     
     
} = β1x1i + β2x2i + ··· + βkxki 
  
 The hazard ratio represents the odds of an event's occurrence along with per unit 
of change in a covariate. Since the value of a hazard ratio is exponentiated, none is 
negative. An exponentiated coefficient of 1.0 implies that the covariate has no effect 
(Exp[0]=1). The coefficient larger than 1 implies that the hazard is increasing with 
changes in the covariate, while the coefficient smaller than 1 indicates that the hazard is 
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decreasing with changes in the covariate. The percentage change in the odds of an event's 
occurrence can be calculated by subtracting 1 from the hazard ratio and then multiplying 
by 100. For example, when the hazard ratio of an unemployment rate is 1.65, it indicates 
that increasing the unemployment rate by 1 percent makes it 65% more likely that a state 
will adopt a given policy.  
 The strong advantage of the Cox model is that the effect of covariates on a 
hazard rate (i.e. duration time) can be estimated, regardless of the nature and shape of the 
baseline hazard rate. Yet, the main drawback of the Cox model is that the estimate of the 
baseline hazard is so closely associated with the observed data, which makes it difficult 
to generalize these estimates to other settings (Gelfand & Fomin, 1963; Royston & 
Parmar, 2002). Royston and Parmar (2002) proposed a flexible parametric hazard model 
to addresses this drawback of the Cox model, based initially on "the assumption of either 
proportional hazards or proportional odds scaling of covariate effects." (p. 2176) 
However, the Cox model has been strongly recommended if the baseline hazard is not of 
central interest (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004).  
 This study will deploy the discrete time EHA model although event history 
process is usually considered to be continuous. Since state legislation operates on yearly 
cycles, the underlying process for policy adoption should be assumed to be discrete rather 
than continuous (Grattet et al., 1998; Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004). Therefore, 
discrete-time methods are more appropriate than continuous-time methods. Furthermore, 
this study will include "the natural log transformation" in the discrete EHA to address the 
problems of time dependency and the unrealistic assumption of a constant hazard rate. 
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This natural log transformation is easy to implement as well as effective to avoid quasi-
complete separation
40
(Allison, 2008). The discrete time model of this study including the 
covariates of interest is as follows: 
 
EFOIA adoption = f (Ideology, Public pressure, Innovativeness, Neighboring, Network, 
Slack, Professionalism, Party, Legal practice, Scandals) 
log {
  
    
} = β0 + β1Ideologyi + β2Publici + ··· + β11 Scandalsi + lnt 
 Multivariate regression model. This study deploys a multivariate regression 
model with panel data to test hypothesized relationships pertaining to states’ 
implementation of EFOIA. Since the dependent variable measuring states’ 
implementation of the EFOIA is the score of e-transparency and is continuous, OLS 
regression coefficients will be reported. The basic function of multivariate regression 
models is as follows (Eom, Lee, & Xu, 2008):  
   =β  β         β                                       
 Where, i : the unit of observation, t : the period of time 
       k : the k
th 
explanatory variable, β
 
: the intercept  
             β
 
: the coefficient of each explanatory variable 
                : error term   
  
                                           
40
 This is a major problem in logistic regression since the coefficients of covariates almost 
perfectly determine the value of the dependent variable, along with no-existence of maximum 
likelihood estimates (Allison, 2008). 
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 In general, a basic OLS model decomposes an error term     into two error 
components: an idiosyncratic error term     and an subject(or individual)-specific error 
term   . In the basic regression model, an idiosyncratic error term     is assumed to be 
uncorrelated with regressors     (Cameron & Trivedi, 2010). A subject-specific error 
term    represents the heterogeneity among subjects, and is assumed to be independent 
of    .  
 When using panel data in the estimation of an OLS regression model, there are 
two types of considerable variations: between (intergroup) variations and within (intra-
group) variations (Wooldridge, 2006, 2009). In this study, between variations mean 
variations in the average score of e-transparency from one state to another, while within 
variations refer to variations in the average score of e-transparency within each state over 
time. Regressions relying on between variations can be problematic due to the influence 
of unobservable differences between (or across) states — that is, omitted variable bias. 
Omitted variable bias occurs when the error term (i.e. the individual-specific error term) 
is correlated with the predictors that are included in the regression model.  
 In non-experimental studies, researchers often leave out certain variables, as they 
are difficult to measure. However, the omission of key predictors in regressions can cause 
severe bias in estimating the effects of the predictors (Allison, 2005). A fixed effects 
model lets researchers control for all possible characteristics of variables — even without 
measuring them — unless those variables are time-invariant (Allison, 2005). In this 
regard, a fixed effects model is generally seen as a powerful statistical method leading to 
the virtues of a randomized experiment (Allison, 2005).  
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  The intuition behind fixed effects regressions is that the solution for removing 
omitted variable bias is to exploit within variations, assuming that there are no changes in 
unobservable variables within each state over time (i.e. time-invariant). The notion of 
Fixed effects implies that it holds constant or fixes the average effects of each state; the 
subject-specific error term (  ) accounting for the heterogeneity is treated as a set of 
"fixed" parameters. Therefore, using fixed effects regressions enable researchers to 
control the average differences across states in any observable or unobservable predictors, 
thereby reducing omitted variable bias.  
 Yet, unfortunately, if within variations are little, fixed effects regression models 
cannot be used despite the threat of omitted variable bias. Fixed-effects models are 
designed to investigate the causes of changes within a state, and thus cannot test the effect 
of a time-invariant variable
41
; a time-invariant characteristic cannot cause changes within 
states because it is constant for each state. Furthermore, since a fixed effects model 
ignores between variations, it can yield standard errors that are considerably higher than 
those produced by alternative methods of analysis using both within variations and 
between variations (Allison, 2005). However, considering that all the variations on the 
independent variables are associated with within subjects, a fixed effects regression 
model can be still useful because it restricts research attention to the within-subject 
variation (Allison, 2005).  
                                           
41
 In a fixed effects model, time-constant variables are perfectly collinear with subject-specific 
intercepts and hence are inestimable (Frees, 2004). 
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 Fixed effects regression models often compare with random effects models. 
Random effects models pay attention to both between variance and within variance. The 
rationale behind random effects model is that, unlike a fixed effects model, the variation 
or heterogeneity across subjects (  ) is "random" — not fixed — with a specified 
probability distribution (i.e. normal distribution), and is "uncorrelated" with the 
regerssors (or independent variables) included in the model (Frees, 2004; Cameron & 
Trivedi, 2010). Thus, a random effects model allows researchers to estimate effects for 
time-invariant variables (e.g. culture, religion, gender, race), while these variables in the 
fixed effects model are absorbed by the intercept (  ).  
 Moreover, a random effects model typically has a less standard error because it 
utilizes both between variances and within variances. However, the drawback of a 
random effects model is that those estimates are inconsistent in some cases, and thus are 
unreliable (Cameron & Trivedi, 2010;). In addition, a random effects model does not 
control for unmeasured factors, as it assumes the error term (   ) to be uncorrelated with 
the independent variables.  
 
  “…the crucial distinction between fixed and random effects is whether the 
 unobserved individual effect embodies elements that are correlated with the 
 regressors in the model, not whether these effects are stochastic or not.” (Greene, 
 2008, p.183)  
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 If so, which is preferable, fixed effects or random effects? To decide between 
fixed or random effects, researchers can run a Hausman test that refers to a test for 
econometrics model misspecification based on a comparison of two different estimators 
of the model parameters. In a Hausman test, a null hypothesis is that coefficients 
estimated by the efficient random effects estimator are same as those estimated by the 
consistent fixed effects estimator (Greene, 2008); it tests whether an error term is 
correlated with predictors, when the null hypothesis is they are not. If same (insignificant 
p-value, Prob>chi2 larger than .05), the use of random effects will be safe, fixed effects, 
otherwise (Greene, 2008). According to the result of a Hausman test, this study should 
utilize a random effects model because p-value is 0.06. 
 However, using simple random-effect estimators ignores the fact that there are 
useful predictors in a fixed-effects model. Furthermore, a random-effects model has the 
problem of the remaining uncertainty associated with unmeasured factors. When a model 
is significant but does not explain all variation, using a mixed-effects model can be more 
appropriate than only adopting either a fixed-effects or random-effects model (Campbell 
collaboration, 2009). Mixed-effects model contains both fixed and random components.  
 Mixed-effects models have become very popular to address questions about 
changes over time in the response and changes in the relationship of the response to 
subjects' characteristics (Gurka & Edwards, 2008; Cheng et al., 2010). In addition, 
mixed-effects models are robust to missing data (Baayen, 2008). Furthermore, a mixed-
effect model allows researchers to assess differences of responses from different groups 
— that is, group effects. The term group indicates a category of the population. The 
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differences in tax liability due to party affiliation (democrat/republican) or due to gender 
(male/female) can be a good example of group effects (Frees, 2004). A mixed-effects 
model has the basic function as follows:  
 
            =      β + β1xgit1 + β2xgit2 + ··· + βk xgitk 
 
    : random, subject-specific effects among groups, 
 β
 
: fixed differences among groups 
g = 1, ... , G(groups); i = 1, ..., Ng subjects in each group 
t= 1, ... , Tgi observations of each subject 
 
 In a similar vein, this study concentrates on the differences in the extent of 
implementing EFOIA among five groups (leading groups, failing groups, and so on). 
Thus, utilizing a mixed-effect model is appropriate to address the research questions of 
this study. The mixed-effects model of this study including the covariates of interest is as 
follows: 
EFOIA implementation = f (Ideology, Public pressure, Innovativeness, Neighboring, Network, 
Slack, Professionalism, Party, e-Gov, IT management, FOIA strength)  
            =      β + β1Ideologygit + β2Publicgit + ··· + β11 FOIAgit  
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CHAPTER 5 
ANALYSES OF DATA & FINDINGS 
 This chapter provides an overview of how the data will be statistically analyzed 
to test the hypotheses of this study, and descriptions for the data and the models. This 
chapter then presents the empirical results of the data analysis, and discusses the findings 
to identify the factors that may influence states' adoption and implementation of EFOIA.  
Data Analysis for the Adoption Phase 
  Since Berry and Berry (1990), the application of event history analysis (EHA) 
with panel data has become established in the field of policy diffusion. This study uses 
the EHA model to explain an unobservable probability (i.e. hazard rate) that a state 
adopts the EFOIA in a specific year. The hazard rate can change over time or remain 
constant. In this study, the hazard rate is treated as constant over the sample period in 
accordance with the general assumption of most EHA models.  
 Even history models can be computed for either discrete or continuous intervals. 
A discrete time model divides the period of time of the analysis into distinct units, while 
a continuous time model does not make this division (Berry & Berry, 1990). Since state 
legislation operates on yearly cycles, a "discrete time model" is more appropriate than a 
continuous time model (Grattet, Jenness, & Curry, 1998). Thus, this study employs a 
discrete time function that defines a year as the applicable observation period, and 
assumes the non-existence of within-year differences.  
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 In a distinct observation time window, the hazard function (i.e. the probability of 
a state's adoption of EFOIA) is generally specified as a "logistic." However, there are 
several statistical weaknesses related to logit models. The first one is associated with the 
likelihood that the observations are temporally dependent (Mooney, 2001; Buckley & 
Westerland, 2004). To consider time seriously (Beck, Katz, & Tucker, 1998) as well as 
avoid the unrealistic assumption of a constant hazard rate, this study includes a log type 
of time (lnt) in the model.  
 The second weakness results from the distributional assumption of a logit model 
that the maximum marginal effect takes place at the value π = .5. This assumption may 
become problematic when the distribution of the observed values of a dependent variable 
(y) is particularly skewed for the presence of few 1's and hundreds of 0's. Thus, this study 
also performs a "complementary log-log model" to check for robustness of a logit model. 
 Finally, since policy diffusion is associated with spatial dependency, it can 
conflict with the logit model's assumption of independent observations. Following 
Francesco (2010) and Buckley and Westerland (2004), this study uses "robust variance 
estimation" to relax the assumption that the error terms are identically distributed.  
  I decided as starting time the year of the enactment of EFOIA by the federal 
government, 1996. The sample period of this study continues through 2009 (i.e. ending 
time) in which almost all of 50 states adopted the EFOIA. This study excludes Alaska 
and Hawaii because they differ on a number of important economic and political 
variables that make them less directly comparable than their counterparts (Doyle et al., 
 116 
 
2010). In addition to these states, this study does not consider four states
42
 that already 
enacted the state law on electronic records before the federal EFOIA of 1996. 
Furthermore, each of these states is dropped from the discrete-time EHA model after its 
year of adoption because it is no longer eligible to adopt so as to avoid estimation bias 
(Omer & Shelly, 2004). 
 
Table 1 Summary Statistics of IVs (Obs=616) 
Independent Variable Mean SD Min Max 
Government ideology .48 .13 .24 .74 
Citizen ideology .51 .15 .08 .96 
Turnout .51 .09 .23 .74 
Internet use .51 .39 0 .83 
Education .26 .05 .14 .39 
Innovativeness .08 .08 0 .59 
Neighboring  .44 .24 0 1 
Network .27 .44 0 1 
Professionalism .20 .13 .03 .68 
Income(log) 10.28 .20 9.80 10.84 
GDP(log) 11.66 1.06 9.58 14.10 
Scandal .32 .30 0 2.53 
Partisanship .53 .49 0 1 
                                           
42
 Before the federal EFOIA of 1996, West Virginia (1992), Indiana (1993), Kentucky (1994), 
and Texas (1995) already had their own law on electronic records to guarantee that the public has 
access to public records of government bodies at all levels. 
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 Table 1 presents summary statistics of independent variables in the analysis for 
the adoption phase of EFOIA. The average level of ideological liberalism in state 
governments as well as state residents is 48% and 51 % respectively. The percentage of 
state households with an Internet access as well as turnout is, on average, 51%. With 
regard to the propensity of a state for policy innovativeness and state legislative 
professionalism, there is a great deal of variation in states, ranging from 0% to 59% and 
from 3% to 68%, respectively. 
Table2 Model Descriptions for the Event History Analysis 
Model Main IVs Label 
The effect of Socialization 
(Model1) 
Government ideology 
Liberal ideological climate 
Citizen ideology 
Turnout 
Public pressure Internet use 
Education 
Innovativeness Innovative policy culture 
The effect of Learning 
(Model2) 
Neighboring  Regional interactions 
Networks National interactions 
The effect of Both 
(Model3) 
Government ideology 
Liberal ideological climate 
Citizen ideology 
Turnout 
Public pressure Internet use 
Education 
Innovativeness Innovative policy culture 
Neighboring  Regional interactions 
Networks National interactions 
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 As shown in Table 2, this study employs three models to examine the 
explanatory power of two types of diffusion mechanism (i.e. socialization and learning) 
on a state's adoption of EFOIA. Model 1 is used to investigate the influence of the factors 
associated with socialization on a state's decision in adopting EFOIA. Model 2 only 
concerns the relationship between the factors related to learning and a state's decision in 
adopting EFOIA. Finally, Model 3 addresses total effects of socialization and learning on 
a state's adoption of EFOIA.  
 Table 3 and Table 4 are associated with two diagnostics to detect 
multicollinearity between independent variables (IVs): Correlation coefficient and 
variable inflation factor (VIF). Multicollinearity can increase estimates of parameter 
variance, thereby producing models in which no variable is statistically significant in 
spite of large R-square(  
 ); parameter estimates provide the "incorrect sign" and 
"implausible magnitude." (Belsley, Kuh, & Welsch, 1980; Greene, 1993).  
 Table 3 describes correlation coefficients between independent variables 
included in the event history analysis. A correlation coefficient implies the linear 
relationship between two variables, indicating the extent to which two variables vary 
together. In general, there is a multicollinearity between two IVs when the correlation 
coefficient is higher than .85 (Cohen et al., 2003). According to Table 3, almost all IVs 
appear to be irrelevant to multicollinearity, except internet, income, and lnt.  
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 On the other hand, Table 4 indicates the values of VIF associated with each 
model after converting an internet variable to a dummy
43
 as well as eliminating an 
income variable from the analysis.
44
 The VIF provides an intuitive interpretation in terms 
of the effects of R-square
45
 (  
 ) on the variance of the estimated coefficient for the i
th
 IV; 
the VIF is 1/(1-  
 ) as the reciprocal of tolerance (1-  
 ). As rules of thumb, a VIF of 10 
has been used to indicate "excessive" or "serious" multicollinearity (Neter et al., 1989; 
Hair et al., 1995). However, some scholars choose a more conservative threshold value of 
30 (O’Brien, 2007). 
                                           
43
 "net1" is dummy; coded 1 if internet >.51 (the mean), 0 otherwise. 
44 As a solution for reducing multicollinearity, researchers generally recommend to eliminate one 
or more of the IVs that are highly correlated with the other IVs (O’Brien, 2007). 
45
   
  represents the proportion of variance in the i
th 
IV associated with the other IVs (O’Brien, 
2007). 
  
1
2
0 
Table 3 Checking Multicollinearity by Correlation Analysis 
 
Note: ** Significant at .05 level(2-tailed)  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 Gideol. 1.0000               
2 Cideol. 
0.5130 
** 
1.0000              
3 Turnout 0.0680  
0.1524 
** 
1.0000             
4 Internet 
0.1982 
** 
0.2126 
** 
0.1706 
** 
1.0000            
5 Edu. 
0.2273 
**  
0.4855 
** 
0.1653 
** 
0.4499 
** 
1.0000           
6 Profess. 0.1101  
0.4227 
** 
-0.0733 -0.0502 
0.2820 
** 
1.0000          
7 Inno. 
0.3270 
**  
0.2273 
** 
-0.0324 
0.1844 
** 
0.2044 
** 
0.2423 
** 
1.0000         
8 Income 
0.3140 
** 
0.4581 
** 
0.1973 
** 
0.8113 
** 
0.6550 
** 
0.2536 
** 
0.2760 
** 
1.0000        
9 Slack 
0.2011 
**  
0.3170 
** 
-0.1729 
** 
0.1011 
0.3014 
** 
0.7833 
** 
0.2956 
** 
0.3623 
** 
1.0000       
10 
Scandal 
-0.1011  0.0272 -0.0093 0.0193 
-0.1699 
** 
-0.0604 0.0120 0.0073  -0.0463 1.0000      
11 
Partisans-
hip 
0.0340   -0.0616   -0.0358    
0.1409 
**   
0.0178    0.0154   
-0.1056 
** 
0.0799    0.0301    0.0121    1.0000     
12 
Network 
-0.0753   -0.0245   -0.0407    0.0750    0.0110    
0.1113 
** 
-0.0479 0.0290      0.0282 -0.0473    0.0325 1.0000    
13 
Neighbor 
0.2261 
**   
0.1742 
**   
0.0088 
0.6500 
**   
0.1501 
** 
-0.0063 
0.2043 
** 
0.5722 
**   
0.2909 
**  
0.1377 
** 
0.1349 
**   
0.0114 1.0000   
14 Legal 
practice 
0.0449 0.0530 
0.1327 
** 
0.4393 
** 
0.1460 
** 
-0.2060 
** 
-0.0355 
0.2944 
** 
-0.1797 
** 
0.0998 
-0.1311 
** 
-0.0646 
-0.2019 
** 
1.0000  
15 lnt 
0.1660      
 
0.1691 
** 
 0.0985 
0.9496 
** 
0.3087 
** 
-0.0577 
0.1657 
**  
0.7246 
** 
0.0871 0.0851   -0.0678    
0.1447 
** 
0.0521 
0.4253 
** 
1.0000 
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Table 4 Checking Multicollinearity by VIF 
Model Main IVs VIF 
Model1 
(Mean VIF=13.38) 
Government ideology 21.63 
Citizen ideology 24.00 
Turnout 31.65 
Education 53.36 
Internet use 12.65 
Innovativeness 2.57 
Model2 
(Mean VIF=3.96) 
Neighboring  8.34 
Networks 1.4 
Model3 
(Mean VIF=12.92) 
Government ideology 22.03 
Citizen ideology 24.23 
Turnout 32.77 
Internet use 4.14 
Education 53.86 
Innovativeness 2.58 
Neighboring  9.41 
Networks 1.77 
Note: No values of VIF of the other variables included in the models are higher than 10. 
  
 According to Table 4, education and turnout variables, seriously, result in 
"excessive" multicollinearity in that their value of VIF is higher than 30 . Although 
dropping a relevant variable from the equation is a general remedy for reducing 
multicollinearity, this solution can be problematic. Eliminating Xj from the equation 
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means that the model being tested has changed, and that the theory being tested by the 
model has also shifted (O’Brien, 2007). Thus, this study attempts to treat education and 
turnout variables as dummy variables; coded 1 if the observed value of the variable is 
more than the mean , 0 otherwise. In addition, this study drops citizen ideology associated 
with multicollinearity from the analysis. As shown in Table 4-1, multicollinearity is 
remarkably reduced. Since no value of VIF is higher 10, this study does not concern the 
issue of multicollinearity any longer.  
 
Table 4-1 Re-checking Multicollinearity by VIF 
Model Main IVs VIF 
Model1 
(Mean VIF=4.94) 
Government ideology 2.30 
Turnout 1.93 
Education 5.90 
Internet use 3.19 
Innovativeness 8.59 
Model2 
(Mean VIF=4.11) 
Neighboring  8.20 
Networks 1.42 
Model3 
(Mean VIF=4.36) 
Government ideology 2.33 
Turnout 1.93 
Internet use 6.06 
Education 3.21 
Innovativeness 8.59 
Neighboring  8.13 
Networks 1.46 
 
Note: No values of VIF of the other IVs included in the models are higher than 10. 
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Data Analysis for the Implementation Phase 
 Since the dependent variable is continuous, measured online transparency scores 
of states over time, this study uses a common statistical method: multivariate regression 
analysis. In general, multivariate regression analysis is used to estimate "a model of 
multiple factors that best predicts the criterion." (Abu-Bader, 2006, pp.233-234) In non-
experimental studies, researchers often leave out certain variables, as they are difficult to 
measure. However, the omission of key predictors in regressions can cause severe bias in 
estimating the effects of the predictors (Allison, 2005). To relax such bias, a fixed or 
random effects model can be used.  
 To decide between fixed or random effects, researchers recommend to conduct a 
Hausman test that is based on a comparison of two different estimators of the model 
parameters. In a Hausman test, a null hypothesis is that the coefficients estimated by the 
efficient random effects estimator are the same as those estimated by the consistent fixed 
effects estimator (Greene, 2008). If p-value is insignificant (Prob>chi2 larger than .05), 
using a random effects model will be safe (Greene, 2008). According to the result of a 
Hausman test (Table 5), this study should employ a random effects model because p-
value is 0.58. 
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Table 5 Hausman Test Results 
Independent Variable 
Coefficient Differences 
(b-B) 
S.E. 
Fixed(b) Random(B) 
Government ideology -.39 -.026 -.37 .95 
Citizen ideology -1.00 .07 -1.07 1.57 
Turnout .02 -.05 .08 .12 
. 
. 
. 
 
Test: H0: difference in coefficients not systematic 
Chi2 (14) = 12.27, Prob>chi2 = 0.58 
  
 However, using simple random-effect estimators ignores the fact that there are 
useful predictors in a fixed-effects model. Also, a random-effects model has the problem 
of the remaining uncertainty associated with unmeasured factors. When a model is 
significant but does not explain all variation, using a mixed-effects model can be more 
appropriate than only adopting either a fixed-effects or random-effects model (Campbell 
collaboration, 2009). Mixed-effects model contains both fixed and random components. 
Mixed-effects models can be useful to examine differences of responses from different 
groups. (Gurka & Edwards, 2008; Cheng et al., 2010). This study concerns the 
differences in the extent of implementing EFOIA, based on five groups in which each 
state is grouped according to its online transparency score. Thus, this study uses a mixed 
effects model for the analysis. Additionally, this study includes "year dummy variables" 
to reduce possible bias in the standard errors from heteroskedasticity. 
 125 
 
 This study excludes Alaska and Hawaii because they differ on a number of 
important economic and political variables that make them less directly comparable than 
their counterparts (Doyle et al., 2010). The Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression 
models in this study have four time periods (T) from 2010 to 2013 and 48 panels (N), 
with each state as a panel. Since the number of time periods is relatively small compared 
to the number of panels (T < N), this study also uses the OLS regression model with 
panel corrected standard errors (PCSE). According to Beck and Katz (1995), the 
coverage probabilities of the OLS estimators with PCSE are closer to nominal levels than 
those of the General Least Squares (GLS) estimators with associated model-based GLS 
standard errors. Therefore, using PCSE can reduce serial correlation in calculating the 
standard errors of the regression coefficients (McNeal & Hale, 2010). 
 Table 6 presents summary statistics of independent variables in the analysis for 
the implementation phase of EFOIA. The average level of policy liberalism in state 
governments as well as state residents is 49% and 53 %, respectively. The percentage of 
state households with an Internet access as well as turnout is, on average, 77% and 52%, 
respectively. With regard to the state legislative professionalism, there is a great deal of 
variation in states, ranging from 3% to 68%. 
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Table 6 Summary Statistics of IVs (Obs=192) 
Independent Variable Mean SD Min Max 
Government ideology .49 .10 .28 .69 
Citizen ideology .53 .14 .26 .87 
Turnout .52 .08 .32 .76 
Internet use .77 .05 61 .87 
Education .28 .04 .18 .39 
Neighboring (time lag) .65 .24 0 1 
Network .31 .46 0 1 
ITcommittee .35 .48 0 1 
Professionalism .20 .12 .03 .68 
E-government 25.27 14.24 1 50 
Partisanship .44 .50 0 1 
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Table 7 Model Descriptions for the OLS Regression Analysis 
Model Main IVs Label 
The effect of Socialization 
(Model1) 
Government ideology 
Liberal ideological climate 
Citizen ideology 
Turnout 
Public pressure Internet use 
Education 
Innovativeness Innovative policy culture 
The effect of Learning 
(Model2) 
Neighboring  Regional interactions 
Networks National interactions 
The effect of Both 
(Model3) 
Government ideology 
Liberal ideological climate 
Citizen ideology 
Turnout 
Public pressure Internet use 
Education 
Innovativeness Innovative policy culture 
Neighboring  Regional interactions 
Networks National interactions 
 
 As presented in Table 7, this study deploys three models to investigate the 
explanatory power of two types of diffusion mechanism (i.e. socialization and learning) 
on a state's implementation of EFOIA. Model 1 is used to examine the influence of the 
factors associated with socialization on a state's extent of implementing EFOIA. Model 2 
only concerns the relationship between the factors related to learning and a state's extent 
of implementing EFOIA. Finally, Model 3 considers the effects of socialization and 
learning on a state's extent of implementing EFOIA together.  
  
 
1
2
8 
Table 8 Checking Multicollinearity by Correlation Analysis 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 Gideol. 1.0000             
2 Cideol. 
0.6560 
** 
1.0000            
3 Turnout 0.1310 
0.2518 
** 
1.0000           
4 Internet 0.0413 
0.2714 
** 
0.4655 
** 
1.0000          
5 Edu. 
0.2487 
** 
0.5260 
** 
0.2975 
** 
0.6735 
** 
1.0000         
6 Profess. 
0.2068 
** 
0.3319 
** 
0.0455 
0.1684 
** 
0.2860 
** 
1.0000        
7 FOIA 
strength 
0.1412 
0.2601 
** 
-0.1237 0.0419 
0.1983 
** 
0.1108 1.0000       
8 Network 0.1078 0.0228 -0.0917 0.0164 0.0199 -0.0595 0.0096 1.0000      
9 e-Gov't 0.0513 
0.2314 
** 
-0.0195 
0.2417 
** 
0.2729 
** 
0.2824 
** 
0.2045 
** 
0.0670 1.0000     
10 
Partisan-
ship 
0.3902 
** 
0.3344 
** 
0.0649 
0.1472 
** 
0.3166 
** 
0.1887 
** 
0.1526 
** 
0.0396 0.1155 1.0000    
11 Slack  0.0935 0.0584 -0.1277 
-0.2915 
** 
-0.0597 0.0336 
0.1712 
** 
0.0760 
0.2462 
** 
0.1100 1.0000   
12 IT. -0.1075 0.0529 0.0195 -0.0574 -0.0746 0.0199 -0.1179 -0.0059 -0.1398 -0.0165 
0.2272 
** 
1.0000  
13 
Neighbor 
-0.0114 -0.0549 
-0.2056 
** 
-0.2477 
** 
-0.1485 
** 
0.0974 0.1079 0.1095 -0.0235 -0.0549 0.0306 0.0405 1.0000 
 
Note: ** Significant at .05 level (2-tailed)
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 Table 8 shows the results of correlation analysis to detect Multicollinearity 
between independent variables included in the analysis. The results of the analysis 
indicates no problems of multicollinearity with the combination of the IVs. However, as 
described in Table 9, the VIF tests designate the existence of the "excessive" 
multicollinearity between the IVs. Almost all IVs are associated with multicollinearity 
because their value of VIF is higher than 10. 
 
Table 9 Checking Multicollinearity by VIF 
Model Main IVs VIF 
Model1 
(Mean VIF=26.42) 
Government ideology 21.32 
Citizen ideology 26.19 
Turnout 13.01 
Education 26.91 
Internet use 15.31 
Model2 
(Mean VIF=5.63) 
Neighboring (lagged) 8.78 
Networks 1.59 
Model3 
(Mean VIF=24.15) 
Government ideology 25.16 
Citizen ideology 21.82 
Turnout 15.75 
Internet use 13.97 
Education 28.22 
Neighboring (lagged) 9.84 
 Networks 1.63 
 
Note: No values of VIF of the other IVs included in the models are higher than 10. 
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 To address multicollinearity, this study treats education, internet, and turnout as 
dummy variables; coded 1 if the observed value of the variable is more than the mean, 0 
otherwise. In addition, this study drops citizen ideology closely related to 
multicollinearity from the analysis. As shown in Table 9-1, multicollinearity is 
remarkably reduced. Since no value of VIF is higher 10, this study does not pay attention 
to the issue of multicollinearity any longer.  
 
Table 9-1 Re-checking Multicollinearity by VIF 
Model Main IVs VIF 
Model1 
(Mean VIF=3.84) 
Government ideology 2.90 
Turnout 4.00 
Internet use 4.16 
Education 4.15 
Model2 
(Mean VIF=3.03) 
Neighboring (lagged) 5.17 
Networks 1.59 
Model3 
(Mean VIF=3.53) 
Government ideology 3.46 
Turnout 4.08 
Education 3.62 
Neighboring (lagged)  6.49 
Networks 1.61 
 
 Note: No values of VIF of the other IVs included in the models are higher than 10. 
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Findings 
 This section assesses the role of socialization and learning in the diffusion of 
EFOIA among the US states. This section first identifies the effects of the hypothesized 
correlates of these diffusion mechanisms on states' decisions in adopting EFOIA. Next, 
this section considers whether these mechanisms are associated with states' 
implementation of EFOIA.  
 The effects of socialization and learning on states' adoption. Table 10 shows 
the statistical results of the models with logistic regression. Model 1 investigates how 
well the variables associated with socialization explain states' adoption of EFOIA. Model 
1 is statistically significant (Wald Ch
2 
= 48.17, p < .000), accounting for approximately 
34% (Pseudo R
2 
= .34) of states' adoption of EFOIA. As the effect of socialization, 
government ideology (Coeff. = 1.23, p = .014) and education (Coeff. = 1.07, p = .048) are 
statistically significant and "positively" associated with adoption of EFOIA, while 
turnout, internet, and slack are not statistically significant. When controlling for the main 
effect of socialization, as the variables representing legal practices, Unclassified 
categorization (Coeff. = -4.30, p = .000) and The OPEN Act (Coeff.= -6.28, p = .000) are 
statistically significant, but "negatively" associated with adoption of EFOIA. 
 Model 2 examines the effect of learning on a state's adoption of EFOIA. Model 2 
is statistically significant (Wald Ch
2 
= 45.40, p < .000), accounting for approximately 30% 
(Pseudo R
2 
= .30) of states' adoption of EFOIA. In the effect of learning, neighboring is 
positively associated with adoption (Coeff.= 3.63, p = .001) whereas network is not 
statistically significant (p = .488). 
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Table 10 Predicting the Effects of Socialization and Learning on Adoption with Logistic Regression 
 
Note: ** Significant at .05 level (2-tailed) 
Covariates Socialization Learning Both 
Model 
1 2 3 
Coefficient (s.e.) P>|z| Coefficient (s.e.) P>|z| Coefficient (s.e.) P>|z| 
Government ideology 1.23** (.50) .014 - - 1.23** (.57) .032 
Turnout .42 (.40) .300 - - .47 (.42) .262 
Internet use .62 (.94) .507 - - .74 (.98) .448 
Education 1.07** (.54) .048 - - 1.30** (.58) .027 
Innovativeness 8.58** (3.85) .026 - - 7.40* (4.12) .072 
Inno*Slack -15.10** (7.18) .035 - - -12.00** (5.77) .038 
Network - - .30(.43) .488 .55 (.52) .298 
Neighboring - - 3.63*** (1.09) .001 3.67*** (1.36) .007 
Professionalism -1.20 (2.21) .587 -2.11 (1.57) .178 -1.45 (1.84) .432 
Unclassified -4.30*** (.90) .000 -3.69*** (.78) .000 -4.33***(.98) .000 
The OPEN -6.28*** (.98) .000 -5.42*** (.92) .000 -6.82***(1.10) .000 
Slack .70 (.64) .274 .05 (.01) .803 .07 (.75) .924 
Scandal -.70(.67) .295 -1.45* (.80) .071 -1.14 (.77) .141 
Partisanship 1.09** (.48) .023 .69 (.42) .093 .99** (.49) .043 
t(log) 2.54(.80) .002 1.75*** (.61) .004 1.78** (.87) .042 
Constant -4.56 (1.31) .001 -2.64 (.87) .002 -4.91 (1.38) .000 
Pseudo R
2
 .34  .30  .38  
Wald Ch
2
 48.17 .000 45.40 .000 52.98 .000 
N 368  368  368  
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 Similar to Model 1, the maximum likelihood (ML) estimates of the effect of 
Unclassified categorization (Coeff.= -3.69., p = .000) and The OPEN Act (Coeff.=-5.42., 
p = .000) are substantially negative, implying reductions in the log of the odds of 
adoption with a one unit of change in these variables (when the other variables in the 
model held constant). 
 Finally, Model 3 examines the total effects of socialization and learning on a 
state's adoption of EFOIA. Model 3 is statistically significant (Wald Ch
2 
= 52.98, p 
< .000), accounting for approximately 38% (Pseudo R
2 
= .38) of states' adoption of 
EFOIA. The ML estimates of the total effects of socialization and learning on adoption 
show that government ideology, education, innovativeness, and neighboring increase the 
log of the odds in adoption. However, Unclassified categorization and The OPEN Act 
decrease the odds in adoption (when the other variables in the model held constant).   
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Table 11 Predicting the Effects of Socialization and Learning on Adoption with Complementary Log-Log Regression  
 
Note: *Significant at .10 level, ** Significant at .05 level, *** Significant at .01 level(2-tailed)
Covariates Socialization Learning Both 
Model 
1 2 3 
Coefficient (s.e.) P>|z| Coefficient (s.e.) P>|z| Coefficient (s.e.) P>|z| 
Government ideology 1.01** (.40) .013 - - 1.07*** (.41) .010 
Turnout .40 (.35) .254 - - .46 (.35) .202 
Internet use .48 (.75) .523 - - .10 (.10) .323 
Education 1.11** (.48) .022 - - 1.31** (.51) .011 
Innovativeness 8.13*** (3.10) .009 - - 8.02** (3.15) .011 
Inno*Slack -15.04*** (4.46) .001 - - -12.52*** (4.26) .003 
Network - - .28 (.35) .426 .37 (.37) .329 
Neighboring - - 2.43*** (.85) .004 2.69*** (.90) .003 
Professionalism -.85 (1.47) .560 -1.68(1.40) .228 -.07 (2.25) .973 
Unclassified -3.48*** (.75) .000 -2.69*** (.55) .000 -3.33***(.77) .000 
The OPEN -5.10*** (.81) .000 -4.04*** (.60) .000 -5.45***(.89) .000 
Slack .76 (.49) .122 .11 (.39) .724 .18 (.56) .753 
Scandal -.57(.69) .412 -1.06 (.74) .146 -.98 (.78) .213 
Partisanship .81** (.35) .023 .69** (.34) .040 .75** (.35) .036 
t(log) 2.11***(.53) .000 1.51*** (.47) .002 1.34** (.58) .021 
Constant -4.40 (1.39) .001 -2.88 (.62) .000 -4.86 (.94) .000 
LR Ch
2
 89.66 .000 75.85 .000 99.05 .000 
N 368  368  368  
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 Table 11 shows the statistical results of the models with complementary log-log 
regression. The complementary log-log regression model is used to check for 
"robustness" of the results in the logistic regression model. The parameter estimates in 
Table 11 are generally consistent with the results in Table 10. All models are also 
statistically significant.  
 In Model 1, the effects of government ideology, education, and innovativeness on 
adoption is positive; if government ideology, education, and innovativeness are increased 
by one percent, one should expect the probability of adoption to increase by 1.01%, 
1.11%, and 8.13%, respectively. In particular, the effect of innovativeness on adoption is 
associated with 15.04 points increase in the states with the low levels of slack resource. 
However, the effects of unclassified categorization and The OPEN Act on adoption are 
negative; if an individual state experienced unclassified categorization or The OPEN Act, 
its likelihood of adopting EFOIA is decreased by 3.48% and 5.10%, respectively. 
 In Model 2, the parameter estimates of learning show that only neighboring is 
positively associated with adoption (Coeff.= 2.43, p = .004); the estimate of network is 
not statistically significant (p = .426). Similar to Model 1, the effects of unclassified 
categorization and The OPEN Act on adoption are negative.  
 Finally, the statistical results of Model 3 indicate that an increase in government 
ideology, education, innovativeness, and neighboring by one percent is associated with an 
increase in the probability of adoption by 1.07%, 1.31%, 8.02%, and 2.69%, respectively. 
However, the effects of unclassified categorization and The OPEN Act on adoption are 
negative.  
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 Taken as a whole, the results of the analysis suggest that socialization and 
learning have a positive impact on a state's decision on adopting EFOIA. Also, the 
probability of a state's adoption of EFOIA is increased over time. However, a state's 
decision on adopting EFOIA is also strongly influenced by the legal environment to 
which it belongs; since the categorization of unclassified information, states are less 
likely to adopt EFOIA, and such tendency continued through 2009. Contrary to 
expectation, since the enactment of the OPEN Government Act, states are less likely to 
adopt EFOIA. In addition, the state legislative professionalism, GDP, and partisanship 
are irrelevant to a state's adoption of EFOIA.  
 The effects of socialization and learning on states' implementation. Table 12 
presents the statistical results of the ML regression models with mixed effects. The 
mixed-effects model 
46
 is used when the data used in the analysis are grouped or nested 
in more than one category (e.g. states, countries, etc). In Table 12 the ML estimates 
represent the effects that vary by state groups (e.g. leading states, emerging states, 
lagging states, etc). The intra-class correlation (IC) is the correlation of the observations 
(cases) within a cluster. In statistics, the IC is a descriptive statistic that can be used when 
quantitative measurements are made on units that are organized into groups. It describes 
how strongly units in the same group resemble each other. If the IC approaches 0 then the 
grouping by states are of no use; one may as well run a simple regression. If the IC 
approaches 1 then there is no variance to explain at the individual level, implying that 
                                           
46
 Mixed-effects models estimate group level averages while regular regression models ignore 
the average variation between entities.  
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every observation (i.e. state) within a particular group is the same. In Table 12, every 
observation within each state group is the same because the value of the IC of all models 
approaches 1 (IC=.94).   
 Model 1 examines the relationship between the variables associated with 
socialization and a state's online transparency. Model 1 is statistically significant (Wald 
Ch
2 
= 27.75, p < .000). Except public pressure measured by education, none of the 
variables associated with socialization are statistically significant. However, the estimates 
of FOIAstrength, slack, and e-Gov are positively associated with online transparency.  
 Model 2 considers the effect of learning on a state's online transparency. Model 2 
is statistically significant (Wald Ch
2 
= 34.94, p < .000). The maximum likelihood (ML) 
estimates of the effect of learning show that neighboring (Coeff. = 6.92, p = .051) is 
positively associated with online transparency. Furthermore, the interaction term between 
slack and neighboring is also statistically significant, but the parameter estimate is 
negative (Coeff. = -11.59, p = .008); the effect of neighboring on online transparency is 
11.59 points more increased in the states with the low levels of slack resources. Similar to 
Model 1, the estimates of FOIAstrength, slack, professionalism, and e-Gov are positively 
associated with state online transparency.  
 Finally, Model 3 examines the total effects of socialization and learning on a 
state's online transparency. Model 3 is statistically significant (Wald Ch
2 
= 41.11, p 
< .000). The ML estimates of the total effects of socialization and learning on online 
transparency indicate that socialization is generally irrelevant to increasing online 
transparency score; the variables related to socialization (i.e. government ideology, 
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turnout, and Internet) are statistically insignificant. At the same time, learning is 
substantially associated with increasing online transparency scores. The interaction term 
between neighboring and slack is statistically significant at the .05 level (Coeff. = 9.82, p 
= .024), but its effect is negative; the effect of neighboring on online transparency is 
increased in the state with the low levels of slack resources. As shown in the other 
models, professionalism, slack, and e-Gov are positively associated with online 
transparency.  
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Table 12 Predicting the Effects of Socialization and Learning on Implementation with Mixed Effects 
 
Note: *Significant at .10 level, ** Significant at .05 level, *** Significant at .01 level (2-tailed)
Covariates Socialization Learning Both 
Model 
1 2 3 
Coefficient (s.e.) P>|z| Coefficient (s.e.) P>|z| Coefficient (s.e.) P>|z| 
Government ideology -1.28 (1.44) .445 - - -1.19 (1.17) .981 
Turnout 1.92 (1.37) .162 - - .06 (1.33) .213 
Internet -1.14 (1.34) .394 - - -.96 (1.39) .491 
Education 1.58 (1.39) .259 - - 2.73* (1.55) .079 
Innovativeness .05 (.10) .619 - - .02 (.09) .809 
Network - - .74 (1.18) .532 .91 (1.19) .442 
Neighboring(lagged) - - 6.92* (3.55) .051 4.94 (3.64) .175 
Slack*Neighboring(lagged) - - -11.59***(4.37) .008 -9.82**(4.35) .024 
Slack 3.35** (1.37) .015 5.45***(1.81) .003 6.43***(1.83) .000 
Professionalism 6.33(4.71) .179 10.34** (4.90) .035 10.99**(4.98) .027 
e-Gov .08** (.04) .05 .09**(.04) .037 .10** (.04) .021 
Partisanship .53 (1.18) .654 .04 (1.10) .973 1.69(1.34) .207 
FOIAstrength 2.16* (1.13) .055 2.35** (1.20) .050 1.72 (1.21)  .155 
IT committee -1.12 (1.16) .314 -.74 (1.15) .516 -1.21 (1.15) .292 
Year2011 5.11 (1.53) .001 (omitted) - (omitted) - 
Year2012 3.05 (1.86) .109 -.31 (1.31) .811 -.09(1.58) .951 
Year2013 5.85 (1.59) .000 1.63 (1.52) .282 2.03 (1.54) .187 
Constant 6.28 (1.23) .000 6.18 (1.42) .000 6.34 (1.30) .000 
Wald Ch
2
 27.75 .000 34.94 .000 41.11 .000 
Intra-class correlation .94  .94  .94  
N 192  192  192  
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 Table 13 presents the statistical results of the regression models with panels 
corrected standard errors (PCSEs). Following Beck and Katz (1995) and McNeal and 
Hale (2010), this study uses the PCSEs model in order to check for "robustness" of the 
results in the mixed-effects model; Beck and Katz (1995) argued that the OLS estimates 
with PCSEs should be used when the number of time periods (T) is relatively small 
compared to the number of panels (N). McNeal and Hale (2010) made a strong case for 
using PCSEs over random effects models for pooled data with four time periods and fifty 
panels.  
 The parameter estimates in Table 14 are generally consistent with the results in 
Table 13. All three models are also statistically significant. In Model 1, all parameter 
estimates of socialization are statistically insignificant, implying that socialization has no 
impact on the online transparency of a state. The effect of FOIAstrength on online 
transparency is positive (Coeff. = 2.18, p = .008); a 1% increase in FOIAstrength leads to 
2.18 points more increase in the online transparency score of a state. In addition, slack 
and e-Gov are positively associated with online transparency. However, the parameter 
estimates of group dummies are negative, implying that the online transparency scores 
are decreased in the other groups in comparison with a leading state group. When 
controlling for the other variables, partisanship, professionalism, and ITcommittee are not 
statistically significant.  
 In Model 2, the parameter estimates of the variables associated with learning 
show that learning has a positive impact on the online transparency score of a state; both 
neighboring (Coeff.= 6.87, p = .056) and neighboring*slack (Coeff.= -11.49, p = .001) are
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Table 13 Predicting the Effects of Socialization and Learning on Implementation with PCSE 
Note: *Significant at .10 level, ** Significant at .05 level, *** Significant at .01 level (2-tailed)   
Covariates Socialization Learning Both 
Model 
1 2 3 
Coefficient (s.e.) P>|z| Coefficient (s.e.) P>|z| Coefficient (s.e.) P>|z| 
Government ideology -1.26 (1.09) .276 - - -.17(.86) .176 
Turnout 1.94 (1.45) .287 - - .08 (.84) .917 
Internet  -1.11 (1.81) .537 - - -.92 (1.91) .629 
Education -1.57 (1.38) .254 - - 2.73*** (.79) .001 
Innovativeness .04 (.09) .634   .02 (.06) .702 
Network - - .75 (1.46) .606 .92 (1.04) .545 
Neighboring (lagged) - - 6.87* (3.60) .056 4.93 (1.33) .140 
Slack*Neighboring - - -11.49***(3.59) .001 -9.75***(3.17) .002 
Professionalism 6.30(6.61) .270 10.31* (5.98) .084 10.94*(6.42) .088 
e-Gov .08*** (.03) .008 .09***(.03) .007 .10***(.03) .001 
FOIAstrength 2.18*** (.81) .008 2.37*** (.50) .000 1.74*** (.60)  .004 
Partisanship .52 (.98) .566 .04 (.82) .958 1.69***(.58) .004 
IT committee -1.13 (.74) .287 -.76 (.77) .320 -1.22 (.91) .178 
Slack 3.31*** (1.05) .002 5.39*** (1.41) .000 6.36*** (1.36) .000 
Year2011 5.08 (.93) .000 (omitted) - (omitted) - 
Year2012 2.97 (1.97) .131 -.35 (.33) .280 -1.14 (.88) .866 
Year2013 5.78 (1.30) .000 1.59** (.69) .021 1.98 (.66) .003 
Group2(Advancing) -9.45*** (1.85) .000 -8.85*** (1.09) .000 -7.43*** (1.26) .000 
Group3 (Emerging) -20.40*** (1.55) .000 -20.82*** (1.20) .000 
-19.665*** 
(1.17) 
.000 
Group4(Lagging) -37.71*** (1.99) .000 -37.33*** (2.32) .000 -36.20*** (2.24) .000 
Group5(Failing) -77.59*** (3.36) .000 -71.10*** (3.00) .000 -69.71*** (3.10) .000 
Constant 8.93 (2.54) .000 8.95 (2.68) .000 9.01 (2.56) .000 
R
2
 92.58  92.88  93.77  
Wald Ch
2
 4552.49 .000 17288.43 .000 4028.06 .000 
N 192  192  192  
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associated with the state online transparency. In particular, the effect of neighboring is 
associated with 11.49 points increase in the online transparency score of the states with 
the low levels of slack resources. FOIA strength, slack and e-Gov are positively 
associated with online transparency. However, partisanship, and ITcommittee are not 
statistically significant.  
 Finally, Model 3 examines the total effects of socialization and learning on a 
state's online transparency. The ML estimates of the total effects of socialization and 
learning on online transparency indicate that socialization is generally irrelevant to 
increasing state online transparency; government ideology, turnout, and internet are 
statistically insignificant. As the other models show, the effect of learning on state online 
transparency is conditional on the level of a state's slack resource. Professionalism, FOIA 
strength, slack, and e-Gov are also positively associated with online transparency. In 
addition, the effect of learning on online transparency of a state is positive when the party 
of a state governor is the same as the presidency (Coeff. = 1.69, p = .004). There is a great 
deal of variation in the online transparency scores between state groups. For example, 
lagging states with a grade of D are associated with 36.20 points less increase in an 
online transparency score than leading states (Coeff. = -36.20, p < .000). 
 To summarize, the results of the analysis suggest that learning has a positive 
impact on the online transparency of a state while socialization, in general, has nothing to 
do with it. Especially, the conditional effect of the interactions between neighboring and 
slack is substantially important in online transparency of a state. The degree of the state 
online transparency is, in general, associated with slack, FOIA strength, and e-Gov. 
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However, partisanship and ITcommittee are generally irrelevant to increasing the online 
transparency of a state. Furthermore, there are a great deal of the differences between 
state groups in the extent of increasing their online transparency. 
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CHAPTER 6 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
  The purpose of this study is to examine what accounts for sustained innovation 
in government transparency. With the theoretical basis of policy diffusion, this study 
explores the factors that influence a state's adoption and implementation of EFOIA. The 
comparison of the determinants between a state's adoption and implementation of EFOIA 
provides the clues to explaining why some early adopters failed to maintain the leader 
position in online transparency through the implementation stage. From the empirical 
findings, this study found that the nature of diffusion mechanisms — socialization and 
learning — was conditional on the two stages of EFOIA. This chapter begins by 
summarizing the empirical findings of this study. Next, this chapter offers the policy 
implications of this study, and concludes with suggestions for future research. 
Summary of the Empirical Findings 
  Determinants of early adoption. Socialization and learning are considered to 
be key factors in a state's adoption of EFOIA. Socialization was conceptualized along 
with four dimensions indicating a state's internal normative climate (i.e. liberal 
ideological climate, public pressure, innovative policy culture, and legal environment); 
learning was represented by external interactions of an individual state with its neighbors 
and with professional networks such as NCSL and NGA.   
 Consistent with the literature on e-disclosure, ethics laws, and anti-corruption 
reforms, liberal ideological climate and public pressure affected states' decisions to adopt 
EFOIA. A state's long history of democratic government seems to have driven its early 
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adoption of EFOIA. As expected, innovative policy culture was an important indicator of 
adoption. However, the effect of innovative policy culture on adoption was unexpectedly 
increased in the state with low levels of slack resources. As one possible explanation, 
slack may diminish incentives to innovate and promotes undisciplined investment in 
projects or practices that rarely yield economic benefits (Leibenstein, 1969; Jensen, 1993). 
 Meanwhile, the legal practices of the federal government, such as the creation of 
unclassified categories, and the enactment of the OPEN Government Act, were found to 
be strong indicators of adoption. Contrary to expectation, the coefficient of the OPEN 
Government Act was negative, implying that states under the Act were less likely to 
adopt EFOIA. This result might conflict with the general philosophy of the Act that 
would support public access to information about inner workings of the government 
through enhanced procedures for information requests.  
 Yet, this result can be acceptable. In fact, the OPEN Government Act has not 
solved the significant systemic problems concerning the disclosure of government 
information because of "secrecy" in the name of national security and privacy (Halstuk, 
2008). The OPEN Government Act in itself is not about extending categories of public 
records that can be released, but about the procedural enhancement for public access to 
information such as a quick response of public agencies to a request. The Act still allows 
the agencies to keep the category of the sensitive and unclassified information in 
response to national security. Thus, if an individual state prefers secrecy to openness in 
the name of safety, the state will be less likely to adopt EFOIA. 
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 With regard to the effect of external interactions on adoption, as expected, 
neighboring effect was a strong and statistically significant predictor of adoption. As 
Berry and Berry (1999), and Mooney (2001) suggested, states might learn from 
neighboring states not only because these nearby states tended to be similar in terms of 
economic and social characteristics, but also because the adoption of a successful policy 
of neighboring states could reduce the political risk of adoption.  
 At the same time, professional network was irrelevant to increasing the 
likelihood that non-adopting states would adopt EFOIA. This may result from the 
unrealistic assumption of national interaction models that all states are essentially the 
same, and that all non-adopting states are equally responding to innovation. These 
assumptions can be problematic in that they overlook the fundamental variances in the 
endogenous and exogenous factors surrounding states. Given the industrial, demographic, 
and political differences across states, the assumptions associated with national 
interactions are somewhat difficult to be supported.  
 As the other determinants of adoption, state legislative professionalism and slack 
resource were not found to be significant factors in any of the three models whereas the 
parameter estimation of party alignment was statistically significant in all three models. 
In this respect, party alignment between the governor and the presidency seems to be 
more influential in a state's decision to establish the legal environment for online 
transparency than state legislative professionalism or slack resources.  
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 Determinants of successful implementation. Because of period effect of 
socialization, this study expects that the influence of socialization is unlikely to continue 
through the implementation phase; a state's internal normative climate may not influence 
its extent of implementation. Thus, learning is considered to be a key factor in a state's 
implementation of EFOIA. As expected, in general, the variables representing a state's 
internal normative climate were not found to be significant indicators of the extent of 
implementation; a liberal ideological climate, and innovative policy culture were not 
associated with the extent of implementation of EFOIA. This implies that policy makers 
tended to pay less attention to EFOIA once the legal environment associated with online 
transparency had been created. As suggested by the legal environment theory, normative 
pressure in response to EFOIA may not continue through implementation as it is short-
lived or time-specific.  
 While household access to the Internet and voter turnout were not statistically 
significant, the level of educational attainment as the proxy of public pressure was 
positively associated with the extent of implementation. This suggests that challenging 
the passive response of the agents to information requests may require active 
participation of citizens in increasing online transparency. Annual referenda and merely 
visiting a transparency website have limitations in urging the agencies to make a 
commitment to enhancing online transparency. Citizens should become informed and 
knowledgeable about online transparency insofar as they can analyze the released data 
and assess the government's operations appropriately. In this respect, a highly educated 
public may be essential to successful implementation of EFOIA. This finding may also 
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reflect that the enforcement of EFOIA is not salient among the general public but is 
primarily the purview of public agencies and interest groups seeking to increase 
government transparency (McNeal et al., 2007). 
 When it came to the effect of external interactions on implementation, 
professional networks such as NGA and NCSL were not associated with the extent of 
implementation. The influence of these organizations may be too diffuse across policy 
areas to identify a distinct influence on online access within the area of transparency 
reform (McNeal et al., 2006). As expected, the effect of successful neighbors depends on 
the influence of the degree of slack resources; the influence of neighboring states on the 
extent of implementation was increased in the states with the low levels of slack 
resources. 
 As another influence factors, slack resources was a powerful predictor of the 
scope of implementation. States with greater resources and the extensive implementation 
of e-government were more likely to have more comprehensive e-transparency programs. 
These finding were consistent with earlier research with respect to resources and the 
influence of e-government (McNeal et al., 2007; Tolbert et al., 2008) The strength of 
FOIA was also significant indicator of the extent of implementation. As the state FOIA 
offered stricter standards and broad criteria pertaining to the disclosure of information, 
states were more likely to create comprehensive and user-friendly transparency websites. 
  Consistent with the literature on administrative reform, legislative 
professionalism was a statistically significant factor in providing more extensive e-
transparency practices; states with more professional legislatures were more likely to be 
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leaders in operating more comprehensive, accessible, and user-friendly transparency 
websites. In addition, there was great variation in the scope of implementation among 
groups of states, especially between a leading and a lagging group. Finally, contrary to 
the research on e-government, partisanship and the operation of IT committees were not 
predictors of the extent of implementation of online transparency (McNeal et al., 2003; 
Tolbert et al., 2008). This finding may reflect that the enforcement of EFOIA is more 
sophisticated than e-government policies related to efficiency concerns because it is  
associated with public demands or government accountability. 
Implications 
 This study has identified the factors that influence sustained innovation in 
government transparency, employing the case of EFOIA. This type of innovation is 
unique in that it is irrelevant to economic competition over tax revenue between states or 
federal coercive actions. Based on the diffusion perspective, the study findings provide 
two insights into "intergovernmental relations" between the federal and state 
governments, and between state governments in adopting and implementing the 
innovation irrelevant to economic motivation or federal mandates.   
 First, the analysis presented here suggests that earliness of adoption may be 
influenced by the variance in the norm's acceptance by states; states resonating with the 
norm of transparency appeared to adopt EFOIA earlier than other states. In this respect, 
to encourage states to accept a federal practice, the federal government may need to 
concentrate on "persuasive efforts" that justify a new norm pertaining to the federal 
practice.  
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 According to the logic of appropriateness, persuasion can occur when states shift 
their minds along with confidence in the appropriateness of a norm, belief, or practice. 
Thus, the federal government should provide states with careful arguments and reasoned 
logic that prove its practice as legitimate and rightful, thereby facilitating the states' 
motivation for political legitimacy. 
 Second, the study finding indicates that spatial proximity is an important channel 
of influence of a federal practice on states. According to the regional effects model, states 
tend to learn from their bordering states because of the similarity in administrative style, 
socioeconomic conditions and/or political ideology. In this sense, states may need to 
develop the venue or the process through which they cooperate with their bordering states 
on the successful enforcement of a federal practice, thereby gaining political legitimacy.  
 Meanwhile, the most distinctive feature of the diffusion of EFOIA is that the 
operation of socialization and learning mechanism differ in two stages, resulting in 
differences in diffusion between adoption and implementation; socialization does matter 
only with regard to early adoption, while learning is a significant predictor of both 
adoption and the scope of implementation. In this respect, socialization — also called 
normative pressure — is characterized as "short-lived" or "temporalization."  
 The influence of socialization may fade over time because normative pressure is 
itself "the weak enforcement mechanism of law." (Edelman, 1990) Socialization creates 
only normative environment to which an individual state must adapt. A major motivation 
for organizational attention to normative environment is the quest for "political 
legitimacy." In the context of EFOIA, the enactment of federal EFOIA in 1996 provided 
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individual states with a normative environment in which the disclosure of information 
would be described as a symbol of good governance. In response to this federal action, 
states that pursue legitimacy initially construct and institutionalize forms of compliance 
with law.   
 In terms of the enforcement of law, the weakness of socialization is that it 
provides states with inadequate and inconsistent feedback on what this legal practice is as 
well as the meaning of "compliance." The ambiguous meaning of compliance, combined 
with the weak enforcement of law allow states to change values associated with the law 
in a way that accommodates their managerial interests, thereby mitigating the impact of 
law (Edelman, 1990). Furthermore, normative pressure from the legal environment does 
not easily erode long-held managerial interests (i.e. bureaucratic efficiency and economic 
power rather than compliance with their normative obligations) (Edelman, 1990).  
 Understanding the limitation of socialization as the weak enforcement 
mechanism of law provides several insights into sustained innovation related to 
normative pressure. 
 First, the provision of clear and adequate guidelines and consistent feedback may 
be important to ensure sub-jurisdictions' compliance with the value of innovation. Until 
the norm of transparency is appropriately settled, the upper-level government (i.e. federal 
government) may need to act as a teacher of norms.  
 Second, concerns about infrastructure and institutional capacity for maintaining 
innovation should be preceded by legislators in the adoption phase. According to the 
empirical findings of this study, slack resource and state legislative professionalism were 
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irrelevant to decisions to adopt EFOIA, but they were found to be powerful indicators of 
the extent of implementation. Thus, no legislative considerations on resources and/or 
responsible institutions for implementing innovation will make it difficult to sustain the 
innovation over time.   
 Third, NGOs can play an important role in facilitating and sustaining innovation 
in a field. For example, NGOs can publish articles and brochures in the attempt to 
convince the public of the need for enhancing government transparency. At the same time, 
they can take government bureaucrats to court in cases in which the public is refused to 
access information (Grigorescu, 2002). Considering that some governments often give 
financial aid to NGOs, they can use NGOs as active supporters of their practices.  
 Furthermore, increasing citizen participation in procedure may facilitate the 
enforcement of innovation. As seen in the philosophy of participatory governance, 
citizens should be able to participate in making the decisions that affect their own lives. 
In this respect, the agencies may need to increase the opportunity to listen to the public 
voice and discuss the issues of online access to government information with the public.  
  Finally, the political support for innovation should not be the only consideration 
in deciding whether or not the innovation should be continued. The shutdown of 
California's transparency portals shows that the governor's political decision clouded 
California's spending picture. In this respect, likewise the civil right movement, the 
government may need to consider ways to increase the societal support for innovation. 
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Future Research 
 This study focuses on identifying the factors that may influence a state's adoption 
and implementation of EFOIA, thereby explaining why some early leaders in adoption 
failed to sustain the leader position in innovation over time. Comparing the factors 
relevant to each stage of EFOIA, this study suggests that the failure of some early 
adopters in sustained innovation may be associated with the nature of socialization — 
that is, temporalization.  
 Although this study suggests several ways to avoid the weak enforcement of law,  
this study is just the fundamental step to address this issue. This study does not cover 
critical issues concerning sustained innovation. As one possible research, it is necessary 
to examine how states understand the meaning of compliance with online transparency, 
and whether there is variance in the perceptions of the meaning of compliance. In 
addition, it is necessary to examine the impact of legal practices on change in 
organizational calculus of bureaucratic efficiency.  
 Furthermore, future research can conduct a deep qualitative study to examine 
how cooperation for law enforcement between states takes place. Finally, to generalize 
the findings of this study, future research needs to test more cases of policy diffusion 
irrelevant to economic motivation and federal coercive actions at the same time, and 
check whether or not the similar results can be found. 
Concluding remark 
 This study attempts to explain the diffusion of EFOIA in the absence of 
motivations to realize economic performance, or mandates and incentives from higher 
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levels of government. According to the empirical results of this study, the quest for 
legitimacy or a desire for enhancing organizational prestige may attract governments in 
sustaining EFOIA over time. In this respect, this study provides the normative imitation 
framework explaining that governments emulate others due to the desire for enhancing 
legitimacy regardless of functional needs (Weyland, 2005). In this view, the desire to 
appear legitimate or modern and comply with new norms encourages governments to 
emulate others' innovations even in the absence of a sufficient assessment of their 
advantages and problems (Weyland, 2005). 
 This framework can be useful to explore the diffusion of innovation in 
"distributive policy areas." Distributive policy decisions tend to be easily triggered by 
symbolic or normative concerns because they make some constituents happy but do not 
make anybody unhappy except for the finance minister (Weyland, 2005). For example, 
homogenization among hospitals may result from the fact that hospitals operate 
according to a norm of social legitimation or a desire for increasing organizational 
prestige (Fennell, 1980). In a similar vein, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) explain the 
normative isomorphism among hospitals as follows:  
 
 Apparently, hospitals can increase their range of services not because there is an 
 actual needs for a particular service or facility within the patient population, but 
 because they will be defined as fit only if they can offer everything other 
 hospitals in the area offer (p. 154).  
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 However, the usefulness of this normative imitation framework is questionable in 
explaining the diffusion of innovation in "redistributive policy areas" such as pension 
reform. Since redistributive policy decisions tend to clearly define the categories of 
winners and losers, there will be the clash of interests. Thus, the quest for legitimacy does 
not seem to be the major driving force behind the diffusion of innovation in these policy 
areas although it may constrain the pursuit of interests and affect the outcome of power 
struggles (Kahneman et al., 1986; Weyland, 2005). 
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APPENDIX A. 
INSTRUMENTATION & SOURCES OF DATA 
  
  
 
1
7
6 
Variable Label Data Description & Measure Data Sources 
EFOIA adoption 
Dependent variable at 
the adoption stage: the 
adoption of EFOIA 
Data indicate the probability that a state will adopt the EFOIA in a 
specific year, given that the state has not already done so. A dummy 
variable; it is coded as 1 in the year a state enacted the EFOIA, and 0 
otherwise. States’ adoption years of EFOIA were derived from Open 
Government Guide. 
Open Government Guide 
(www.rcfp.org/open-
government-guide) 
EFOIA 
implementation 
Dependent variable at 
the implementation 
stage: the percentage e-
transparency score 
(ranging from 0 to100) 
Data indicate the percentage score of 
a state's transparency website that 
offers online services regarding 
government spending data in a given 
year. Since state governments have 
improved their transparency 
websites by increasing their online 
services over time, 2010score and 
2011score are weighted scores, 
based on 2012score as a standard. 
Data reflect the extent to 
which a state implements 
provide online access to 
government spending data in a 
given year through its 
transparency website, in 
compliance with EFOIA.  
 
The U.S. PIRG Education 
Fund researchers evaluated a 
state’s transparency website 
that provides information on 
government spending, in terms 
of data availability, usability, 
and accessibility. Data went 
through the review of state 
agencies administering 
transparency websites for 
accuracy.  
U.S. PIRG 
(www.uspirg.org/reports/) 
Liberal 
ideological 
climate (Norm 
resonance) 
Independent variable: 
government ideology 
index 
Government ideology refers to the mean position on a liberal-
conservative continuum of the elected officials in a state, weighted 
according to the power they have over public policy decisions. Higher 
values indicate greater policy liberalism. Developed by Berry et al 
(1998, 2010) 
Institute for Quantitative 
Social Science 
(stateminder.org/variables) 
  
 
1
7
7 
Liberal 
ideological 
climate (Norm 
resonance) 
Independent variable: 
state citizen ideology 
index  
Citizen ideology refers to the mean position on a liberal-conservative 
continuum of the active electorate in a state. Higher values indicate 
greater policy liberalism. Developed by Berry et al (1998, 2010) 
Institute for Quantitative 
Social Science 
(stateminder.org/variables) 
Public pressure 
(Demand) 
(Norm 
resonance) 
Independent variable: 
voter turnout 
Data indicate voting rates for gubernatorial elections in each state. 
Voter turnout represents the ability of citizens engaging directly in 
democratic processes to protect their civil rights and challenge the 
government’s operations (Gamble, 1997; McNeal and Hale, 2010). 
The Book of States 
(published by The Council 
of State Governments) 
(knowledgecenter.csg.org) 
Independent variable: 
the public’s Internet use 
Data indicate the percent of state households with Internet access. 
National 
Telecommunications and 
Information 
Administration 
(www.ntia.doc.gov) 
Independent variable: 
educational attainment 
by state 
Data indicate the percent of state residents over age 25 with a 
bachelor’s degree or more in a given year. 
U.S. Census Bureau 
(www.census.gov) 
Innovative policy 
culture 
(Norm 
resonance) 
Independent variable: 
state policy 
innovativeness index  
Data indicate the propensity of a state for policy innovativeness; a 
state’s willingness to adopt new policies sooner or later relative to 
other states. This score varies from zero to one, with larger values 
indicating a quicker policy adoption rate and a higher innovation 
score. Innovativeness at a given point in time, t, for state i is measured 
by 
Rij =
   ikt
Kit
i 1
T
t T0
 Kit
T
t T0
 
Kit represents the number of policies that state i could potentially 
adopt in year t. Yikt, takes on the value zero in years of non-adoption, 
one in the year of adoption, and is treated as missing in subsequent 
years. Developed by Boehmke & Paul Skinner (2012) 
Institute for Quantitative 
Social Science 
(stateminder.org/variables) 
  
 
1
7
8 
Legal practice 
(Legal 
environment) 
Independent variable: 
legal action of the 
federal government 
regarding transparency  
(Applied only to the 
analysis for the 
adoption of EFOIA) 
Data indicate a legal action of the federal government concerning 
transparency, which may create the legal environment influencing a 
state's policy decision on transparency. This normative pressure can 
mediate the effect of EFOIA of 1996 on states. Dummy: coded 1 if a 
state adopted EFOIA after a federal legal action had occurred, 0 
otherwise.  
 
1996: the enactment of 
federal EFOIA 
2002: the creation of a 
category of unclassified 
information 
2007: the enactment of the 
OPEN Government Act  
Neighboring 
effect 
(Policy learning) 
Independent variable: 
the proportion of 
adjacent neighbors or 
other states within a 
similar geographic 
region that have already 
adopted (adoption 
phase), or successfully 
implemented EFOIA 
(i.e. leading and 
advancing states) 
(implementation phase) 
Data indicate the proportion of neighboring states and states within 
the applicable BEA region (without double-counting) that have 
previously adopted (adoption phase), or that have a grade of A or B 
(>=80) (i.e. leading and advancing state groups) in online 
transparency in a given year (implementation phase). The numerator is 
the total number of neighboring states and states within the applicable 
BEA region (without double-counting) that have previously adopted 
(adoption phase), or that have a grade of A or B (>=80) (i.e. leading 
and advancing state groups) in online transparency in a given year 
(implementation phase). The denominator is the total number of 
neighboring states and states within the applicable BEA region 
(without double-counting). This variable captures the implications of 
both the neighbor model and fixed-region model of regional diffusion 
theory. 
Hageman & Robb (2011)’s 
scale 
Professional 
network 
(Policy learning) 
Independent variable: 
state leadership 
positions in NGA or 
NCSL  
Data indicate a state’s representation in the leadership of the NGA or 
NCSL in a given year. A dummy variable; it is coded as 1 if a state had 
a leadership position in a given year, 0 for otherwise. Leadership in 
professional networks is defined as state membership on the NCSL’s 
Executive Committee including ex-officio members, and the NGA 
Executive Committee including standing committees. Borrowing the 
scale of McNeal et al (2003, 2007)  
National Governors 
Association 
(www.nga.org) 
National Conference of 
State Legislators 
(www.ncsl.org) 
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9 
Slack resources 
Control variable: GDP 
by state  
Data indicate the state counterpart of the Nation's gross domestic 
product (GDP). GDP by state is derived as the sum of the GDP 
originating in all the industries in a state (Millions of current dollars). 
Bureau of Economic 
Analysis 
(bea.gov) 
Control variable: per 
capita personal income 
Data indicate the income that is received by persons from all sources. 
Total personal income divided by total midyear population. 
U.S. Department of 
Commerce, Bureau of 
Economic Analysis 
(http://www.bea.gov/) 
Partisanship 
Control variable: party 
alignment between the 
presidency and the state 
governor  
Data indicate the party alignment between the presidency and the 
governor of a state government. Dummy: coded as 1 if the governor's 
party is the same as the president's party, 0 otherwise. 
Indiana State University - 
Klarner Politics 
(http://www.indstate.edu/p
olisci/klarnerpolitics.htm) 
State legislative 
professionalism 
Control variable: 
legislative 
professionalism index 
Data indicate the percent of professionalism that a state’s legislature 
had compared to Congress in a given year, which indicates overall 
professionalism of state government. This index serves as a measure 
of state institutional capacity and a proxy for overall 
professionalization of state government. Developed by Squire (2007) 
who used indicators of pay, staff resources, and session length of state 
legislatures.  
Squire’ scale (2007) 
IT management 
Control variable: IT 
office & IT committee 
 
(Applied only to the 
analysis for the 
implementation of 
EFOIA) 
Data serve as a measure of state infrastructure and leadership capacity. 
IT office presents whether a state has a separate IT office as a 
department unto itself (1 = yes, 0 = no). IT committee presents 
whether there are IT committees in the state legislature (Coded as 1 if 
either the state House or Senate has an IT committee, 0 if neither has 
an IT committee). 
The Book of States 
(published by The Council 
of State Governments) 
(knowledgecenter.csg.org) 
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0 
e-government 
implementation 
Control variable: e-
government index 
 
(Applied only to the 
analysis for the 
implementation of 
EFOIA) 
Data indicate an index of state e-government use (or overall 
performance) during the period 2001-2008. This measure is an annual 
index based on a composite score using the following criteria: online 
publications, online databases, audio clips, video clips, foreign 
language or language translation, advertisements, premium fees, user 
payments or fees, disability access, privacy policy, security policy, 
online services, digital signatures, and so on.  
Developed by Darrell West and reported in a series of studies, State 
and Federal E-Government in the United States. 
Darrell West's scale  
(2001-2008) 
FOIA strength 
Control variable: state’s 
FOIA score  
 
(Applied only to the 
analysis for the 
implementation of 
EFOIA) 
Cordis and Warren determined the FOIA score of each state by giving 
one point for each of the criteria such as the presumption for 
disclosure and exemptions, fee provisions, agencies’ response times to 
a request, administrative appeal provisions, and penalties imposed for 
violation of the statutes. State FOIA scores are positively correlated 
with the scores provided by several surveys that were conducted by 
the Better Government Association (BGA) and the Investigative 
Reporters and Editors Inc. (2002), and the BGA and the National 
Freedom of Information Coalition (2007). 
Cordis & Warren’s (2012) 
scale 
Scandals 
Control variable: state 
conviction rate per 
capita 
 
(Applied only to the 
analysis for the 
adoption of EFOIA) 
Data indicate a state conviction rate per capita, implying the extent of 
corruption at the state level (for 100,000 people in the state 
population). This corruption data was derived from the Justice 
Department’s “Report to Congress on the Activities and Operations of 
the Public Integrity Section.” This publication lists the number of 
federal, state and local public officials convicted of a corruption-
related crime by state. As Glaeser and Saks (2006) did, I collected 
information on the number of convictions by state annually from the 
Justice Department’s report, and then divided these convictions by 
state population to form an estimate of the state conviction rate per 
capita. 
Glaeser & Saks’ s scale 
(2006) 
Department of Justice 
(www.justice.gov) 
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Weighted E-transparency Score 
 
 
Note: Since the 2013 criteria are the same as those of 2012, the 2013 scores are not adjusted. 
checkbook
(detailed expenditure
information)
contract &
summary
information
historical
expenditure
grants &
economic
incentives
feedback
(data request)
tax expenditure
reports
search
 by vendor
(contractor)
search by
keyword
(activity)
search by
agency
(department)
downloa
dable
off-budget
agencies
city and
county
budget
ARRA
funding
2010 o o o o x o o o x x o o o
2011 o o o o o o o o x o o o o
2012 o o o o o o o o o o o o o
2010score 40 (*30/40) 10 5 10 . (zero) 10 10(*8/10) 10(*8/10) .(zero) .(zero) 2 1(*2) 2 87(=100-2-8-3)
2011score 35(*30/35) 10 5 10 2 10 10(*8/10) 10(*8/10) .(zero) 2(*3/2) 2 2 2 92(=100-8)
2012score 30 10 5 10 2 10 8 8 8 3 2 2 2 100
E-transparency Score
2010 → 2011
2011→ 2012
Weighted
total score
(maximum)
Improvement of
a transparency website
Data availability (comprehensiveness) Usability (easy to use) Accessbility (link to other websites)
Year
feedback & downloadable
search by agency (department)
Added criteria
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STATE TRANSPARENCY WEBSITE URL 
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3 
State Transparency Website URL State Transparency Website URL 
Alabama open.alabama.gov Montana transparency.mt.gov 
Alaska checkbook.alaska.gov Nebraska nebraskaspending.gov 
Arizona openbooks.az.gov Nevada open.nv.gov 
Arkansas transparency.arkansas.gov New Hampshire www.nh.gov/transparentnh 
California www.dgs.ca.gov New Jersey yourmoney.nj.gov 
Colorado tops.state.co.us New Mexico www.sunshineportalnm.com 
Connecticut www.osc.ct.gov/openct New York www.openbooknewyork.com 
Delaware transparency.delaware.gov North Carolina www.ncopenbook.gov 
Florida www.myfloridacfo.com/transparency North Dakota data.share.nd.gov/pr 
Georgia open.georgia.gov Ohio transparency.ohio.gov 
Hawaii hawaii.gov/spo2 Oklahoma data.ok.gov 
Idaho transparent.idaho.gov Oregon www.oregon.gov/transparency 
Illinois accountability.illinois.gov Pennsylvania www.pennwatch.pa.gov 
Indiana www.in.gov/itp Rhode Island www.transparency.ri.gov 
Iowa data.iowa.gov South Carolina www.cg.sc.gov/fiscaltransparency 
Kansas kanview.ks.gov South Dakota open.sd.gov 
Kentucky opendoor.ky.gov Tennessee www.tn.gov/opengov 
Louisiana wwwprd.doa.louisiana.gov/latrac Texas www.texastransparency.org 
Maine www.opencheckbook.maine.gov Utah www.utah.gov/transparency 
Maryland spending.dbm.maryland.gov Vermont spotlight.vermont.gov 
Massachusetts www.mass.gov/transparency Virginia datapoint.apa.virginia.gov 
Michigan www.michigan.gov/openmichigan Washington fiscal.wa.gov 
Minnesota www.mmb.state.mn.us/tap West Virginia www.transparencywv.org 
Mississippi www.transparency.mississippi.gov Wisconsin sunshine.wi.gov 
Missouri mapyourtaxes.mo.gov/map Wyoming wyoming.gov/transparency.html 
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APPENDIX C 
ADOPTION YEAR & ONLINE TRANSPARENCY SCORE 
  
  
 
1
8
5 
 
State’s adoption of EFOIA State’s implementation of EFOIA 
Rank State (Adoption year) Rank State (Adoption year) Rank State (Avg. score) Rank State (Avg. score) 
1 West Virginia (1992) 26 Hawaii (2004) 1 Kentucky (95) 26 New Mexico (68) 
2 Indiana (1993) 27 Missouri (2004) 2 Texas (93) 27 Massachusetts (68) 
3 Kentucky (1994) 28 Alaska (2005)   3 Illinois (82) 28 Hawaii (66) 
4 Texas (1995) 29 Oklahoma (2005) 4 Pennsylvania (82) 29 Indiana (65) 
5 Colorado (1996) 30 Florida (2005) 5 Louisiana (81) 30 South Carolina (65) 
6 Maryland (1996) 31 Montana (2005)   6 Utah (79) 31 New Jersey(63) 
7 Mississippi (1996) 32 Ohio (2005) 7 Oregon (79) 32 Michigan (61) 
8 Nebraska (1996) 33 Utah (2005) 8 Virginia (79) 33 South Dakota (60) 
9 North Carolina (1996) 34 Idaho (2007) 9 New York (78) 34 Rhode Island (60) 
10 Vermont (1996) 35 Oregon (2007) 10 Missouri (78) 35 Tennessee (56) 
11 Alabama (1997) 36 New Hampshire (2008) 11 Minnesota (76) 36 Alaska (53) 
12 Delaware (1997) 37 New York (2008) 12 North Carolina (76) 37 Washington (53) 
13 Connecticut (1998) 38 North Dakota (2008) 13 Oklahoma (76) 38 California (50) 
14 Rhode Island (1998) 39 Pennsylvania (2008) 14 Nebraska (75) 39 Wyoming (50) 
15 Georgia (1999) 40 Tennessee (2008) 15 Alabama (74) 40 Connecticut (50) 
16 Illinois (2000) 41 Arizona (2009) 16 Mississippi (74) 41 West Virginia (48) 
17 Nevada (2000) 42 Iowa (2009) 17 Maryland (71) 42 Vermont (46) 
18 South Carolina (2000) 43 Kansas (2009) 18 Nevada (71) 43 Wisconsin (40) 
19 Wisconsin (2000) 44 Louisiana (2009) 19 Kansas (71) 44 Iowa (34) 
20 Arkansas (2001) 45 Massachusetts (2009)    20 Georgia (71) 45 New Hampshire (34) 
21 California (2001) 46 New Mexico (2009)     21 Ohio (71) 46 Maine (31) 
22 Michigan (2001) 47 South Dakota (2009)    22 Arizona (70) 47 Arkansas (26) 
23 New Jersey (2002) 48 Washington (2009)    23 Delaware (70) 48 North Dakota (26) 
24 Minnesota (2002) 49 Wyoming (2009)    24 Colorado (69) 49 Idaho (21) 
25 Virginia (2003) 50 Maine (2011)    25 Florida (69) 50 Montana (20) 
